Caughie v. Brown
| Decision Date | 06 February 1903 |
| Docket Number | 13,235 - (234) |
| Parties | ROBERT CAUGHIE v. SEBA S. BROWN and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Crow Wing county to recover from defendants, Seba S. Brown and D. W. Billings, $1,050, treble damages, for trespass upon plaintiff's land. The case was tried before McClenahan, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $200. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant Brown appealed. Reversed.
License to Cut Trees -- Ownership of Land.
A written instrument construed. Held to be, in legal effect, a permit or license to cut and remove all trees upon the lands described therein to which the licensor had any right, title or interest, and, further, that it conferred no consent or authority on the licensee to cut trees upon land to which the licensor had no right, title, or interest, although such land was described in the permit or license. Held, further, that such consent or authority is expressly and explicitly withheld by the terms of the instrument.
Unauthorized Cutting.
Simultaneously with this instrument the licensee executed and delivered to the licensor a mortgage upon the trees covered by the permit to secure the payment of the purchase price. The licensee subsequently cut trees upon plaintiff's land to which the licensor had no right, title, or interest, but which were described in the permit. Held, in the absence of further proof connecting the licensor with the trespass he could not be compelled to respond in damages.
Wilson & Van Derlip, for appellant.
The deed to Billings conveyed Brown's interest only, if any, and, if he had none, imposed no liability upon him -- either to Billings or any third person. Martin v. Brown, 4 Minn. 201 (282); Hope v. Stone, 10 Minn. 114 (141); Everest v. Ferris, 16 Minn. 14 (26); Bemis v. Bridgman, 42 Minn. 496; Brame v. Towne, 56 Minn. 126, 128; Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 56 Minn. 250, 255; Mitchell v. Chisholm, 57 Minn. 148, 153; Hulett v. Hamilton, 60 Minn. 21, 23; Brown v. Jackson, 3 Wheat. 449, 452; Field v. Columbet, 4 Saw. 523, Fed. Cas. No. 4764; Allen v. Holton, 20 Pick. 458; Sweet v. Brown, 12 Metc. (Mass.) 175; Hoxie v. Finney, 16 Gray, 332; Knight v. Campbell, 76 Iowa 730; Rogers v. Chase, 89 Iowa 468.
A license to enter upon lands and cut timber thereon which is owned by the grantor and none other does not render the grantor an accessory to the cutting of timber not owned by him. Allen v. Holton, supra; Sweet v. Brown, supra; Knight v. Campbell, supra.
Trespass is a wrong done, with force, to the person, property, or rights of another. No wrong or force is shown upon the part of Brown, either directly or by his consent or procurement, or to his knowledge. Moak's Underhill, Torts, 3, 4, 10, 16, 350, 565; Bishop, Non-Contract Law, §§ 4, 22; Holly v. Boston, 8 Gray, 123, 130; Benton v. Beattie, 63 Vt. 186.
The giving and receiving of the mortgage had no more effect upon the rights of the parties, one way or another, than would the giving by Billings of any collateral security having no reference to the logs. Its execution and delivery were competent as between the parties and did not affect the nature of the transaction. Bemis v. Bridgman, supra.
J. H. Warner, for respondent.
The law permits the party injured to treat all concerned in the injury as constituting together one party, by their joint co-operation accomplishing certain injurious results, and liable to respond to him in a gross sum as damages. Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 152, 153. The deed to Billings was, at least, a consent on the part of defendant Brown to the cutting and removal of the timber on plaintiff's land, and as such made Brown liable in damages. Sanborn v. Sturtevant, 17 Minn. 174 (200). By the deed Brown licensed and permitted Billings to enter upon the land and cut the timber. This license was irrevocable by the grantor, and it was unnecessary for him to ratify the acts of defendant Billings which were intended to be done and were done under this authority given by Brown. Bolland v. O'Neal, 81 Minn. 15. The acts of trespass were committed by force and against the consent of the plaintiff. Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 145.
