Caudle v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 19 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 08–00205 (HHK). |
| Citation | 804 F.Supp.2d 32,113 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 53 |
| Parties | Frazier CAUDLE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John Peter Relman, Jennifer I. Klar, Katherine A. Gillespie, Megan Moran–Gates, Relman, Dane & Colfax, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
In June and July of 2010, a three-week jury trial was held in this case. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs Frazier Caudle, Nikeith Goins, William James, Sholanda Miller, and Donald Smalls, concluding that the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) had retaliated against plaintiffs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The District now moves for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and remittitur of the jury's award of damages to four of the five plaintiffs [# 297]. Upon consideration of the motion, the opposition thereto, and the record of this case, the Court concludes that the motion must be denied.
In the summer of 2006, the five plaintiffs were members of the MPD First District Focus Mission Unit (“FMU”), a specialized plainclothes unit composed of “productive” patrol officers who “graduated to” FMU duty. See Trial Tr. 165–66, 169, June 15, 2010 (test. of Capt. Ralph McLean). Goins was part of the FMU's auto theft section; the other plaintiffs were part of its vice unit. After Lieutenant Ronald Wilkins took charge of the FMU, plaintiffs, who are African American, came to feel that they were being treated differently from their Caucasian colleagues. They believed that Wilkins, who is Caucasian, was discriminating against them because of their race. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 111, June 28, 2010. After a failed attempt to meet with the First District Commander, Diane Groomes, about Wilkins's behavior, Caudle, James, Miller, and Smalls enlisted the help of Caudle's fiancé, an attorney, in drafting an anonymous letter to Groomes expressing their concerns about Wilkins. See Trial Tr. 22–23, June 15, 2010; Trial Tr. 124–25, June 30, 2010. The letter was sent to Groomes on June 16, 2006. See Pls.' Opp'n Ex. 20 (unsigned letter to Diane Groomes, June 16, 2006). Goins, who was not involved in the production of the unsigned letter, complained orally to Wilkins about Wilkins's conduct on numerous occasions. Trial Tr. 113, June 28, 2010.
On June 25, Officer Chanel Howard, also a member of the FMU, sent an email to Groomes expressing her belief that Caudle, James, Miller, and Smalls were behind the anonymous letter. Trial Tr. 17–18, June 21, 2010; Trial Tr. 23–24, June 22, 2010. Wilkins likewise speculated that those officers were responsible for the letter. Trial Tr. 28–30, June 24, 2010. Shortly after receiving the letter, Groomes called a meeting of all FMU officers, at which she “explained to them that [she] was in receipt of a letter of complaint and went over parts of what the complaint was.” Trial Tr. 19, June 22, 2010. After discussing the complaint, Groomes asked the FMU officers whether “they could work together as a unit.” Trial Tr. 21, June 22, 2010. During the meeting, many of the FMU officers spoke; according to plaintiffs, the other officers appeared to know who was behind the unsigned complaint, and many officers “t[ook] shots at” plaintiffs. Trial Tr. 130, June 30, 2010.
Soon thereafter, Groomes decided to require the FMU officers to submit applications to remain in the unit, an apparently unprecedented step that she described as motivated by performance concerns. Trial Tr. 24–25, June 22, 2010. Caudle, James, Smalls, and Goins each submitted an application to remain in the FMU. Trial Tr. 51, June 15, 2010; Trial Tr. 115, June 28, 2010; Trial Tr. 34, 134, June 30, 2010.
Plaintiffs were concerned that the reapplication process was a ruse designed to allow their removal from the unit because of their complaints about Wilkins. While the applications were pending, Caudle, James, Miller, and Smalls, who had for some time patrolled together in an unmarked car, were forced to split up and ride with other officers. Trial Tr. 44–45, June 15, 2010; Trial Tr. 32–33, 131, June 30, 2010. They were also excluded from certain FMU operations. Trial Tr. 42, June 15, 2010; Trial Tr. 131–33, June 30, 2010. Believing these changes to be retaliatory, all five plaintiffs, along with Greg Philpotts, another FMU officer, drafted (and signed) a second written complaint, which they sent to the D.C. Office of Human Rights and the U.S. Department of Justice on August 24, 2006. See Pls.' Opp'n Ex. 29 (August 24, 2006 written complaint).
