Cavazos v. Kerry, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-0661-G
| Decision Date | 03 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-0661-G |
| Parties | FÁTIMA MARGARITA CAVAZOS, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. JOHN KERRY, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the United States, ET AL., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment of the defendants: John Kerry in his official capacity as Secretary of State; Jeh Johnson in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Ron Rosenberg in his official capacity as acting chief of the Administrative Appeals Office of the Department of Homeland Security; and Tracy Tarango in her official capacity as Director of the Dallas Field Office of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (collectively, the "government") (docket entry 25). For the reasons discussed below, the government's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiffs, José Mario Cavazos ("José") and Fátima M. Cavazos ("Fátima") (together, the "Cavazoses"), seek a judgment from this court declaring them to be citizens of the United States. Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunction ("Complaint") ¶ 1 (docket entry 1). José alleges that he is a citizen of the United States by virtue of his birth in Menlo, Washington on January 19, 1953. Id. ¶ 2. Fátima's claim that she is a citizen of the United States is wholly dependent on José's claim of citizenship. See id. ¶¶ 9-22.
According to José, his mother, Angelica Cavazos Morales, gave birth to him while accompanying her husband, José Cavazos Leal, on a business trip to Vancouver, Washington. Id. ¶ 44. On this trip, the couple decided to drive to Vancouver, Canada after finishing their business in Vancouver, Washington. Appendix in Support of Brief in Support of the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Government's Appendix") at 54 (docket entry 27). While driving to Vancouver, Canada, his mother felt "bad" and the couple stopped at a hospital attended by nuns. Id. at 50-51. From there, they were sent to a midwife in Pe Ell, Washington, and the midwife successfully aided Angelica in giving birth to José. Id. at 52-53. On the wayback to Mexico, Angelica and José stayed in San Antonio, Texas with an "Aunt Juana" because José fell ill. Id. at 55. José Cavazos Leal continued on to Mexico by himself. See id. at 56. On February 17, 1953, José Cavazos Leal registered José's birth in the records of Nuevo Leon, Mexico as occurring in the downtown section of Allende, Nuevo Leon, Mexico. Plaintiffs' Appendix to Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' Appendix") at 15 (docket entry 38). Then, he returned to San Antonio and picked up Angelica and José. Government's Appendix at 58. During the drive back to Mexico, José's health continued to deteriorate, so the family stopped in Roma, Texas to get José baptized. Id. at 59-60. On March 19, 1953, José was baptized at Our Lady of Refuge Catholic Church in Roma, Texas. Plaintiffs' Appendix at 139 (docket entry 39). The baptismal certificate lists José's birthplace as "Menlo, Pacific County, Washington." Id.
In February 2010, agents from the State Department took José's passport away from him and have not returned it. Complaint ¶ 63. On March 21, 2012, Fátima received a letter from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") stating that her certificate of citizenship had been denied. Id. ¶ 64. On August 15, 2014, USCIS denied Fátima's motion to reconsider. Id. ¶ 67. The Cavazoses filed this suit for a declaration that they are both citizens of the United States. Id. ¶ 1.
On February 27, 2015, the Cavazoses filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 8 U.S.C. § 1503. Id. On April 29, 2016, the government filed the instant motion for summary judgment (docket entry 25). On June 10, 2016, the Cavazoses filed a timely response (docket entry 34), to which the government served a timely reply (docket entry 43).
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits, if any, "show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c)(1). A fact is material if the governing substantive law identifies it as having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue as to a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.; see also Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (). To demonstrate a genuine issue as to the material facts, the nonmoving parties "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric IndustrialCompany v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving parties must show that the evidence is sufficient to support the resolution of the material factual issues in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company, 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)). However, it is not incumbent upon the court to comb the record in search of evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving parties have a duty to designate the evidence in the record that establishes the existence of genuine issues as to the material facts. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). "When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant[s] fail[] even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court." Malacara, 353 F.3d at 405.
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1503 provides:
If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person may institute an action under the provisions of [28 U.S.C.§ 2201] against the head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). This court has power to grant the relief sought under 8 U.S.C. § 1503 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
In a case properly brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1503, the court must make a de novo determination whether the plaintiff is a national of the United States. Richards v. Secretary of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985); Delmore v. Brownell, 135 F. Supp. 470, 473 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd, 236 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1956). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is a United States national. Reyes v. Neelly, 264 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir. 1959); Liacakos v. Kennedy, 195 F. Supp. 630, 631 (D.D.C. 1961).
Summary judgment may only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The central fact issue in this case, where José was born, is very much in dispute. The government repeatedly questions the credibility of the Cavazoses' evidence, but the court does not assess evidentiary credibility on a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Consequently, summary judgment on the question of where José was born is inappropriate.
The Cavazoses have met their prima facie burden by producing, among other evidence, a Texas baptismal certificate listing Menlo, Washington as José's birthplace, Plaintiffs' Appendix at 139, a Mexican birth certificate listing Pacifica, Washington as José's birthplace, id. at 142-43 (docket entry 40), and the testimony of Benjamin Cavazos, who corroborates the account of José. Id. at 164-97.
The government contends that the Texas baptismal certificate from Our Lady of Refuge Catholic Church in Roma, Texas "was, at best, admittedly based on hearsay." Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 15 (docket entry 26). However, a statement of fact contained in a baptismal certificate is excluded by the rule against hearsay if the statement is made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, attested that the person administered a sacrament, and purported to have been issued at the time of the birth or within a reasonable time after it. FED. R. EVID. 803(12). Further, the government challenges the credibility of the baptismal certificate because Roma, Texas is located near the border between Texas and Mexico. Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply") at 3 (docket entry 43). However, the fact-finder will determine the weight and credibility that should be attributed to the evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 255. It is not this court's function, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "to weighevidence, assess credibility, or determine the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence." Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1987).
The government correctly asserts that the judgment of the Mexican court to change José's record to indicate his birthplace as Pacifica, Washington has no preclusive or determinative effect on ...
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