Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Refining Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 3875.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 274 S.W. 120
• Parties: CAUBLE v. BEAVER-ELECTRA REFINING CO.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 120

274 S.W. 120

CAUBLE v. BEAVER-ELECTRA REFINING CO.

(No. 3875.)^*

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 10, 1925.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of the Seventh Supreme Judicial District.

Action by the Beaver-Electra Refining Company against Mrs. S. O. Cauble. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals (243 S. W. 762), and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Weeks, Morrow & Francis, of Wichita Falls, for plaintiff in error.

Aynesworth, Williams & Watkins, of Wichita Falls, for defendant in error.

GREENWOOD, J.

This case involves the right of a married woman to bind herself by a contract incidental to the management of her separate property or of community property committed to her sole management, control, and disposition. In opinions delivered today in the cases of Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. ___, 273 S. W. 799, and Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. ___, 273 S. W. 808, the court has affirmed the right of a married woman to bind herself by contracts of this nature. The case was withdrawn from the Commission of Appeals pending our determination of the cases cited after full argument.

The opinion of section A of the Commission of Appeals by Judge Bishop is in accord with our conclusions, and is adopted as properly disposing of the case. It is as follows:

"Mrs. S. O. Cauble, plaintiff in error, engaged in the oil business upon her separate account, with the understanding with her husband, H. F. Cauble, that whatever profits she should make therefrom were to belong to her personally, and constitute her separate estate. She first began business as a broker, and from this business made commissions from which she derived about $48,000. With this money she began to buy and sell oil leases, and also bought and operated drilling rigs and machinery. She would operate these drilling rigs in drilling oil wells upon her own leases, and also leases owned by other parties. While so engaged in operating her drilling machinery and for the necessary purpose of operating same, she purchased from Beaver-Electra Refining Company, defendant in error, fuel oil of the market value of $4,452.58.

"Defendant in error filed this suit in the district court against plaintiff in error and her husband, H. F. Cauble, by allegations usually made in an ordinary suit on an open account for the market value of said fuel oil, and also alleged that S. O. Cauble was a married woman, having a separate estate; that she purchased said oil under the name of the Cauble Oil Company, a trading name for herself and husband, and in so doing was acting for her separate estate and her husband; that they were partners in business; and that each, and the separate estate of said S. O. Cauble, became liable, bound, and promised to pay the full amount of said claim.

"H. F. Cauble and Mrs. S. O. Cauble filed separate answers consisting of general demurrer and general denial. Plaintiff in error, Mrs. Cauble, by special plea answered that the fuel oil purchased was not necessary for the support of herself and children, and that as a married woman she could not in law make a binding contract to pay for same on account of her coverture, which she pleaded in bar. She also alleged that at the time of the purchase she was engaged in business for her own account, in which she bought and sold leases, and drilled oil wells, and engaged in the oil business generally; that she was not in any way joined by her husband, and was not acting as his agent, and he had no interest whatever in such enterprise; that she was so engaged without his consent, and he was not a party to her transactions. H. F. Cauble, by special plea, denied partnership, and alleged that he was not connected in any way with her oil dealings and transactions; and that he did not authorize her to incur this obligation, and received no benefit therefrom, and had no interest in the properties affected thereby.

"The case was tried before the court without a jury, and a judgment was rendered for defendant in error against plaintiff in error for the amount of said account with interest, and that defendant in error take nothing against H. F. Cauble, and he was discharged with his cost. On appeal by plaintiff in error the judgment of the trial court was by the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed (243 S. W. 762), and the case is before the Supreme Court on writ of error.

"Just a few days prior to the trial in the district court a decree was rendered dissolving the bonds of matrimony theretofore existing between plaintiff in error and H. F. Cauble, and by said decree she was awarded all of the property she had acquired by reason of her own efforts by agreement of both parties in the divorce case.

"By her first assignment plaintiff in error claims that the property for the use of which the fuel oil was purchased was community property of herself and now former husband, H. F. Cauble, and for this reason she is not personally liable on account therefor.

"This oil was purchased by her for the purpose of operating oil rigs and machinery which she acquired as a result of her individual efforts with an understanding with her husband that all property so acquired by her should be her separate property. The husband has the right to give to the wife either his separate property, or his interest in community property, and thereby constitute it her separate property if he so desires, and if this does not interfere with the rights of creditors. In this case this seems to be the effect of what was done. Lindley v. Lindley, 102 Tex. 135, 113 S. W. 750; Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex. 16; Green v. Ferguson, 62 Tex. 529.

"The case of Cox v. Miller, supra, does not sustain the claim of plaintiff in error that the property for the use of which the fuel oil was purchased was community property, and not the separate property of Mrs. Cauble under the agreement and understanding between her and her husband. The holding there is that community property under the statute cannot be converted into separate property of the wife by mere agreement or understanding, and thereby defeat the rights of creditors. In the opinion the court says:

"`We do not mean to deny that the husband * * * may not make to the wife a direct gift of his separate property or out of the community estate. What we mean to say is, that, by a mere agreement between husband and wife, they cannot change the character or nature of their rights and interest in property owned and acquired by them from that prescribed by law, and thereby relieve it from liability to be taken in satisfaction for the payment of community debts.'

"Under the facts in this case it...