Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo
Decision Date | 21 August 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 80-CV-930,80-CV-960.,80-CV-930 |
Citation | 667 F. Supp. 938 |
Parties | CAYUGA INDIAN NATION OF NEW YORK, et al., Plaintiffs, and The Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. Mario M. CUOMO, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Marks Murase & White (Arthur J. Gajarsa, Kenneth A. Marra, of counsel), Washington, D.C., Meggesto & Meggesto (Judy Lewis Meggesto, of counsel), Syracuse, N.Y., for plaintiffs.
Wiles Fahey & Lynch (Joseph E. Fahey, of counsel), Syracuse, N.Y., Ziontz Pirtle Morisset Ernstoff & Chestnut (Glenn M. Feldman, of counsel), Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-intervenor Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma.
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of State of New York, Dept. of Law (David Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), Albany, N.Y.
Huber Lawrence & Abell (Howard M. Schmertz, of counsel), New York City, for New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.
Hiscock & Barclay (Richard Hughes, Clifford Wilson, of counsel), Syracuse, N.Y., for Consol. Rail Corp.
Hale and Dorr (James D. St. Clair, William F. Lee, of counsel), Boston, Mass., for Seneca County, et al.
Goodwin Procter & Hoar (Allan van Gestel, of counsel), Boston, Mass., for Cayuga County, et al.
Thomas H. Pacheco, Indian Resources Section, Land and Natural Resources Div., Washington, D.C., for United States amicus curiae.
In this action, one of a number with which the court has dealt involving Indian land claims, the court is being asked by the plaintiff, the Cayuga Nation of New York, and the plaintiff-intervenor, the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma (the plaintiffs),1 to determine that two conveyances of land, one occurring in 1795, and the other occurring in 1807, violated the Nonintercourse Act (or the Act), 25 U.S.C. § 177. The court has already written one lengthy opinion in this action denying the defendants' motions to dismiss, and in that opinion, with which familiarity will be presumed, the court set forth in detail the basic factual background of this action. Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 565 F.Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y.1983) (McCurn, J.). Currently pending before the court are a motion by the plaintiffs for partial summary judgment and motions by the defendants for summary judgment made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
Before addressing the merits of the motions, the court should make clear its role at this stage of the proceedings. In a recent trilogy of cases, the Supreme Court has illuminated the responsibility of the district court and the burdens on the parties when dealing with summary judgment motions. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
In Anderson, the Court stated:
106 S.Ct. at 2510. The Court went on to state:
Our prior decisions may not have uniformly recited the same language in describing genuine factual issues under Rule 56, but it is clear enough from our recent cases that at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. As Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), supra, and First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), supra, indicate, there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Cities Service, 391 U.S., at 288-289, 88 S.Ct., at 1592. If the evidence is merely colorable, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam), or is not significantly probative, Cities Service, supra, 391 U.S. at 290, 88 S.Ct. at 1592, summary judgment may be granted.
Id. at 2511. In Celotex, the Court discussed the burden on a party opposing a motion for summary judgment:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. "The standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, ___, 90 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. With the procedural fundamentals of summary judgment motions firmly in hand, the court will proceed to address the merits of the pending motions.
The most recent pronouncement of the Nonintercourse Act, which has been in effect in various versions for almost two hundred years, is as follows:
The plaintiffs contend that the 1795 and 1807 conveyances of land, made pursuant to treaties with the State of New York, were invalid under the Act because the requisite federal government ratification was never received.
To establish a violation of the Nonintercourse Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) it is or represents an Indian tribe within the meaning of the Act; (2) the parcels of land at issue are covered by the Act as tribal land; (3) the United States has never consented to the alienation of the tribal land; and (4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe has never been terminated or abandoned. Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 434 F.Supp. 527, 537-38 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd and rem'd, 719 F.2d 525 (2d Cir.1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 470 U.S. 226, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F.Supp. 899, 902 (D.Mass.1977).
The defendants, asking for no quarter and giving none, are battling the plaintiffs right from the start by arguing that the plaintiffs have yet to prove their tribal existence. The plaintiffs argue, among other things, that they are recognized as Indian tribes by the federal government and that the federal government has had a continuous relationship with them for a great number of years.
Based on affidavits by federal government officials that have been submitted to the court, there is no doubt that the federal government officially recognizes the Cayuga Nation of New York and the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma as Indian tribes. The government acknowledges the Cayuga Nation of New York as the same tribe with whom it entered into the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua,2 and it recognizes the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma as a successor tribe to the tribe with whom it treated in 1794. See...
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