Catron v. Lafayette County
| Decision Date | 26 November 1894 |
| Parties | Catron, Appellant, v. Lafayette County |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. James Gibson, Judge.
Reversed.
Wash Adams for appellant.
(1) Having a judgment against Lafayette county, plaintiff had the right to execution thereon. R. S. 1889, sec. 4895. Sections 4904, 4905, Revised Statutes, 1889, provide that certain property belonging to a county shall be exempt from execution. What sense would there be in such a statute provision if no execution at all could be issued against a county? Whatever the law may be elsewhere, in this state the right to execution in one having a judgment against a county is a statutory right. Judgments at common law bore interest but that interest was not collectible by execution on the judgment; it could only be collected by action of debt. Freeman on Judgments [4 Ed.], sec. 441; Watson v Fuller, 6 Johns. 283. Our statute has remedied the defect of the common law. (2) The judgment bears compound interest because the bonds upon which it was rendered bore compound interest. Gen. Stat. 1865, sec. 3, p. 401; R. S 1879, sec. 2725. No question was made that the bonds in suit bore compound interest; indeed the record in the case reported in 106 Mo. 659, which the bill of exceptions makes part hereof, shows that compound interest was computed and paid on the bonds by the defendant for eight years. This construction that the bonds bore compound interest was placed on the bonds by the parties themselves and they are bound by it. Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; Topliff v. Topliff, 122 U.S. 121. It was held by this court that they bore compound interest. Catron v. Lafayette Co., 106 Mo. 670. (3) It was not necessary to specify compound interest in the judgment itself. Evans v. Fisher, 26 Mo.App. 543; State v. Vogel, 14 Mo.App. 189; Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 283. The rule in this state (whatever it may be elsewhere) is well settled that a contract drawing a specified rate of interest before maturity bears the same rate after maturity until paid. Borders v. Barber, 81 Mo. 636; Briscoe v. Kinealy, 8 Mo.App. 84.
William Aull for respondent.
(1) The "poorhouse and farm" of Lafayette county was not subject to levy under execution. The proper remedy was mandamus. High. Ext. Leg. Rem. [2 Ed.], secs. 93, 238, and notes; Gooch v. Gregory, 65 N.C. 142; Lutterloh v. Co., 65 N.C. 403; Covington Co. v. Dunklin, 52 Ala. 277; Commissioners v. Moore, 53 Ala. 25; Lyle v. St. Clair Co., 3 McLean (C. C.), 580; People v. Supervisors, 28 Cal. 431; Randolph v. Ralls, 18 Ill. 29; King v. McDrew, 31 Ill. 418; Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 586; Schaffer v. Cadwallader, 36 Pa. St. 126; 4 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 372, and notes; Louisiana v. U.S. 103 U.S. 289; Ralls Co. v. U.S. 105 U.S. 733; Warren v. Mayor, 23 Iowa 351; Alton v. Trust Co., 12 Ill. 38; Sharp v. County, 34 Cal. 284; Emerick v. Gilman, 10 Cal. 404; Ranson v. Boal, 29 Iowa 68; Const. Mo., art. 10, sec. 6; R. S. 1889, sec. 4904. (2) A judgment rendered upon a compound interest contract does not bear compound interest. At common law interest was not allowed in any case. The term was synonymous with usury and was a punishable offense. Abbott's Law Dict.; 2 Blk. Comm., 454; Viner's Abridgment, title "Interest," (c) sec. 7; Chitty on Contracts, sec. 385; Pekin v. Reynolds, 31 Ill. 529; Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 42; 11 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 379. Compound interest was not allowed by statute in Missouri when the contract in controversy was made. R. S. Mo. 1865, p. 401, sec. 2; R. S. Mo. 1865, p. 401, secs. 3, 6. The statute regulating interest is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 19; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380; Sedgwick on Constr. Stat. Law, 274. Section 3 provides that judgments shall bear the same interest as the contract, but does not provide that the method of computation (interest upon interest) shall also be included in the judgment. Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 19; Evans v. Fisher, 26 Mo.App. 543; Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 283; Black on Judgments, sec. 981; In Re Fuller, 1 Sawyer, 243; Pinkney v. Laughlin, 2 Hill (S. C.), 343; Wheaton v. Pike, 9 R. I. 132; 11 Am. Rep. 227.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Lafayette county quashing a writ of execution issued on a judgment in favor of the appellant against the respondent, rendered in said court on the twenty-ninth day of October, 1887, for the sum of $ 8,811.36, on which the respondent on the twenty-first day of November, paid the sum of $ 12,392.19, being the amount of the face of the judgment with ten per cent. simple interest thereon from the date thereof. The rate of interest which the judgment should bear was not stated in the judgment.
I. The bonds upon which the judgment was recovered, were issued in 1867, bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, to be annually compounded.
Our statute provides that all judgments for "money upon contracts bearing more than six per cent. interest shall bear the same interest borne by such contracts and all other judgments for money shall bear six per cent. per annum." R. S. 1889, sec. 5974; R. S. 1879, sec. 2725.
In State v. Vogel, 14 Mo.App. 187, it was held that
This ruling was followed in Evans v. Fisher, 26 Mo.App. 541, and approved by this court in Crook v. Tull, 111 Mo. 283, 20 S.W. 8. And this construction of the statute, evidently correct, may now be considered settled law. The clerk in this case looking at the record found that the contracts upon which the judgment was rendered bore interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum compounded annually; that the amount paid on the judgment lacked $ 594.53 of discharging the same when the interest was thus computed in accordance with the terms of the contract, and issued the execution for that amount which was quashed by the court.
It is not disputed that the execution is for the proper amount when the interest on the contract is thus computed; nevertheless it is insisted that the judgment will not sustain an execution for that amount. The only reason assigned for this contention is that statutes allowing interest being in derogation of common law are to be strictly construed, and that in Raun v. Reynolds, 11 Cal. 14, the supreme court of that...
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