Caudle v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1955
• Docket Number: No. 739,739
• Citation: 88 S.E.2d 138,242 N.C. 466
• Parties: Henry D. CAUDLE, Administrator of the Estate of Henry Gerald Caudle v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 138

88 S.E.2d 138

242 N.C. 466

Henry D. CAUDLE, Administrator of the Estate of Henry Gerald Caudle v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

No. 739

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 30, 1955

W. T. Joyner, Raleigh, and Womble, Carlyle, Martin & Sandridge, Winston-Salem, for defendant, appellant.

Elledge & Johnson, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff, appellee.

BOBBITT, Justice.

A majority of this Court is of opinion that the evidence offered by plaintiff was sufficient, when considered in the light most favorable to him, to require submission of the case to the jury. Hence, the assignment of error directed to the denial of defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit is overruled. Since a new trial is awarded for reasons stated below, we refrain from a discussion of the evidence presently before us. Harrison v. Kapp, 241 N.C. 408, 85 S.E.2d 337; Davis v. South Eastern Finance Co., 242 N.C. 233, 87 S.E.2d 209.

In his initial instructions to the jury on the issue relating to damages, the trial judge, with minor variations, used the language of this Court as set forth in Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N.C. 130, 131 S.E. 400, in giving a general statement of the rule as to the measure of damages applicable in wrongful death actions. G.S. § 28-174; Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194; Journigan v. Little River Ice Co., 233 N.C. 180, 63 S.E.2d 183; Lamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49. The only reference to the element of present value is in this sentence: 'It is only the present worth of the pecuniary injury resulting from the wrongful death of the deceased that may be awarded the plaintiff.'

In the decisions cited and others of like import the measure of damages, and the successive steps by which the jury is to arrive at the amount of its award, are as set out below.

The measure of damages for the loss of a human life is the present value of the net pecuniary worth of the deceased based upon his life expectancy.

The net pecuniary worth of the deceased is to be ascertained by deducting from the probable gross income to be derived from his own exertions the probable cost of his own reasonably necessary personal living expenses over the period of his life expectancy.

In ascertaining the probable gross income to be derived from his own exertions during the period of his life expectancy, the jury may take into consideration the age, health and expectancy of life of the deceased, his earning capacity, his habits, his ability and skill, the business in which he was engaged and the means he had for making money.

In ascertaining the probable cost of his reasonably necessary personal living expenses during the period of his life expectancy, the jury may take into consideration his age and manner of living.

In ascertaining his life expectancy, the jury may take into consideration the mortuary tables, as evidence, along with other evidence as to his health, constitution and habits.

Having thus ascertained the net pecuniary worth of the deceased over the period of his life expectancy, the present value of such net pecuniary worth, that is, its value now in terms of a lump sum presently paid rather than from time to time during his life expectancy, is the amount of damages to be awarded.

The trial judge explained to the jury, in relation to the facts, the elements to be considered in determining the life expectancy of the deceased and in determining the net pecuniary worth of the deceased over the period of his life expectancy. However, no further instruction of law was given bearing upon the final essential element, namely, that the jury's award should be the present value of the net pecuniary worth over the period of his life expectancy. We need not decide whether this omission, standing alone, would...