Causion v. State

• Decision Date: 23 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1766,Sept. Term, 2010.,1766
• Parties: Shannon D. CAUSION v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

209 Md.App. 391

59 A.3d 1061

Shannon D. CAUSION

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 1766, Sept. Term, 2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Jan. 23, 2013.

Shannon D. Causion, pro se, for appellant.

Jessica V. Carter (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellee.

Panel: DEBORAH S. EYLER, KEHOE, and IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ.

KEHOE, J.

Shannon D. Causion is serving a fifty year sentence for the 1996 murder of Parren Clifton Lee. In 2010, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4–642 (d)¹, he asked the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to disclose to him the records of the grand jury proceedings that resulted in his indictment. Causion's request was unusual because there was no pending action, such as a post-conviction proceeding, to which the records might have some relevance. The court denied the motion and Causion has appealed.

The appeal raises two issues: first, whether the order denying Causion's motion to disclose grand jury records is appealable; and second, whether the circuit court erred in denying it. We conclude that the court's order is an appealable final judgment. We further hold that, because Causion's motion was procedurally deficient, the circuit court did not err in denying it.

Background

After a grand jury indicted Causion for the first degree murder and the use of a handgun to commit the murder, he pleaded guilty to those crimes on June 26, 1997. Based on the State's proffer that multiple witnesses saw Causion repeatedly shoot his victim at point blank range on a busy city sidewalk, the circuit court accepted the plea, convicted Causion, and sentenced him to a term of life with all but fifty years suspended for the murder and a concurrent term of twenty years incarceration for the handgun offense. Causion filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was denied, and a petition for postconviction relief under the Maryland Uniform Post–Conviction Relief Act, which was also denied by the circuit court. He then filed a petition for leave to appeal the postconviction court's denial of his petition, which this Court denied on April 14, 2000. Causion then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland; the District Court dismissed the petition with prejudice on August 17, 2001. Other motions, e.g., for a reduction in sentence and for an evaluation pursuant to Health General Article § 8–505, failed to yield relief from his convictions and sentences. We now turn to the instant case.

On August 24, 2010, Causion filed a motion seeking disclosure of confidential grand jury testimony pursuant to Md. Rule 4–642(d) and a request for a hearing on that motion. The motion stated in relevant part (grammatical errors and misspellings corrected):

Petitioner was indicted on October 10, 1996 in the Baltimore City Circuit Court and on August 25, 1997 was sentenced to life with all but 50 years suspended for first degree murder, with 20 years to run concurrently for use of handgun in the commission of a crime of violence.

Petitioner meets the “particularized need” standard for disclosure of grand jury testimony and minutes in the case at bar in accordance with Grimm v. State, 6 Md.App. 321, 331 [251 A.2d 230 (1969) ] (a criminal accused may, in a proper case be afforded access to grand jury minutes if he demonstrates a particularized need for disclosure.)

Causion gave the following basis for his claim that he had demonstrated a particularized need for access to the grand jury minutes (some grammatical errors and misspellings corrected):

The investigation in question is approximately 15 years old and has since been completed, thus the need for continued secrecy is no longer required. The Grand Jury's operation ended upon the conviction of petitioner in 1997.

Petitioner's request for disclosure is intended to assist in the cross-examination as well as the impeachment of witnesses who testified before the Grand Jury. Particularly, witnesses Philip Williams, Artist Leak, Philip Lee, and Olive Seawright who not only had incentives for providing testimony, but motive for giving statements to Baltimore City police detectives.

Witnesses Phillip Lee and Phillip Williams provided Detectives with different descriptions of a suspect; such inconsistencies were never brought out at trial. Moreover, statements given to police must be consistent with those given to a Grand Jury in order for an accused defendant to obtain the benefit of due process.... Petitioner is entitled to the same protection at the appellate level for access to or in camera review of Grand Jury Testimony.