When the reapplication process was complete, each plaintiff's application was denied, and each was replaced by an officer from the patrol unit. Trial Tr. 41, 139–40, June 30, 2010. Plaintiffs, who had been praised by their supervising sergeants as effective and capable officers, see, e.g., Trial Tr. 206–09, June 24, 2010, were devastated. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 120, June 28, 2010. Caudle, who had previously been named FMU Officer of the Year, was sent back to the patrol unit, which he found “embarrassing and humiliating.” Trial Tr. 41, June 30, 2010. James, Smalls, and Goins were assigned to a newly created “Intel” unit, of which they were the only members. Trial Tr. 143–44, June 30, 2010. The Intel unit was eventually dissolved, and James, Smalls, and Goins were returned to patrol positions. Trial Tr. 92, June 15, 2010. Miller, who had previously requested a transfer to the patrol day shift to allow her to care for her child, Trial Tr. 44, June 21, 2010, was instead assigned to the patrol evening shift. Trial Tr. 74, June 21, 2010; Trial Tr. 121, June 22, 2010.
Believing all of these events to constitute retaliation for their complaints of discrimination, plaintiffs filed this action against the District in February 2008. In June and July of 2010, a jury heard eleven days of testimony. The jury found for plaintiffs, awarding Caudle and Goins $200,000 each, James and Smalls $250,000 each, and Miller no damages.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, “[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may ... grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1)(B). Because, however, “a judgment as a matter of law intrudes upon the rightful province of the jury, it is highly disfavored.” Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C.Cir.1994); accord Breeden v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 646 F.3d 43, 53–54 (D.C.Cir.2011). Accordingly, the Court's task in ruling on such a motion “is limited to evaluating whether [the nonmovant] proffered ‘sufficient evidence upon which a jury could properly base a verdict’ for” the nonmovant. Boodoo, 21 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Richardson v. Richardson–Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 828 (D.C.Cir.1988)) (emphasis omitted). The Court “neither assesses witness credibility nor weighs evidence.” Id. (citing Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C.Cir.1983)). If a reasonable jury could have found for the nonmovant, the motion must be denied. See Breeden, 646 F.3d at 53–54 (citing Conseil Alain Aboudaram, S.A. v. de Groote, 460 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C.Cir.2006)).
Rule 59 provides that, after a jury trial, “[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1)(A). Under this standard, “[t]he decision to grant or deny such a motion lies within the sound discretion of the court.” In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 467 F.Supp.2d 74, 87 (D.D.C.2006) (citing Grogan v. Gen. Maint. Co., 763 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C.Cir.1985); Machesney v. Larry Bruni, M.D., P.C., 905 F.Supp. 1122, 1130 (D.D.C.1995)). And, to protect the province of the jury, “such a motion should be granted only when the court is convinced that the jury verdict was a ‘seriously erroneous result’ and where denial of the motion will result in a ‘clear miscarriage of justice.’ ” Id. (quoting Warren v. Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 239 (D.D.C.2004)). “[M]inor evidentiary errors” will not warrant a new trial. See id.
“In reviewing the actual amount of a jury's award, [the Court's] task is limited and a reluctance to interfere is [its] touchstone.” Carter v. Duncan–Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1238 (D.C.Cir.1984). Therefore, a jury's award will be reduced only where “(1) the verdict is beyond all reason, so as to shock the conscience, or (2) the verdict is so inordinately large as to obviously exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.” Peyton v. DiMario, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Jeffries v. Potomac Dev. Corp., 822 F.2d 87, 96 (D.C.Cir.1987); Williams v. Steuart Motor Co., 494 F.2d 1074, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1974)). And “[a] court must be especially hesitant to disturb a jury's determination of damages in cases involving intangible and non-economic injuries.” Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Ruiz v. Gonzalez Caraballo, 929 F.2d 31, 34 (1st Cir.1991)). The burden of establishing that the jury's award was excessive rests with the party challenging it. See Carter, 727 F.2d at 1239.
The District first moves for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient to establish any of the three elements of a Title VII retaliation claim: protected activity, materially adverse action, and a causal connection between the two. Def.'s...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Bowyer v. District of Columbia
...actions when the context of the schedule change exacts an identifiable cost on the employee, see, e.g., Caudle v. District of Columbia, 804 F.Supp.2d 32, 44 (D.D.C.2011) (holding that “the denial of a requested schedule change” was materially adverse because it “prevented [the plaintiff] fr......
- Ohio Coal Ass'n v. Perez
-
Chambers v. Dist. of Columbia
...v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007), or "fewer opportunities for compensation and advancement," Caudle v. District of Columbia, 804 F. Supp. 2d 32, 43 (D.D.C. 2011). Here, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whet......
-
St. John v. Napolitano
...formal performance appraisal for the plaintiff during his time as Acting Director.10 The plaintiff also relies on Caudle v. District of Columbia, 804 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.D.C.2011), which was reversed and remanded on appeal, for the proposition that Stajcar's less than perfect performance review......