This appeal is from an order of the district court denying the motion of defendant Brown for a new trial. The action was brought to recover treble damages, under the statute, for trespass upon forty acres of land belonging to plaintiff; the act complained of being the alleged cutting and removal of the standing trees by both defendants.
For some reason not appearing, Brown was not present, nor was he represented by counsel, at the trial. Defendant Billings appeared personally and with counsel, and admitted that he cut and removed the trees himself, believing that he had written authority so to do from Brown; and the alleged authority was shown. The trial court charged the jury that plaintiff was entitled to recover the actual value of the timber as against both defendants, and a verdict for the sum of $200 was returned. The contention on appeal from an order denying Brown's motion for a new trial is that the verdict was contrary to law, as against him, because it was wholly unsupported by the evidence. This is the only question, and the facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff was the owner of the land under a government patent issued in 1885. In November, 1897, defendant Brown, his wife joining, executed and delivered to Billings an instrument in writing, which was thereafter duly recorded, and it is upon this instrument, Billings' mortgage, executed simultaneously and given to secure the purchase price ($1,500), and some letters written by Brown to the attorney for Billings in response to notice from the latter that the plaintiff claimed to be owner of the land, that the verdict rests as against Brown.
It is apparent that Brown and his wife, in executing the instrument before mentioned, which, in law, amounted to a permit or license to cut and remove timber, used a blank quitclaim deed; and the real question in the case is the construction which must be placed upon this instrument, and its legal effect. It is set out at length in the record, and by its operative words the parties of the first part (Brown and his wife) remised, released, and quitclaimed to Billings, party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, all of their "right, title, and interest in and to the oak and pine trees on the following lands." Then followed a description of over forty-eight hundred acres of land, and included therein was the forty which, as before stated, actually belonged to the plaintiff. Immediately following this description, authority was given to Billings to enter upon the lands and cut and remove trees for the period of three years from date, and then it was declared that it is "The purpose of this instrument to transfer to the said party of the second part by this deed, and on the delivery thereof, all the right, title, and interest that we, the said grantors, have, and that either of us has, and no other; the said grantee being, as to the ownership of the said trees and the timber and logs to be cut therefrom, in all respects the successor in interest of both and each of us, having our rights in respect thereto, and none other."
Now, what was the purpose and the intention of the parties by the execution, delivery, and acceptance of this instrument? What did defendant Brown convey by it, and what acts did he sanction? What trees did Brown authorize Billings to cut, and what timber did the permit or license cover, so that the cutting or removal by Billings can be attributed to any of Brown's acts, as evidenced by the writing? In what clause of the permit do we find any language upon which to base the assertion that Brown, when using it, encouraged or even consented to the cutting or removal of trees from plaintiff's land, to which he had no title, and in which he had no interest? To affirm the order appealed from, it must appear that, by means of the writing, Brown actively or passively approved of or consented to the trespass.
Under our statute, a quitclaim deed passes all of the estate which the grantor can convey by deed of bargain and sale. It is the mode adopted for the conveyance of land where the grantor does not propose to be held responsible for the condition of the title, and, when he thus conveys, it is immaterial to him whether he has title or not. It passes such rights and interests as the grantor possesses at the time, but by its execution and delivery a grantor does not affirm that he is possessed of any title whatsoever. Such a deed is in legal effect a refusal to fix the extent of the interest held by the grantor, and is accepted by the grantee with such a condition or refusal annexed. It is therefore plain that had Brown conveyed the land itself by quitclaim deed, and Billings had immediately entered upon the same and cut the timber, the former, in the absence of anything further connecting him with the cutting, could not be held in an action of this character. Now, did this permit to cut and remove trees, timber, and logs have any greater scope or effect than a quitclaim deed would have had? In the one case the authority, whatever its extent may be, is expressed. In the other it arises by operation of law. The intent of the parties to the instrument, as manifested by the language used, must be allowed to govern when construing it, and to control the rights of plaintiff arising through it, as against the defendant Brown.
To a majority of this court this question seems not complicated or difficult. Not only was Billings' right to cut expressly circumscribed, confined, and restricted, by the operative words found in...
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