Wilson v. City of Jersey City

Decision Date08 March 2012
Citation39 A.3d 177,209 N.J. 558
PartiesParis WILSON, an infant by his Guardian Ad Litem, Sonya MANZANO, and D'Artagnan Manzano, Individually and as Administrator of the Estates of Dequan Wilson and Dartagnania Wilson, and DeQuan Wilson and Dartagnania Wilson, Individually, Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. CITY OF JERSEY CITY, 911 Operator Laura Jean Petersen (Operator No. 35) and 911 Operator Brenda Murdaugh–Jones (Operator No. 326), Defendants–Appellants,andPolice Officer Jose M. Santana (Shield No. 2853), Police Officer Ernest Vidal (Shield No. 2395), Radio Dispatcher Michael Edward Clark, State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, and 911 Operator Lu Ann Burd, Defendants,andCity of Jersey City, Police Officer Jose M. Santana (Shield No. 2853), Police Officer Ernest Vidal (Shield No. 2395), 911 Operator Laura Jean Petersen (Operator No. 35), Radio Dispatcher Michael Edward Clark, and 911 Operator Brenda Murdaugh–Jones (Operator No. 326), Defendants–Third–Party Plaintiffs, v. Dwayne Wilson and 185 Martin Luther King Drive, LLC; State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Police, Third–Party Defendants.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stephen M. Orlofsky argued the cause for appellant City of Jersey City (William C. Matsikoudis, Corporation Counsel and Blank Rome, attorneys; Mr. Orlofsky, Priti R. Vakharia, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Adrienne C. Rogove, and Juli E. Greenberg, Princeton, on the briefs).

Robert E. Levy argued the cause for appellants Laura Jean Petersen and Brenda Murdaugh–Jones (Scarinci Hollenbeck, attorneys; Mr. Levy and Michael A. Cifelli, of counsel; Mr. Levy, Mr. Cifelli and Candida J. Griffin, Lyndhurst, on the briefs).

Brian C. Harris, Livingston, and Patrick J. Boyle argued the cause for respondents (Braff Harris & Sukoneck and Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, attorneys; Mr. Harris, Mr. Boyle, and Lisa A. Herbert, on the briefs).Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this appeal, we must determine whether 9–1–1 operators, along with their public-entity employers, are statutorily immune from civil liability for the negligent mishandling of emergency calls. The paramount issue before us is the scope of the 9–1–1 immunity statute, N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10.

The panels in Massachi v. City of Newark Police Department, 415 N.J.Super. 518, 522, 2 A.3d 1117 (App.Div.2010) and in this case, Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey City, 415 N.J.Super. 138, 157, 165, 1 A.3d 723 (App.Div.2010), concluded that, under N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10, 9–1–1 operators are not immune for mistakes made when they dispatch police, fire, or first-aid personnel to the scene of an emergency, but are immune for mistakes made when they assist police in an ongoing investigation. Under this construction of the statute, 9–1–1 operators have no immunity for errors committed in carrying out their primary responsibility—dispatching first-responders to the scenes of emergencies, but have immunity for a secondary responsibility—providing assistance to an ongoing police investigation. Under this interpretation of N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10, 9–1–1 operators do not share the same statutory immunity that shields police, fire, or first-aid personnel from liability for their missteps in responding to the scene of an emergency.

In this case, the Wilson appellate panel overturned the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of two 9–1–1 operators, as well as their public employer, who were sued because of their alleged negligent handling of an emergency call reporting a disturbance that, in fact, turned out to be a multiple homicide. We now reverse and remand.

In creating an enhanced 9–1–1 system that would allow police, fire, and first-aid personnel to respond to emergencies, the Legislature mandated the participation of telecommunications companies and governmental entities. In exchange for this compelled cooperation, the Legislature apparently devised a statute, N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10, to shield public and private entities, and their personnel, from civil liability for certain acts of ordinary negligence arising from the operation of the 9–1–1 system. No one disputes that these entities and their personnel are not immune for acts or omissions constituting “a wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons or property.” N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10(d) and (e).

In light of the language of N.J.S.A. 52:17C–10, its legislative history, and the overall objectives of the statutory scheme, we conclude that the enactment confers immunity on the 9–1–1 operators and public entity in this case for any negligence in the “delivery” of 9–1–1 services, including the mishandling of emergency calls. Although we reverse on this issue, we nevertheless remand to the Appellate Division to address an issue it left undecided: whether the conduct of the 9–1–1 operators constituted wanton and willful disregard for the safety of persons, conduct that would deny defendants protection under the 9–1–1 immunity statute.

