Catino v. Board of Ed. of Town of Hamden

• Decision Date: 14 March 1978
• Citation: 174 Conn. 414,389 A.2d 754
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Paul CATINO v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF HAMDEN.

Page 754

389 A.2d 754

174 Conn. 414

Paul CATINO v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF HAMDEN.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 7, 1977.

Decided March 14, 1978.

Barry C. Pinkus, Asst. Town Atty., New Haven, with whom was Richard G. Kent, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Robert F. McWeeney, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C. J., and LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, LONGO and SPEZIALE, JJ. LONGO, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas under General Statutes § 10-151(f) from the termination of his employment contract as a tenured physical education teacher by the defendant, the board of education of the town of Hamden. The board is appealing to this court from a judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal and ordering his reinstatement with back pay from the date of termination. The court decided the case on the record and did not make a finding.

The record reveals that in April, 1976, the board notified the plaintiff that termination of his contract was being considered on the basis of four specific charges. The plaintiff requested a hearing before an impartial hearing panel in accordance with General Statutes § 10-151(b), ¹ and after six days of hearings the panel issued a unanimous decision on June 30. In its decision the panel reviewed the evidence as to each charge and found that "the Board of Education has not met its burden of proof with respect to any of the four (4) charges." The panel recommended that "the termination of the contract of Paul Catino be rescinded in favor of other alternatives," such as transfer. After receiving the panel's decision, the board nevertheless voted on July 13 to terminate the plaintiff's contract. The board's notice to the plaintiff stated that the grounds for dismissal were the four charges considered by the panel, and general information contained in the plaintiff's personnel file.

The board urges that it was not bound by the panel's decision, and that consequently the court erred in concluding that the board's action was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. We look first to the statute. Section 10-151(b) directs the panel to hold a hearing and submit "findings and a recommendation" to the board concerning disposition of the charges. "Recommend" is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "advise." Nothing in the statute's language or legislative history ² suggests that the panel's recommendation was intended to be more than advisory. It is clear from a reading of the statute that a school board has discretion to accept or reject a recommendation from an impartial hearing panel.

That discretion is not unlimited, however. When a school board considers terminating a teacher's contract it is an administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Miller v. Board of Education, 166 Conn. 189, 191, 348 A.2d 584; Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 492, 123 A.2d 747. It has a duty under § 10-151(b) to afford a tenured teacher a fair hearing and to terminate the employment contract only for one or more of six reasons, which must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Prior to 1975 the responsibility for hearing evidence and finding facts belonged exclusively to school boards. 1975 Public Acts, No. 75-615, amended § 10-151(b) by delegating the fact-finding function, at the option of the teacher or the board, to an impartial hearing panel consisting of one member appointed by the board, one by the teacher, and a third member chosen by those two appointees.

In this case, the panel held a lengthy hearing and all three panel members found the factual issues in favor of the plaintiff. After reviewing the record the trial court concluded, and the board does not dispute, that the panel's findings were not necessarily contrary to the evidence; that the panel properly applied a civil burden of proof; and that there was no showing that the panel acted illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously. Under these circumstances the board had no legal basis for deciding that the four charges established cause for terminating the plaintiff's contract. Were the board free to disregard the panel's findings, it would make a mockery of the plaintiff's statutory right to be dismissed only for cause after a fair hearing by an impartial hearing panel. We must presume that the legislature did not intend to enact useless legislation, and that no part of the statute is superfluous. J & M Realty Co. v. Norwalk, 156 Conn. 185, 192, 239 A.2d 534; State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 211, 91 A.2d 773.

Furthermore, the board's reference to information contained in the plaintiff's personnel file was not a valid ground for terminating his contract. The plaintiff had neither notice nor an opportunity to defend against any charges derived from information in his personnel file. See Murphy v. Berlin Board of Education, 167 Conn. 368, 374-75, 355 A.2d 265.

The board contends that since the...