Pursuant to Wilson v. State, 4 Md.App. 192, 207 [242 A.2d 194 (1968) ] that court held that the “particularized need” requirement is one which relates to the fairness of the trial. Petitioner has satisfied that requirement. Petitioner avers that the continued secrecy only perpetuatesinjustice and diminishes the fact-finding mission [of] the Court.

As relief, Causion requested a hearing and that he “be granted disclosure of the minutes and/or an in camera review of the testimony in question.”

The certificate of service reflected that the motion was mailed only to the Clerk of the Baltimore City Circuit Court. The record does not reflect that Causion served, or attempted to serve, the State's Attorney.

By order dated September 1, 2010, the circuit court denied Causion's motion without a hearing. The court's order did not explain its reasoning.

Challenging the denial of his request for access to grand jury records, Causion noted this pro se appeal. In Causion's view, he was entitled to a hearing on his motion and, ultimately, to a court order awarding him access to sealed testimony before the grand jury that indicted him for Mr. Lee's murder.

The State moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it “is not allowed by these rules or other law.” Alternatively, the State argues that the circuit court properly denied Causion's motion on both procedural and substantive grounds.

I. The State's Motion to Dismiss

The State has moved to dismiss this appeal. Its argument begins with the premise that the jurisdiction of an appellate court is generally limited to final judgments, see Courts and Judicial Proceedings (“CJP”) Article § 12–301, certain interlocutory orders immediately appealable as allowed by statute, see, e.g., CJP § 12–302, and orders that are appealable through the common law collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Kurstin v. Bromberg, 420 Md. 466, 480, 24 A.3d 88 (2011); Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 312–13, 22 A.3d 886 (2011). The State then correctly asserts that there is no specific statutory authorization for interlocutory appeals from orders denying access to grand jury records in Maryland. It posits that the only judgment at issue in the case is Causion's conviction, which became final upon the imposition of sentence. Because the circuit court's denial of Causion's motion for disclosure of the grand jury proceedings did not constitute a final judgment in the criminal proceeding, the State argues that the denial of the motion is not appealable. Finally, the State argues that the order is not an appealable collateral order. We agree with the State's suggestions that the order in question is neither an appealable interlocutory order nor an appealable collateral order but not with the remainder of its reasoning.

We begin with the State's argument that the court's order was not a final judgment. “[A] final judgment is one that either determine[s] and conclude[s] the rights of the parties involved or den[ies] a party the means to prosecut[e] or defend[ ] his or her rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 171, 31 A.3d 250 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted; alterations in original); Harris v. State, 420 Md. 300, 312, 22 A.3d 886 (2011) (“[T]o constitute a final judgment, a trial court's ruling must either decide and conclude the rights of the parties involved or deny a party the means to prosecute or defend rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

While the question whether an order denying access to grand jury records is appealable appears to be one of first impression in Maryland, on several occasions both this Court and the Court of Appeals have exercised appellate review over court orders granting such access. See In re Criminal Investigation No. 437 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, 316 Md. 66, 76, 557 A.2d 235 (1989) (hereafter cited as “No. 437 ”); In Re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 575, 458 A.2d 75 (1983) (“No. 236 ”); ²In re Criminal Investigation No. 51,843 in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, 119 Md.App. 112, 118, 704 A.2d 464 (1998) (“ No. 51,843 ”). Among these decisions, only No. 236 expressly addressed the basis of the Court's jurisdiction. In that case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the order granting access was a final judgment because: “[o]nce the motion was granted there was nothing more to be done in this particular case. It thus settled the rights of the parties and terminated the cause.” 295 Md. at 575, 458 A.2d 75. In the instant case, the order of the circuit court also settled the rights of the parties in that it denied Causion's request to obtain access to the proceedings of the grand jury. There was nothing more that the court could do to give effect to its ruling and Causion sought no other relief. The reasoning in No. 236 strongly suggests that the court's order in the instant case constituted a final judgment.

The State argues that the court's order was not final for two reasons. First, it suggests that the only relevant final judgment is Causion's conviction and that the only available procedural means by which Causion could access the grand jury records would be to re-open his postconviction relief proceeding by means of a request made pursuant to Criminal...