I.
A.

We begin with some basic principles of law. Our review of the meaning of a statute is de novo, and we owe no deference to the interpretative conclusions reached by the trial court and Appellate Division. Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200 N.J. 507, 512–13, 984 A.2d 872 (2009); see also Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). In determining whether summary judgment was properly granted based on the record, we apply the same standard governing the trial courtwe view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Henry v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 330 (2010); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523, 666 A.2d 146 (1995); see also R. 4:46–2(c). Here, the trial court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs, the non-moving parties. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts, viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.

B.

Sometime shortly after 12:00 a.m. on September 20, 2005, Dwayne Wilson carried out a brutal rampage, repeatedly stabbing his sister Marcia Wilson and her three children, Paris, age nine; DeQuan, age eleven; and Dartagnania, age eleven, in their Jersey City apartment located at 207 Wegman Parkway (also known as 185 Martin Luther King Drive). Having survived the attack, Paris lay unconscious until around 9:45 a.m., when he awoke for about an hour. He spoke with his brother, DeQuan, and sister, Dartagnania, who were seriously injured and lying on the floor. His sister asked for water, and his brother told them “to look for the phone.” Paris was unable to help them and lapsed back into unconsciousness. The next morning, September 21, when Paris regained consciousness, he retrieved his mother's cellular telephone and called 9–1–1. Shortly afterwards, police officers arrived in the apartment where they found Paris grievously wounded but alive. His mother, brother, and sister were dead.

C.

At the time of the attack, Anthony Andrews was temporarily living with his sister in an apartment at 207 Wegman Parkway, across the hall from the Wilson family. After hearing a disturbance coming from the Wilson apartment, Andrews called 9–1–1 using his sister's cellular telephone. That call was automatically routed to a New Jersey State Police Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) 1, commonly referred to as a 9–1–1 call center. At 12:52 a.m., State Police 9–1–1 Operator Lu Ann Burd received Andrews's call: 2

[Burd]: 9–1–1, where is your emergency?

Andrews: Hello, um, um at 227 Wegman. We heard somebody screaming next door, inside this building right here.

[Burd]: What town?

Andrews: Jersey City.

[Burd]: Alright hold on I'll connect you into the police department out there, hold on.

[ (Emphasis added).]

At this point, Burd transferred Andrews to the Jersey City Police Department's PSAP, where 9–1–1 Operator Laura Jean Petersen picked up the call. Petersen then took information from Andrews:

[Petersen]: 911 operator 3–5, where is your emergency?

[Andrews]: Uh— 185–Wegman ...

[Petersen]: 185 We

[Andrews]: Yeah, I hear some screamin' and throwing stuff, so I don't know what's going on next door. Somebody's fighting or something.

[Petersen]: Okay, and that's 185 Wegman Parkway?

[Andrews]: Yeah.

[Petersen]: Okay, we're going to get someone over there as soon as possible, Sir.

[Andrews]: Alright bye.

[Petersen]: Thank you, bye bye now.

[ (Emphasis added).]

Petersen then prepared a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) ticket, a computerized textual narrative of the 9–1–1 call, for transmittal to a Jersey City Police dispatcher.3 The CAD ticket that Petersen generated contained a number of errors. First, Petersen listed the incorrect address given to her by Andrews: “185 WEGMAN PKWY.” Andrews undoubtedly was confused because the building in which he was temporarily residing had two addresses, 207 Wegman Parkway and 185 Martin Luther King Drive. Second, in the narrative portion of the dispatch ticket, Petersen wrote that [Reporting party] hears screaming coming from the house next door, no further info.” Petersen failed to ask Andrews what he meant by “next door” and mistakenly assumed that he was describing an adjacent house rather than an adjacent apartment. Third, Petersen did not ask the caller's name or confirm the telephone number from which he was calling, a violation of the Jersey City Police Department Call Taker Policy and Procedure Manual.4 Fourth, Andrews called from his sister's cellular telephone. Nevertheless, Andrews's telephone number—not his sister's—was automatically generated from his cellular service provider's billing information.5

The flawed CAD ticket was forwarded to Jersey City Police Dispatcher Michael Edward Clark, who in turn radioed Officers Jose Santana and Ernest Vidal to “Check 185 Wegman Parkway.” In his dispatch, Clark added that “caller states he hears someone screaming from the house next door. I don't know if that's the caller's address.”

On their arrival, Officers Santana...

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