Catlin v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 01 January 1864
• Parties: RACHEL CATLIN vs. LOREN FLETCHER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 75

9 Minn. 75

RACHEL CATLIN vs. LOREN FLETCHER.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from order of the district court, Nicollet County.

Points and authorities for plaintiff in error: —

1. The district court erred in sustaining the demurrer on the third cause assigned. The complaint does state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and entitles the plaintiff to the relief demanded. 1 Story Eq. Jur. §§ 186-88, 192, 221; 6 Ind. (Porter) 183; 5 Blackf. 509; 8 Car. & P. 124.

Points and authorities for defendant in error: —

1. Parties seeking relief are not entitled to enjoy the benefit of a contract which they repudiate. Hill on Trustees, 149, notes h and 1, and cases there cited; 3 Wend. 236; 8 Met. 550; 4 Mass. 520; 23 Pick. 283; 5 Cush. 126; 1 Denio, 69; 5 Barb. 319.

2. The acts of the defendant, as alleged in the bill, do not constitute a cause of action. The fraud in this case, if any, comes under the first class (as classified by Lord Hardwick, in Chesterfield v. Jansen, 2 Ves. 155), "fraud arising from facts and circumstances of imposition," whether by suggestio falsi or suppressio veri. In this action there is no suppression of fact complained of, but the complaint is of "false promises and representations." To constitute fraud under this head "the false statements must be of such facts as are material and do not lie within the knowledge of the other party, and must have the effect of deceiving him in the transaction." Hill on Trustees, 147, note 1 and cases there cited; id. 148; the leading case under this head is Small v. Atwood, 6 Clark & Finnelly, 232, 531 — for an abstract of the case see Rawle Cov. Title, 612 to 617; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 275, and notes; 2 Phil. Ev. 350; 2 Stark. Ev. 544, 548; 12 Wend. 573; 2 Minn. [277]; 5 Minn. [418]; 1 Barb. 471; 6 Met. 319.

3. If this parol promise had been binding upon the defendant at the time it was made he is now released from it by operation of law. There is no rule better established than that a contract will not become illegal by reason of the performance thereof being excused or prohibited by statute. Laws of 1860, p. 216; Chit. Cont. 604-5, 635, and note 2; 6 Mee. & W. 269, 277, (1 Smith Lead. Cas. 169, b) 4 N. Y. 412; 5 Cow. 538; 3 Porter, 231; 7 Mass. 325; 13 Mass. 94.

4. But a false representation of one's purposes does not make fraudulent the act or deed in connection with which the representations were made. Story Eq. Jur. § 199; 12 East. 637-8; 5 John. 354; Sug. Vendors, (7th ed.) 6.

5. The representations of the defendant, whether true or false, go only to the legal effect of the conveyance, and such representations will not avoid the deed. Chit. Cont. 591-2; 2 Parsons Cont. 274-5; 4 Barn. & Cress. 506, 512; S. C. 6 Dow. & R. 567; 5 Hill, 303; 2 Atk. 202.

6. Mistake of a party as to the law of the case will not defeat the deed, conveyance, or agreement. 6 Clark & Finnelly, 911, 916 to 971; 1 Pet. 1, 15; 12 Pet. 56; 1 Johns. Ch. 512, 515.

7. When title is to be affected or conveyances annulled a strong case must be made out — much stronger than the defense need be to defeat a bill for specific performance. 16 Ves. 83; 18 Ves. 10; 10 Ves. 292; Hill on Trustees, 147, (marg. notation).

A. G. Chatfield, for plaintiff in error.

Austin & Warner, for defendant in error.

ATWATER, J.

The plaintiff brought her action to set aside a mortgage executed by her husband and herself (upon the homestead of the mortgagors), upon the ground that she was induced to execute the same from the false and fraudulent representations of the defendant. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff sued out a writ of error.

The demurrer was properly sustained upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The plaintiff alleges, that the defendant told her that if she would sign the mortgage he would never do anything with it, that he would collect the money out of Swift (the indorser of the note), and that when the money was collected out of Swift the debt would be paid, and the mortgage would be cleared off, and the plaintiff could have the place for her homestead; that relying upon the said promises of the defendant, that he would collect the debt from Swift and never resort to the mortgage, and upon his representations that Swift could not touch the house and lot for the said debt, plaintiff finally reluctantly consented to execute the mortgage; and that if she had not been induced by the defendant to believe and rely upon his said promises and representations, she would not have consented to execute the mortgage. And upon her belief charges that the defendant made said promises and representations knowing the same to be untrue, and with the intent and for the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff and defrauding her into the execution and acknowledgment of the mortgage. This is the substance of the fraud charged. Here are two false promises or misrepresentations charged: First, that the defendant would not enforce the mortgage. Second, that Swift, the indorser, could not. Suppose the plaintiff had alleged directly that she executed the conveyance upon the agreement and condition on the part of the defendant that he would re-convey the premises to her, would that constitute a good or sufficient ground for setting aside the mortgage? Clearly not. Such promise would be within the statute of frauds, and this court has repeatedly held that parol proof of such cotemporaneous agreement cannot be received. Wentworth v. Wentworth, 2 Minn. [277]; Russell v. Schurmeier, 9 Minn. [28]; Evans v. Folsom, 5 Minn. [422]. And in the latter case it was held, that "fraud cannot be predicated of a promise not performed, for the purpose of avoiding a written instrument or bargain of any kind. A false promise to convey land does not taint the proceeding with such fraud as a court of equity will relieve against." The principle is equally applicable to the agreement to surrender a mortgage or not to use the same.

The complaint contains no statement of facts tending to show that the statement of the defendant, in regard to his not making use of the mortgage, was false at the time it was made, but rests solely in the belief of the plaintiff. No inference can in this case be drawn to that effect, from the fact that the defendant commenced to foreclose his mortgage; as a law has been...