Cedeno v. Com.
Decision Date | 23 February 1989 |
Citation | 404 Mass. 190,534 N.E.2d 293 |
Parties | Enrigue CEDENO v. COMMONWEALTH. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Arnold R. Rosenfeld, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Maureen B. Brodoff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with him), for Enrigue Cedeno.
R. Michael Cassidy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Com.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and LYNCH, JJ.
The Legislature has enacted two statutory provisions making the possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute it unlawful. The two provisions set forth somewhat inconsistent potential penalties for conviction of that crime. See G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(a ), as amended through St.1982, c. 650, § 7, 1 and G.L. c. 94C, § 32A(c ), St.1988, c. 125. 2 Although there are considerable similarities in the sentencing options available to a judge under the two statutes, § 32A(c ) requires the imposition on conviction of "a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one year," whereas § 32A(a ) contains no mandatory minimum prison term. Relying solely on the due process of law provisions of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the plaintiff, Cedeno, argues that the two sections are void for unconstitutional vagueness and that as a result he may not properly be convicted under either section. We reject the argument. 3
The case is before us on a reservation and report by a single justice of this court on the pleadings and an "Agreed Statement of Facts." In September, 1988, a complaint was brought under G.L. c. 94C, § 32E (1986 Ed.), in the Dorchester District Court charging Cedeno with trafficking in cocaine. Counsel was appointed. In October, 1988, after a bench trial, a judge found Cedeno guilty of the lesser-included offense of possession of a Class B substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute it in violation of § 32A(a ). The judge sentenced Cedeno to two years in a house of correction, service of one year of which he suspended. The judge did not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, and appropriately so, because § 32A(a ) does not call for a mandatory minimum sentence. Cedeno appealed to the six-person jury session of the Boston Municipal Court.
On October 21, 1988, the day set for trial, Cedeno's attorney requested leave to withdraw, and a judge of the Boston Municipal Court remanded the case to the Dorchester District Court A judge in the Dorchester District Court thereafter assigned the Committee for Public Counsel Services as new counsel, and Cedeno subsequently was released on bail.
Promptly on its appointment, the Committee for Public Counsel Services commenced this action on behalf of Cedeno under G.L. c. 211, § 3 (1986 Ed.), in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, asserting the constitutional challenge we have described earlier. Although that constitutional issue was not raised in the Dorchester District Court at any time, the question presented by Cedeno's petition in the county court is one of statewide significance and should be answered in the exercise of our statutory power of general superintendence. 4
The governing principles of Federal due process protection against vague criminal statutes are well established. As to allegedly inconsistent criminal penalties, we recently summarized the application and rationale of that Federal due process concept in Commonwealth v. John G. Grant & Sons, 403 Mass. 151, 526 N.E.2d 768 (1988). Id. at 155, 526 N.E.2d 768. Id. at 153-154, 526 N.E.2d 768.
Cedeno argues first that § 32A(a ) and § 32A(c ) are void for vagueness because a person could not tell until charged under one or the other subsection whether he was risking a mandatory minimum prison term. His second void for vagueness argument challenges the discretion that a prosecutor has to proceed under one or the other subsection.
There is no significant doubt about what the Supreme Court of the United States would do if Cedeno's notice argument were presented to it under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In United States v. Batchelder, supra, two statutes made the same conduct criminal and prescribed different maximum penalties. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced under the statute having the higher maximum penalty. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence. The Court said: United States v. Batchelder, supra, 442 U.S. at 123, 99 S.Ct. at 2204. The Batchelder opinion presents a view substantially on point on these facts, but, of course, based on Federal due process of law principles rather than on the State due process of law provisions relied on in this case.
Cedeno does not urge that different underlying reasons for the void for vagueness doctrine apply in making a due process of law analysis under the Constitution of the Commonwealth. He argues in effect that State due process of law principles should be less tolerant of confusion in a criminal statute. We need not decide whether the State standard is stricter than the Federal standard. We simply see no significant ambiguity in the legislative intent expressed in § 32A(a ) and § 32A(c ). The only question, one which we address later in this opinion, is whether there is any constitutional weakness because the prosecutor can elect whether to proceed against a defendant under § 32A(a ) in the District Court or under § 32A(c ) in the Superior Court (perhaps after a probable cause hearing in the District Court). 5
Cedeno relies heavily on our opinion in Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 441 N.E.2d 753 (1982), in which we struck down as unconstitutionally vague a drug control statute that contained both a mandatory term of imprisonment and an optional penalty of a fine or imprisonment, or both, for violation of the statute. The Gagnon case, which was argued solely on Federal constitutional grounds, involved a special situation not present in this case. Commonwealth v. John G. Grant & Sons, 403 Mass. 151, 156, 526 N.E.2d 768 (1988) . The void for vagueness argument disappears, however, when there is no fundamental inconsistency in the expressed legislative intent. Id.
The Appeals Court has appropriately distinguished the Gagnon case from other situations in which claims of unconstitutional vagueness have been asserted. In one instance, it commented that the unconstitutional ambiguity in the Gagnon case appeared in clauses in the same section of a statute and "created a situation in which no reasonable person could have chosen among several possible constructions of the penalty provisions." Commonwealth v. Maracic, 18 Mass.App.Ct. 722, 725-726, 469 N.E.2d 1304 (1984). In another case, the Appeals Court characterized the circumstances of the Gagnon case as one in which "the core concept [was] indecipherable" and "one could only speculate as to the punishment the Legislature may have intended by the impenetrable language employed to express it." Fogelman v. Chatham, 15 Mass.App.Ct. 585, 589, 446 N.E.2d1112 (1983).
In the Gagnon case, this court tried to resolve the statutory inconsistency by looking to the legislative history of the section but found it to be inconclusive. Commonwealth v. Gagnon, supra, 387 Mass. at 572, 441 N.E.2d 753. Confronted with a statute containing an ambiguity similar to that in the Gagnon case, a Federal Court judge in this State did not follow the Gagnon result, however, because he was able to resolve the "inconsistency" by looking at the accompanying statutory provisions and legislative history. United States v. Restrepo, 676 F.Supp. 368, 375 (D.Mass.1987) ().
As we have said, there is no uncertainty about what the Legislature has provided in § 32A. Section 32A(a ) proscribes certain conduct and prescribes a range of penalties for its violation. Section 32A(c ) proscribes certain conduct which also falls within the conduct proscribed by § 32A(a ) and prescribes a range of penalties. No one can be confused about what the Legislature intended. If a person possesses cocaine with the intent to distribute it, that conduct is criminal. That point is clear. The Legislature has...
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