Cavanaugh v. People

• Decision Date: 01 May 1916
• Docket Number: 8295.
• Citation: 61 Colo. 292,157 P. 200
• Parties: CAVANAUGH v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

157 P. 200

61 Colo. 292

CAVANAUGH v. PEOPLE.

No. 8295.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

May 1, 1916

Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Chas. C Butler, Judge.

E. J Cavanaugh was convicted, and brings error. Affirmed.

Clay B Whitford, Henry E. May, Greeley W. Whitford, and Hubert L. Shattuck, all of Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Fred Farrar, Atty. Gen., Francis E. Bouck, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Norton Montgomery, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

TELLER J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted of violating the provision of chapter 108, Laws of 1913, by engaging in the business of loaning money, on security, at a rate of interest greater than 12 per cent. per annum, without having obtained a license therefor, as provided by said act. His counsel allege that the act is unconstitutional on several grounds: (1) Because of a defect in its title; (2) because it is special and class legislation; and (3) because the license provisions are unreasonable.

The title of the act is:

'To regulate the business of loaning money on security of any kind by persons, firms, and corporations other than national banks, or any banks or bankers operating under state charters or under state supervision, or building and loan associations.'

It is objected that the title does not mention the regulation of rates of interest, which, counsel assert, is the primary object of the act.

We cannot agree with counsel that the purpose of the act is primarily to regulate interest charges. It covers six pages in the Session Laws, and provides a system for the obtaining of licenses, the giving of bonds by licensees, the keeping of registers of loans, the making of annual statements to the state bank commissioner, for an investigation by him of licensees on complaint made, and for his general supervision of the said business; all clearly a part of a system to regulate the business named in the title.

This court has said:

'That which is appropriate or relevant to the subject of a bill as expressed by its title, or is a necessary incident to the object of a bill, as thus expressed, is germane.' People v. Ergaugh, 42 Colo. 490, 94 P. 352.

If it is clearly germane to the subject, it is within the title. Lamar Canal Co. v. Amity Land & Irr. Co., 26 Colo. 370, 58 P. 600, 77 Am.St.Rep. 261. We have held that a provision authorizing county commissioners to fix water rates would be good under a title of 'an act to regulate the use of water for irrigation.' Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144, 6 P. 142.

It would seem clear, therefore, that the title of this act, 'To regulate the business of loaning money.' would cover a provision concerning interest on money loaned. We are of the opinion that the title fully meets the requirements of section 21 of article 5 of the Constitution.

Counsel say that the act regulates the rate of interest, 'and it must be special, because it is not general.' This indicates a misapprehension of the meaning of 'special' as applied to laws.

'A law is not local or special when it is general and uniform in its operation upon all in like situation.' People v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238-264, 94 P. 294, 302; People v. Cooper, 83 Ill. 585.

The number of persons upon whom the law shall have any direct effect may he very few, by reason of the subject to which it relates, but it is sufficient to make it a general law if it operates upon all who are brought within the relations for which it provides. People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 398; Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85. This statute is general and uniform as to all in like situations, and binds all within the state. It is therefore not special legislation in form. In substance, it applies to a class of persons which may be large in number and carrying on the specified business in all parts of the state. Unless, then, the classification is unreasonable, the law is valid, and any violation of it is subject to punishment.

It is also objected that the law discriminates against one class of borrowers and favors another class. This objection, however, need not be considered, since the plaintiff in error is not in the class alleged to be injured, and cannot therefore be heard to question the constitutionality of the act on that ground. Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300-311, 47 P. 278; Southern Ry. Co. v. King. 217 U.S. 524-534, 30 S.Ct. 594, 54 L.Ed. 868.

'In all criminal prosecutions the accused, to entitle him to raise the question of the constitutionality of a statute, must show that his rights are affected by it, and when thta is done he will be allowed to question only such provisions of the statute as apply to his own rights as distinguished from other rights.' Cyc. 789.

It is said, further, that the law is unjust and unreasonable because it exempts national banks, state banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, and title and guaranty associations, and does not apply to those who loan money at 12 per cent. or less, or who loan without security. The exceptions, however, appear to be reasonable, inasmuch as they cover only money lenders who are already subject to governmental supervision and control. Such exceptions have been held...