Causey v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1914
• Docket Number: 524.
• Citation: 81 S.E. 917,166 N.C. 5
• Parties: CAUSEY v. SEABOARD AIR LINE R. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

81 S.E. 917

166 N.C. 5

CAUSEY v. SEABOARD AIR LINE R. CO.

No. 524.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

May 20, 1914

Appeal from Superior Court, Randolph County; Long, Judge.

Action by R. L. Causey, as administrator of the estate of H. O Causey, against the Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company to recover damages for wrongful death of plaintiff's intestate alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

In an action for death of an employee, evidence held to warrant a finding that a release of liability for injuries resulting in decedent's death had been procured by fraud or undue influence.

The intestate was injured on December 1, 1903, and died on June 7, 1912. On December 27, 1903, the intestate executed the following conditional release: "Seaboard Air Line Railway. Conditional Release Agreement. If, before the expiration of thirty days from this date, the Seaboard Air Line Railway shall pay to me, H. O. Causey, the sum of seventy-five dollars, I hereby agree to release the said railway of and from all claims whatsoever for damages for or on account of personal injury sustained by No. 1 freight running into A. C. L. freight at Hilton Bridge, throwing me against stove, cutting my head, on the 1st day of December 1903. Witness my hand and seal, this 27th day of December 1903. [ Signed] H. O. Causey. [ Seal.] Witness: [Signed] R. M. Baldwin."

The foregoing conditional release agreement has the following indorsement stamped on it: "Voucher made for January 5, 1904, amount shown," and, "Voucher sent to auditor disbursements, February 8, 1904."

On February 17, 1904, the intestate executed the following release: "Seaboard Air Line Railway. Release. For and in consideration of the sum of seventy-five and no/100 dollars ($75) to me paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, H. O. Causey, do hereby release and forever discharge the Seaboard Air Line Railway, and any and all railroads owned, leased, operated, or controlled by it, and its successors, from all injuries received by me in collision of trains, S. A. L. No. 1 and A. C. L. No. 80, on or about December 1, 1903, at or near Wilmington, N. C., while a conductor, in the employ of the Seaboard Air Line Railway; the consideration hereinbefore referred to being in full compromise, satisfaction and discharge of all claims and causes of action arising out of the injuries, and in exoneration of the railway from all liability by reason thereof. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this 17th day of February, A. D. 1904. [ Signed] H. O. Causey. [ Seal.] Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of: [Signed] R. M. Baldwin."

The defendant pleaded the release as a defense, and also the statute barring a recovery for personal injury within three years.

The plaintiff replied, alleging that the release was procured by undue influence and fraud.

The jury returned the following verdict:

"(1) Was H. O. Causey, the intestate of the plaintiff, killed by the negligence of the defendants, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Yes.

(2) Did H. O. Causey, the intestate of plaintiff, execute the release as alleged by the defendant, the Seaboard Air Line, in its answer? Answer: Yes.

(3) If plaintiff's intestate did execute and deliver the said release, did he at the time of the execution thereof have sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the said release? Answer: Yes.

(4) If the deceased, H. O. Causey, did not have such mental capacity, did the defendants have notice thereof? Answer: No.

(5) If said release was executed and delivered as alleged in the answer, was the same procured by fraud and undue influence of the defendant, the Seaboard Air Line, as alleged by the plaintiff? Answer: Yes.

(6) Is the plaintiff's cause of action barred by the statute of limitations? Answer: No.

(7) What damage, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to recover? Answer: $6,075."

W. H. Neal, of Laurinburg, for appellant.

Hammer & Kelly, of Ashboro, for appellee.

ALLEN J.

There was evidence to support the finding by the jury that the injury in 1903 caused the death of the intestate, and this is practically conceded by the defendant.

It is, however, earnestly insisted that there was no evidence of fraud or undue influence in procuring the execution of the release, set up as a defense.

