Caucino v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. A-1733-21 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Citation | 475 N.J.Super. 405,293 A.3d 527 |
| Parties | John CAUCINO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Arnold C. Lakind argued the cause for appellant (Szaferman, Lakind, Blumstein & Blader, PC, attorneys; Arnold C. Lakind, Lawrenceville, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jeffrey Padgett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jeffrey Padgett, on the brief).
Before Judges Messano, Rose and Gummer.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MESSANO, C.J.A.D.
From September 1993 until August 2004, petitioner John Caucino was a teacher employed by the Monmouth County Vocational School District (School District) and a contributing member of the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund (TPAF). Caucino pled guilty in federal district court to bank fraud in 1995 and was sentenced in 1999. In June 2004, the New Jersey Board of Education (NJBOE) notified Caucino that he was disqualified from employment as a teacher pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, which permanently disqualifies teachers and other school employees who have been convicted of certain crimes from employment in all school systems under the supervision of the Department of Education.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:66-36 (Section 36), a TPAF member, who has "completed [ten] years of service" and has "separated voluntarily or involuntarily from ... service[ ] before reaching service retirement age," is eligible to receive deferred retirement benefits, provided the separation was "not by removal for conduct unbecoming a teacher or other just cause." Caucino applied for deferred retirement benefits, but the TPAF Board of Trustees (Board) denied his application. The Board determined that Caucino's involuntary separation from TPAF service was a "removal for conduct unbecoming a teacher," rendering him ineligible for deferred retirement benefits.
This appeal requires us to decide a question of first impression. Is a TPAF member permanently disqualified from employment in a school system because of a conviction for a crime enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1 but unrelated to his employment as a teacher, ineligible for deferred retirement benefits under Section 36?
Prior to his employment with the School District and while he worked for Ocean Bay Mortgage Company, Caucino was criminally charged for his role in a scheme to falsify construction reports and bank loan documents. In 1995, he pled guilty to bank fraud, 18 U.S.C.A § 1344, and in 1999, the federal district court sentenced Caucino to a five-year probationary term and ordered him to pay restitution.
In October 1999—six years after he was hired by the School District—federal authorities advised the NJBOE of Caucino's conviction and sentence. The NJBOE took no action against Caucino's teaching certificate until five years later, when a fingerprint search conducted by NJBOE's Criminal History Review Unit confirmed Caucino's conviction and sentence. The NJBOE notified Caucino in June 2004 that his federal conviction permanently disqualified him from employment in a school or other educational institution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. The School District terminated his employment in August 2004. Caucino made his last pension contribution on June 30, 2004, when he was forty-three-years old and had accumulated eleven years of TPAF service credit.
Caucino appealed his disqualification and termination, contending the federal offense to which he had pled guilty was not one of the crimes enumerated in N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1. The matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL), and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) summarily affirmed NJBOE's revocation of Caucino's teaching certificate. The ALJ concluded that the federal conviction was substantially equivalent to theft by deception, a disqualifying crime under N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1(c)(2). The Commissioner of Education adopted the ALJ's initial decision, and, on December 8, 2005, the State Board of Examiners revoked Caucino's teaching certificate.
Caucino filed an application for retirement benefits in January 2021. The Board denied his application, finding Caucino "was removed for conduct unbecoming a teacher" and, therefore, was not eligible for deferred retirement benefits pursuant to Section 36. Caucino appealed, seeking reconsideration or, alternatively, an OAL hearing. On January 6, 2022, the Board reaffirmed its previous decision and denied Caucino's request for a hearing. The Board issued its final agency determination on February 4, 2022, explaining that because Caucino's conviction disqualified him from serving as a teacher, his termination necessarily constituted "removal for conduct unbecoming a teacher," rendering him ineligible to receive deferred retirement benefits.
Caucino filed this appeal. Citing the statutory structures of other public employee pension plans and case law developed under them, Caucino essentially argues that because his criminal conviction was unrelated to his conduct as a teacher, the Board improperly denied his application for deferred benefits. He also contends that an earlier version of N.J.S.A.18A:6-7.1 in effect at the time of his federal criminal conviction would not have compelled his disqualification from employment. Lastly, Caucino argues the NJBOE's decision to delay revocation of his teaching certificate until 2004, despite knowing about his criminal conviction since at least 1999, runs afoul of the doctrine requiring administrative agencies to turn "square corners."
The Board asserts that the statutes governing other public pension plans and case law developed under them are irrelevant because the TPAF's statutory framework is significantly different. It also contends that Caucino is estopped from challenging his disqualification from employment in any school system based on differences between the current and prior versions of N.J.S.A. 18A:6-7.1, and any delay by the NJBOE in notifying the School District cannot be attributed to the Board.
We disagree with the Board's interpretation of Section 36. We therefore reverse its denial of Caucino's application for deferred retirement benefits and remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Quasi-judicial agency decisions "are afforded a deferential standard of review and will be reversed only if ‘there is a clear showing that [the decision] is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record.’ " S.L.W. v. N.J. Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 238 N.J. 385, 393, 210 A.3d 898 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Mount v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 233 N.J. 402, 418, 186 A.3d 248 (2018) ). "We also recognize that state agencies possess expertise and knowledge in their particular fields."
Caminiti v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 431 N.J. Super. 1, 14, 66 A.3d 192 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Hemsey v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 198 N.J. 215, 223, 966 A.2d 1020 (2009) ).
"However, when an agency's decision is based on the ‘agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,’ we are not bound by the agency's interpretation." Saccone v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 219 N.J. 369, 380, 98 A.3d 1158 (2014) (quoting Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27, 17 A.3d 801 (2011) ). "Statutory interpretation involves the examination of legal issues and is, therefore, a question of law subject to de novo review." Ibid. (citing McGovern v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 107–08, 47 A.3d 724 (2012) ).
In interpreting the meaning of a statute, "our role ‘is to discern and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.’ " Ibid. (quoting Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592, 46 A.3d 1262 (2012) ). "[G]enerally, the best indicator of that intent is the statutory language." S.L.W., 238 N.J. at 394, 210 A.3d 898 (alteration in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ). "If the statutory language is clear, our inquiry ends ...." Id. at 394–95, 210 A.3d 898 (citing Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195, 927 A.2d 543 (2007) ).
"However, if a statute's seemingly clear language nonetheless creates ambiguity in its concrete application, extrinsic evidence may help guide the construction of the statute."
Saccone, 219 N.J. at 380, 98 A.3d 1158 (citing In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557, 568, 46 A.3d 1247 (2012) ). "Extrinsic guides may also be of use ‘if a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall statutory scheme.’ " Id. at 380–81, 98 A.3d 1158 ().
Additionally, "pension statutes are ‘remedial in character’ and ‘should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby.’ "
Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 199 N.J. 14, 34, 970 A.2d 354 (2009) (quoting Geller v. N.J. Dep't of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597–98, 252 A.2d 393 (1969) ). "However, ‘[i]n spite of liberal construction, an employee has only such rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions of the statute.’ " Francois v. Bd. of Trs., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 415 N.J. Super. 335, 349, 1 A.3d 843 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original) ).
Guided by these principles, we turn to the issues presented in this appeal.
The Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:66-1 to -93 (the TPAF Law), "provides a comprehensive, uniform state-wide plan for the...
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