Cavan v. Woodbury

• Decision Date: 29 November 1921
• Citation: 133 N.E. 95,240 Mass. 125
• Parties: CAVAN v. WOODBURY et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

240 Mass. 125

133 N.E. 95

CAVAN

v.WOODBURY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Nov. 29, 1921.

Appeal from Probate Court, Essex County; Harry R. Dow, Judge.

Proceeding by Daniel J. Cavan against Chester T. Woodbury and others for instructions as to the disposition to be made of property in his hands as trustee under a will. From the decree the respondent George O. Tilton appeals. Reversed, and decree entered.

Michael L. Sullivan and James J. Ronan, both of Salem, for appellant.

Peter J. McSweeney, of Haverhill, for appellee.

CARROLL, J.

Angie N. Tilton, who died October 20, 1915, in the second clause of her will gave to her husband ‘the other one-half of may entire estate, * * * but in trust nevertheless for the following uses and purposes, viz.: To use the income thereof and whatever part of the principal may be necessary for the comfortable support and maintenance of may son Andrew J. Tilton in the manner in which he is accustomed to live.’ Andrew J. Tilton died September 11, 1918. The will contained no residuary clause. The petitioner is the trustee under the will of Angie N. Tilton and he prays in this petition for instructions that the court may determine the persons entitled to the trust estate created by the second clause of the will. In the probate court a decree was entered that Andrew J. Tilton was the sole equitable owner of the fund given in trust under the second clause of the will of his mother; that he having died, the trust was terminated, and the petitioner was directed upon the settlement of his account, to pay the balance of the trust property in his hands to the executor of the will of Andrew J. Tilton. From this decree George O. Tilton, the husband of the testatrix, appealed. He contends that Andrew J. Tilton had merely an equitable life interest in the trust estate, and upon his death, in the absence of a residuary clause in the will, the trust fund passes as intestate property.

The testatrix gave one-half of her estate to her husband absolutely. The remaining one-half was given in trust for the maintenance of her son. The income and whatever part of the principal became necessary was to be used for his ‘comfortable support * * * in the manner in which he * * * [is] accustomed to live.’ Her purpose in creating the trust was to provide for her son's support and maintenance, and although the income and whatever part of the principal was necessary might be used for this purpose, she did not give him an absolute estate in one-half of the property, but an equitable interest for life only.

In Keating v. Smith, 5 Cush. 232, the residue of the estate was given in trust, to pay the income to the daughter of the testatrix. It was held that her beneficial and equitable interest was in the income only, and that she took an equitable estate for life. Where the residue of an estate was given in trust, ‘the same to be used as far as necessary for the support and maintenance’ of the testatrix's aunt, it was decided that on the death of the aunt the trust terminated and what remained of the fund was to be disposed of as intestate property. Woodbury v. Hayden, 211 Mass. 202, 97 N. E. 776. In Buffington v. Maxam, 152 Mass. 477, 25 N. E. 975, the testator gave the rest and residue of the estate, except certain legacies, to one daughter, ‘for the support of my daughter Caroline E.’ In an opinion of this court by Knowlton, J., it was held that the legacy given to Caroline E. in trust on her death went to the testator's representatives. See, also, Loomis v. Gorham, 186 Mass. 444, 71 N. E. 981;Stearns v. Stearns, 192 Mass. 144, 77 N. E. 1154;Walton v. Draper, 206 Mass. 20, 91 N. E. 884.

Although the trustee had the right to expend whatever part of the principal was required, the testatrix did not intend by this provision of her will to do more than fully provide for her son's support. She did not give him control of the fund. The legal interest was in the trustee and nothing more than an equitable life interest in one-half of her estate was given her son. See Woodbury v. Hayden, supra, and cases cited.

The case at bar is to be distinguished from those cases where there is a gift in terms direct to the beneficiary and an additional provision...