No presumption of fraud arises from the relation of employer and employé, "but it is recognized by the courts that the employer has great influence in determining the conduct of the employé and may use it to his injury." King v. R. R., 157 N.C. 63, 72 S.E. 809. And "where there is no coercion amounting to duress, but a transaction is the result of a moral, social, or domestic force exerted upon a party, controlling the free action of his will and preventing any true consent, equity may relieve against the transaction on the ground of undue influence, even though there may be no invalidity at law. In the vast majority of instances, undue influence naturally has a field to work upon in the condition or circumstances of the person influenced which render hm peculiarly susceptible and yielding--his dependent or fiduciary relation towards the one exerting the influence, his mental or physical weakness, his pecuniary necessity, his ignorance, lack of advice, and the like." Pom. Eq. Jur. vol. 2, § 851.

The plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence to prove fraud and undue influence, and as was said by Justice Brown in the matter of Everett's Will, 153 N.C. 85, 68 S.E. 925: "Experience has shown that direct proof of undue or fraudulent influence is rarely attainable, but inference from circumstances must determine it. * * * Undue influence is generally proved by a number of facts, each one of which standing alone may be of little weight, but taken collectively may satisfy a rational mind of its existence."

Let us, then, examine the circumstances connected with the execution of the release. The intestate was in the employment of the defendant when the release was executed, and wished to continue the employment. He was injured on December 1, 1903, by a blow on the back of the head, and, while the jury finds that he had sufficient mental capacity to execute a release, it was in evidence that he had trouble with his head continuously after the injury. He accepted $75 in settlement for an injury which finally resulted in death. The settlement was made under an agreement to pay him for his lost time (the claim agent of the defendant testifies to this), and he was at that time earning from $90 to $95 a month, and, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, lost 2 1/2 months. The evidence does not disclose that any one was present when the release was executed, except the claim agent of the defendant, and he made conflicting statements as to his meeting with the intestate, saying: "I met him by appointment. He sent word that he wanted to see me. I did not meet him by appointment. I did not send for him to come and see me. I met him on the hotel porch at Hamlet by accident." The conditional release was executed on December 27, 1903, conditioned to accept $75, if paid within 30 days, under an agreement to pay for lost time, when there was due him then, computing at the rate of $90 per month, $81 and the time he would lose could not then be ascertained as he had not resumed work. The sum of $75 was not paid within the 30 days, but the intestate stood by the agreement, and at the end of 2 months and 17 days, while still unable to work, executed a full release for $75, under the same agreement, the defendant says, to pay for lost time, when his wages alone would, at that time, have amounted to $231, not considering damages for mental and physical suffering and for reduced capacity, for which the defendant was liable, if for anything.

We have then a full release executed upon the payment of less than one-third of the amount agreed to be paid, and when the most important element of damages was not then taken into consideration--mental and physical suffering, and reduced capacity. It was executed by an employé who was, at the time, suffering mentally and physically from his injury, and who wished to retain his place with the defendant, and when no one was with him except the claim agent of the defendant, who made contradictory statements about his meeting with the intestate. It would seem that one of two conclusions must follow, if the jury accepted this evidence: That the intestate did not have sufficient mind to execute a release, or that he was improperly influenced. The jury has adopted the latter solution, and in our opinion there was evidence to support it.

In King v. R. R., 157 N.C. 65, 72 S.E. 809, quoting from our own reports and from the Supreme Court of the United States, as to the effect of inadequacy of consideration upon an issue of fraud and undue influence, we said: "In Byers v. Surget, 19 How. 311 , the Supreme Court of the United States says: 'To meet the objection made to the sale in this case, founded on the inadequacy of the price at which the land was sold, it is insisted that inadequacy of consideration, singly, cannot amount to proof of fraud. This position, however, is scarcely reconcilable with the qualification annexed to it by the courts, namely unless such inadequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience, for this qualification implies necessarily the affirmation that, if the inadequacy be of a nature so gross as to shock the conscience, it will amount to proof of fraud.' And again, in Hume v. U. S., 132 U.S. 411, 10 S.Ct. 136, 33 L.Ed. 393: 'It (fraud) may be apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself, such as no man in his senses, and not...