Caudill v. Conover, Civil No. 5: 10-84-DCR
| Decision Date | 31 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 5: 10-84-DCR |
| Parties | VIRGINIA S. CAUDILL, Petitioner, v. JANET CONOVER, WARDEN, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
In 2000, Virginia Caudill and her co-Defendant Jonathan Wayne Goforth were convicted for the 1998 robbery and murder of Lonetta White. Both were sentenced to death. Caudill filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in this Court in 2010, claiming that: (i) she was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (ii) the prosecutor engaged in several acts of misconduct; and (iii) the trial court committed numerous errors, including the improper exclusion of mitigating evidence and giving improper jury instructions. [Record No. 1] As explained fully below, Caudill has not provided any reason to grant the relief sought.
The following description of the relevant facts is derived largely from the Supreme Court of Kentucky's opinion in Caudill's direct appeal, Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003). At the time of the murders in mid-March, 1998, Caudill had been living with Steve White. On March 13 or 14, the couple argued about Caudill's drug use, and Caudill moved out of his home. When Caudill went to a nearby crack house, she encountered Goforth, a prior acquaintance whom she had not seen in fifteen years. On the afternoon of March 14, Goforth drove Caudill to the home of Lonetta White, Steve White's 73-year-old mother. Once there,Caudill convinced Lonetta White to give her $20 or $30 to rent a hotel room for a night. But after getting the money, Caudill returned to the crack house and bought cocaine.
Around 3:00 a.m. on March 15, Caudill and Goforth returned to Lonetta White's home. One or both bludgeoned Lonetta White to death. At trial, each blamed the other. Caudill contended that Goforth was the sole or primary active participant in the crimes. She testified that she went to the door and asked White for more money to rent a room while Goforth remained out of sight. Caudill contended that when White turned to get the money, Goforth attacked the elderly woman without warning. When White begged Caudill for help, Goforth allegedly took Caudill to a separate room and tied her hands together. After Goforth killed White, he ransacked the home, and took the jewelry, guns, and a mink coat he found and put them in his truck. Caudill testified that Goforth wrapped White's body in a carpet, and convinced her to carry the body and load it into the trunk of White's car. The pair then drove White's car and Goforth's truck to a vacant field where Goforth doused White's vehicle with gasoline and set it on fire.
Conversely, Goforth contended that the roles were reversed, with Caudill acting as the lead participant in the crimes. He testified that Caudill told White that they were having car trouble, but once inside her home, Caudill demanded more money. When White refused, Caudill hit White in the back of the head with a hammer that she had taken from Goforth's truck. When Caudill continued to beat White with the hammer, Goforth alleged that he walked into the living room, sat on the sofa, and considered what to do next. According to Goforth, it was Caudill who ransacked the home, loaded the goods into his truck, wrapped White's body in a carpet, and convinced him to load the body into the trunk of White's car. The two then drove both vehicles to a vacant field, where Caudill doused White's automobile with gasoline and set it on fire.
When questioned by police on the evening of March 15, Caudill denied any involvement, stating that she had been with Goforth. But before law enforcement could question Goforth, the pair left Fayette County, and later fled the state. The two first moved to Ocala, Florida, and then to Gulfport, Mississippi. Caudill then moved by to New Orleans, Louisiana, where she was arrested six months after the murder. At that time, Caudill admitted she was present when White was killed, but contended that Goforth was the murderer. Goforth was arrested shortly thereafter, and asserted that Caudill and an unidentified African-American male had committed the murder.
During the trial in February 2000, two jailhouse informants testified that Caudill had confessed to her participation in the murder, although each gave inconsistent details of the events. Cynthia Ellis testified that Caudill told her that, when White refused to give her money, Caudill pulled a clock off the wall and struck her twice on the head. Julia Davis testified that Caudill told her that she broke into the victim's home to steal money for drugs, but when White discovered her, Caudill killed her, stole her guns and jewelry, and set fire to her vehicle. Following trial, a jury convicted both Caudill and Goforth of murder, first degree robbery, first degree burglary, second degree arson, and tampering with physical evidence. Each was sentenced to death.
Caudill's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003) (Caudill I), and following state collateral review proceedings, Caudill v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000457-MR, 2009 WL 1110398 (Ky. Oct. 29, 2009) (Caudill II). Caudill then sought habeas relief in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting eighteen grounds for relief, not including subparts. [Record No. 1]
Before a federal court may grant relief based upon a claim presented in a federal habeas petition, the petitioner must have presented the claim to the state courts and exhausted all remedies available in the state system. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To "fairly present" a claim to the state courts, the petitioner must have presented the state courts with both the legal and the factual bases supporting the claim. Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000)). Fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim requires the petitioner to make the federal basis of the claim explicit to the state court, either by citing federal law or decisions of federal courts. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (); Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999). If a petitioner cites exclusively to state statutes and state court decisions, she may fail to adequately indicate that she was asserting a violation of her federal civil rights. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 33 (2004) (); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) () If the petitioner has not exhausted a claim, the federal court may nonetheless deny relief if the claim is without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
Exhaustion is an affirmative defense and may be waived if the respondent fails to assert it. Smith v. Moore, 415 F. App'x 624, 628 (6th Cir. 2011) ( ) (citing Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2004)). Additionally, if a petitioner's claim has been exhausted in the state courts, he or she bears the burden of demonstrating any right to federal habeas relief. Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 351 (6th Cir. 2003)).
When a petitioner presents a claim to state courts but those courts do not address the merits of the claim in any manner, the federal habeas court evaluates the merits of the claim de novo. Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 293 (6th Cir. 2007); Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 531 (2003)). De novo review is only appropriate if the petitioner affirmatively shows that the state court's decision "did not involve a determination of the merits of his claim," such as where the state court denied the claim on procedural grounds. Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011).
Where the state courts adjudicated the claim presented for federal collateral review, habeas relief is only available if the state court's decision was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). These two provisions collectively require a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). This deference is required even where the state court provides no explanation for its decision. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784.
To apply the deference required by § 2254(d)(1) to the state court's legal conclusions, "clearly established law" refers to both bright-line rules and legal principles set forth in thedecisions of the United States Supreme Court, as of the time the state court rendered the pertinent decision. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000) (O'Connor, J., opinion of the Court for Part II). Conversely, "clearly established law" does not include dicta in Supreme Court decisions. Id. Nor does it include holdings from the federal courts of appeal. Id. at 381-82.
A state court's...
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