Ceglia v. Youngstown State Univ.

• Decision Date: 01 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14AP–864.,14AP–864.
• Parties: Nickola CEGLIA, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

38 N.E.3d 1222

Nickola CEGLIA, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.YOUNGSTOWN STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14AP–864.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Sept. 1, 2015.

Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., Patrick K. Wilson, Warren, and Matthew M. Ries, for appellant.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Randall W. Knutti, Columbus, and Lindsey M. Grant, for appellee.

NUNC PRO TUNC¹

SADLER

, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Nickola Ceglia, appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio in favor of defendant-appellee, Youngstown State University (“University”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment in part and affirm in part.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} Appellant is a licensed social worker who received his Master of Social Work (“MSW”) in 2006. Appellant began teaching social work as a part-time instructor with the University in 1982. In 2006, appellant was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis and Parkinson's disease

, and there is no dispute that the University was aware of appellant's medical diagnosis. At appellant's request, the University had restricted appellant's class size to 30 students in order to accommodate his medical conditions. During his lengthy tenure as a part-time instructor with the University, appellant consistently received favorable performance reviews and had never been disciplined.

{¶ 3} In November 2012, the University posted an opening for a full-time position as an instructor in the Department of Social Work.² The newly-created position was to originate out of the University's Lakeland Community College location, and it was designed to mirror a position currently held by instructor Karla Wyant at the Lorain Community College location. The starting salary for the new position was $40,000 per year as opposed to the $9,600 salary available to a part-time instructor.

{¶ 4} At the time of the posting, appellant was 58 years old. The posting identified the following two minimum qualifications for the position: (1) five years post-MSW work experience, and (2) demonstrated successful teaching experience at the Bachelor of Social Work (“BSW”) and MSW levels. Additional “desired” qualifications included: (1) diverse social work experience with a range of client types and practice settings, (2) supervisory experience, (3) prior experience serving as a social work field instructor, and (4) demonstrated commitment to the social work profession and social work education. Appellant timely submitted his application for the position.

{¶ 5} The University established a search committee, chaired by Dr. Dennis Morawski, for the purpose of screening applicants for the position, conducting interviews, and selecting a new instructor. Other members of the committee included Dr. Shirley Keller, Dr. Melody Hyppolite, and Wyant. Dean Joseph L. Mosca had final signature authority over the committee's hiring decision. The committee identified six candidates who met the qualifications for the position, including appellant. The committee decided to interview the top four candidates for the position, but appellant was not among them. When one of the four selected candidates declined to interview, the committee decided to interview only three candidates.

{¶ 6} On April 3, 2013, appellant asked Dr. Morawski if the committee had chosen to interview him. According to appellant, Dr. Morawski told him that the committee focused on the “mid-career” applicants and that he would not receive an interview for the position. (Appellant's affidavit, ¶ 23.) Following the interview process, the University offered the position to Michael Madry. Madry is a licensed social worker in his thirties who had received his masters in 2004 and had been teaching social work for three years. Madry declined the offer.

{¶ 7} The University then offered the position to Tami Holcomb–Hathy, a 44–year old social worker who received her MSW in 2002. There is no dispute that when the University posted the position, Holcomb–Hathy had no classroom teaching experience. When the University interviewed Holcomb–Hathy for the position, she was six weeks into her first semester as a part-time instructor at the University. Holcomb–Hathy accepted the offer.

{¶ 8} In early May 2013, appellant asked Dr. Morawski “about the position being given to a much younger candidate.” (Appellant's affidavit, ¶ 24.) According to appellant, Dr. Morawski reiterated that the committee focused on “mid-career” candidates, and he added that the committee did not want to hire “someone who had been around for a long time.” (Appellant's affidavit, ¶ 24.) Appellant subsequently refused Dr. Morawski's offer to return to the University as a part-time instructor.

{¶ 9} On August 5, 2013, appellant filed a complaint alleging that the University discriminated against him on the basis of his age, disability, and perceived disability in violation of R.C. 4112.02

. On July 28, 2014, the University filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence was that the members of the committee held an honest belief in their proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for denying appellant the position. On October 2, 2014, the Court of Claims granted the motion. The court held that even though appellant had satisfied his prima facie case for age and disability discrimination, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the evidence produced by the University was that each of the members of the search committee honestly believed in their proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for denying appellant the position.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 10} Appellant assigns the following as error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MR. CEGLIA'S AGE AND DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT [the University's] PROFFERED REASONS FOR NOT HIRING HIM ARE PRETEXTS FOR UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 11} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C)

, summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate only under the following circumstances: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978)

.

{¶ 12} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996)

. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Because summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, courts should award it cautiously after resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358–59, 604 N.E.2d 138 (1992).

{¶ 13} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. Byrd v. Arbors E. Subacute & Rehab. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 14AP–232, 2014-Ohio-3935, 2014 WL 4459120

. When an appellate court reviews a trial court's disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial court and conducts an independent review, without deference to the trial court's determination. Id., citing Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A., 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107, 614 N.E.2d 765 (10th Dist.1992). We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant in the trial court are found to support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Helfrich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP–559, 2013-Ohio-4335, 2013 WL 5450931, ¶ 7, citing Coventry Twp. v. Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41–42, 654 N.E.2d 1327 (9th Dist.1995).

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Age Discrimination

{¶ 14} R.C. 4112.02(A)

states in part: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice * * * [f]or any employer, because of the * * * age * * * of any person, * * * to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” In general, “ ‘Ohio courts examine state employment discrimination claims under federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.2000e.’ ” Morrissette v. DFS Servs., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 12AP–611, 2013-Ohio-4336, 2013 WL 5451109, ¶ 14, quoting Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 10AP–1155, 2011-Ohio-6054, 2011 WL 5873375, ¶ 10, citing Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175, 2004-Ohio-723, 803 N.E.2d 781.

{¶ 15} “To prevail in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent” and may establish such intent through either direct or indirect methods of proof. Ricker v. John Deere Ins. Co., 133 Ohio App.3d 759, 766, 729 N.E.2d 1202 (10th Dist.1998)

, citing Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 583, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996). Absent direct evidence of age discrimination, a plaintiff may indirectly establish discriminatory intent using the analysis promulgated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Barker v. Scovill, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 451 N.E.2d...