Caverly v. State

• Decision Date: 09 February 2022
• Docket Number: SC 20577
• Parties: Ronald G. CAVERLY, Administrator (Estate of James B. Caverly) v. STATE of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

342 Conn. 226

269 A.3d 94

Ronald G. CAVERLY, Administrator (Estate of James B. Caverly)

v.STATE of Connecticut

SC 20577

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 18, 2021

Officially released February 9, 2022^*

Michael G. Rigg, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Robert D. Silva, for the appellant (defendant).

Marc J. Ubaldi, with whom, on the brief, were Leslie Gold McPadden and Adele R. Jacobs, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

ECKER, J.

The decedent, James B. Caverly, died while under the medical care of the employees of the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff, Ronald G. Caverly, administrator of the decedent's estate, subsequently received authorization from the Office of the Claims Commissioner to file a medical malpractice action against the defendant, the state of Connecticut, doing business as UCONN Health Center/John Dempsey Hospital, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 4-160 (b).¹ The plaintiff filed the present medical malpractice action, which the state moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. The state argued that, because the plaintiff had received a settlement payment from a joint tortfeasor² in connection with the decedent's death, the plaintiff's action was barred by General Statutes § 4-160b (a), which provides that "[t]he Office of the Claims Commissioner shall not accept or pay any subrogated claim or any claim directly or indirectly paid by or assigned to a third party." The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss on the ground that § 4-160b (a) applies only to subrogated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. We affirm the trial court's denial of the state's motion to dismiss.

The operative complaint alleges the following relevant facts.³ On December 5, 2016, the doctors and/or nurses at John Dempsey Hospital prescribed warfarin

, an anticoagulant medication, to the decedent. The prescription was filled at a CVS Pharmacy in Mansfield. According to the instructions printed on the prescription label, the decedent was directed to "take four and one-half 3 milligram tablets on Monday and Thursday and three 3 milligram tablets on the other days of the week." On December 8, 2016, the decedent was seen at the anticoagulation clinic at John Dempsey Hospital, at which time "he was directed to take the warfarin 3 milligram, four days per week, and the warfarin [4.5] milligram three days per week."

On December 16, 2016, the decedent returned to the anticoagulation

clinic, complaining of "bruising and swelling on his arm and elbow, indicative of recent bleeding." The decedent's international normalized ratio (INR)⁴ was tested, "which revealed that his INR was greater than 8, with normal limits considered to be between 2 and 3." The decedent underwent a second blood test to ascertain a more specific INR value. "The [second] blood test documented an INR result that was dangerously high at 14.1.... As a result of the dangerously high INR level, the ... decedent was instructed to [stop taking] the warfarin and to return to the anticoagulation clinic on December 19, 2016, for a repeat INR test, and to go to the emergency room if any bleeding event occurred." Additionally, the decedent was prescribed one 5 milligram dose of vitamin K. Two days later, after taking the vitamin K, the decedent "was taken emergently to Hartford Hospital," where he "died from hemorrhagic complications of Coumadin /warfarin administration from his blood being too thin."

On December 14, 2017, the plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, alleging that "employees of the state of Connecticut employed by the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center deviated from the standard of care ... while [the decedent] was a patient [at] the hospital," resulting "in the decedent experiencing a hemorrhage that caused his death." Attached to the plaintiff's notice of claim was "a certificate of good faith and an opinion letter in accordance with [General Statutes] § 52-190a." The claims commissioner granted the plaintiff "permission to sue the state of Connecticut for damages of up to $5 million for acts of alleged medical negligence" in accordance with § 4-160 (b). The plaintiff thereafter filed the present medical malpractice action against the state.

Meanwhile, in March, 2019, prior to receiving a decision from the claims commissioner, the plaintiff had filed an action in the Superior Court against CVS Pharmacy and certain of its corporate affiliates (collectively, CVS Pharmacy), alleging that CVS Pharmacy's negligence in filling the decedent's warfarin

and vitamin K prescriptions caused the decedent's death. See Caverly v. CVS Health Corp. , Superior Court, judicial district of Rockville, Docket No. TTD-CV19-6017238-S (March 22, 2019) (CVS action). The CVS action, which was removed to federal court, settled in January, 2020, for $2 million.

On June 30, 2020, the state moved to dismiss the present case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiff's receipt of the settlement funds in the CVS action vitiated the claims commissioner's grant of authorization allowing the plaintiff to sue the state. Specifically, the state claimed that, in light of the settlement, the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state had been "indirectly paid by ... a third party" within the meaning of § 4-160b (a).

The plaintiff opposed the state's motion to dismiss, arguing that § 4-160b (a) was inapplicable to the present case because the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state had not been subrogated or assigned to a third party and was separate and distinct from its claim against CVS Pharmacy. Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that the timing of the claims commissioner's authorization to sue the state was dispositive of the state's motion because "the claims commissioner granted permission to sue before the settlement was paid," and, therefore, "the claims commissioner accepted a claim that was at the most payable, rather than paid," under § 4-160b (a). (Emphasis in original.)

The trial court denied the state's motion to dismiss. The court found that the plain language of § 4-160b (a) demonstrated "that the legislature meant simply to limit its waiver of sovereign immunity by excluding from its application subrogees and assignees of claims." The trial court observed that "[t]he statute is silent as to any subsequent forfeiture or revocation of the claim upon payment by a joint tortfeasor" and concluded that, "if the legislature intended to either require the absence of joint tortfeasors before a claim is accepted, or to withdraw a waiver of sovereign immunity upon the payment of a common harm or injury by such joint tortfeasor, it could have done so but did not." Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff's medical malpractice action was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The state appealed from the decision of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.⁵

It is well established that "[t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss. ...

A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law," over which we exercise plenary review. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301, 313, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). More specifically, whether § 4-160b (a) waives the state's sovereign immunity with respect to a claim for damages against the state when the plaintiff has received or will receive compensation for his or her loss by way of a settlement with a joint tortfeasor is a question of law subject to plenary review. See, e.g., Graham v. Commissioner of Transportation , 330 Conn. 400, 416, 195 A.3d 664 (2018) (whether statute operates as waiver of sovereign immunity is "a question of statutory construction that constitutes a question of law over which our review is plenary").

To ascertain the meaning of § 4-160b (a), we apply the principles of statutory construction set forth in General Statutes § 1-2z. See, e.g., Boisvert v. Gavis , 332 Conn. 115, 141–42, 210 A.3d 1 (2019). We are also guided by the "principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed. ... [When] there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect [that] makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Envirotest Systems Corp. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles , 293 Conn. 382, 388, 978 A.2d 49 (2009).

Section 4-160b (a) provides that "[t]he Office of the Claims Commissioner shall not accept or pay any subrogated claim or any claim directly or indirectly paid by or assigned to a third party." It is undisputed that the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state was not "subrogated" or "assigned to a third party." Instead, the parties dispute whether the plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against the state was indirectly paid by a third party when CVS Pharmacy paid the plaintiff $2 million to settle the CVS action.⁶

Chapter 53 of the General Statutes, entitled "Claims Against the State," defines the term "claim" as "a petition for the payment or refund of money by the state or for permission to sue the state ...." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 4-141 (1) ;⁷ see General Statutes § 4-141 (2) (defining "just claim" as "a claim which in equity and justice the state should pay , provided the state caused damage or injury or has received a benefit" (emphasis added)); see also General Statutes § 4-165 (a) (providing that "[a]ny person having a complaint for" damage caused by state officer or employee ...