Cedar Cnty. v. Sager

• Decision Date: 27 January 1894
• Citation: 90 Iowa 11,57 N.W. 634
• Parties: CEDAR COUNTY v. SAGER. CEDAR COUNTY v. LANE. CEDAR COUNTY v. GRAY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

90 Iowa 11

57 N.W. 634

CEDAR COUNTY

v.SAGER.

CEDAR COUNTY

v.LANE.

CEDAR COUNTY

v.GRAY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 27, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Cedar county; J. H. Preston, Judge.

Actions to recover sums of money paid by the plaintiff for the support of the defendants in the hospital for the insane at Mt. Pleasant. The actions were tried and submitted together to the court, without the aid of a jury, and a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, in each case, for the amount demanded, and costs. The defendants appeal.W. G. W. Geiger, for appellants Sager and Lane.

E. M. Brink, for appellant Gray.

Sam S. Wright, for appellee.

ROBINSON, J.

The petition in the Sager Case alleges that the defendant is and has been a charge upon the plaintiff since the year 1879, and that the plaintiff has paid for his support at the hospital for the insane at Mt. Pleasant the sum of $1,353.68, as shown by a bill of particulars attached; that there are funds belonging to the estate of the defendant, in charge of his guardian, sufficient to pay the amount plaintiff has expended, for which judgment is demanded. The petitions in the other cases are similar, excepting as to the time during which the defendants were supported, and the amounts paid by the plaintiff.

1. Section 1433 of the Code, as amended, provides that the law made “for the support of the insane at public charge, shall not be construed to release the estates of such persons from liability for their support; and the auditors of the several counties, subject to the direction of the board of supervisors, are authorized and empowered to collect from the property of such patients, any sums paid by the county in their behalf, as herein provided; and the certificates from the superintendent, and the notice from the auditor of state, stating the sums charged in such cases, shall be presumptive evidence of the sums so stated. If the board of supervisors, in the case of any insane patient, who has been supported at the expense of the county, shall deem it a hardship to charge the estate of any such patient with such cost of supporting the patient, they may relieve such estate or estates from any part or all of such burdens, as may seem to them reasonable and just.” The petitions were attacked on the ground that they do not show that the board of supervisors had authorized the auditor to commence the actions. If it be conceded that such authority was required, it was not necessary to set it out in the petitions. The evidence shows that the board of supervisors had directed the auditor to collect the claims of the defendants, and actions for that purpose were properly brought in the name of the county.

2. The first item in the bill of particulars in the Sager Case is for board, and is dated March 31, 1879. It is followed by other charges, chiefly for board, which were made at the ends of the quarters of a year. The charges in the other cases were made in substantially the same way. The appellants contend that a complete cause of action accued when each charge was made; that the charges together cannot be regarded as a continuous, open, current account, within the meaning of section 2531 of the Code, and therefore that all items charged more than five years before the commencement of the actions are barred by the statute of limitations. It was held in Kilbourn v. Anderson, 77 Iowa, 502, 42 N. W. 431, that charges for services rendered during a long term of years, although at rates of compensation which varied at different times, constituted a continuous account. The same rule has been applied to charges for board, office rent, and care of horse, which accrued from day to day, or monthly, or by the year; (Moser v. Crooks, 32 Iowa, 172; and in Wendeling v. Besser, 31 Iowa, 248, it was said that a claim for the continuous and uninterrupted boarding, lodging, and in other respects providing for, a person, during a period of 11 years, constituted a continuous, open account. We are of the opinion that the charges in these cases constitute accounts, within the meaning of the statute, and that they are continuous, although the charges were made at stated intervals. It is claimed that the...