Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker

• Decision Date: 29 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 22S01–1506–PL–401.,22S01–1506–PL–401.
• Parties: CELEBRATION WORSHIP CENTER, INC., Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Patrick TUCKER and Carolyn P. Tucker, a/k/a Patty Tucker, Appellees (Defendants).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

35 N.E.3d 251

CELEBRATION WORSHIP CENTER, INC., Appellant (Plaintiff)

v.Patrick TUCKER and Carolyn P. Tucker, a/k/a Patty Tucker, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 22S01–1506–PL–401.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 29, 2015.

Joseph C. Klausing, Stephanie L. Caldwell, O'Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, Attorneys for Appellant.

John A. Kraft, Young, Lind, Endres & Kraft, New Albany, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees.

On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 22A01–1405–PL–229

DICKSON

, Justice.

This appeal challenges summary judgment for claimants establishing title to and use of real property by adverse possession and by prescriptive easement. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, we affirm the trial court.

In June 2011, the appellant/plaintiff Celebration Worship Center (“the church”) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, seeking to determine the boundary line between it and the appellees/defendants Patrick and Carolyn P. (‘Patty’) Tucker (collectively, “the homeowners”), to determine ownership of its real estate, to allow it to build a fence along the boundary line, and to seek further injunctive relief against the homeowners to cease their “trespass” activities. Appellant's App'x at 8. The church holds the deed to lots 1, 2, and 3 on plat 349 in Floyd County, Indiana. The homeowners hold the deed to lot 4, the adjacent property to the east. Surveys attached to the church's complaint describe a boundary line as “Edge of Gravel,” id. at 15–16, which appears to refer to the east edge of a gravel driveway along the east border of lot 3.

Although the church has sued both the homeowners, the only titleholder of the disputed real estate is Patty Tucker, who purchased her home from her mother, Bonnie Weathers, who had owned and occupied the property from March 15, 1972, until she conveyed it to Patty by quitclaim deed on November 4, 2003. Organized in 2002, the church took title to its real estate on January 10, 2003, from Resurrection Morning Fellowship, Inc. The church's pastor, David Ledger, began his employment in 2001 and never held an office with Resurrection Morning Fellowship. The boundary control issue arose in 2003—shortly before the homeowners moved in, and the property was surveyed soon after.

The homeowners filed their answer and a counterclaim to the church's complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing they had acquired title to the disputed real estate—the grassy portion along the east side of lot 3 contiguous to the west side of lot 4 (their side yard) and the “edge of the gravel”—by adverse possession, as well as a prescriptive easement over the adjacent gravel driveway along the west edge of the disputed grassy area and contiguous to the gravel parking area of lot 3. After written discovery and depositions, competing motions for summary judgment, and a hearing on said motions, the trial court issued an order on July 16, 2013, denying the church's motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the homeowners on both the adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims. The parties subsequently filed numerous motions to correct errors, for clarification, and for reconsideration.

The church appeals the trial court's July 16, 2013 order as well as its orders clarifying the homeowner's use of the acquired prescriptive easement on January 22, 2014, and April 30, 2014. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on both claims, concluding the church, not the homeowners, was entitled to summary judgment. Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker, 26 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind.Ct.App.2015)

(table). We now grant transfer and affirm the trial court on both claims.

We review a summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the designated evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Trial Rule 56(C)

, quoted in

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.2014) ; Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties' differing accounts of the truth ... or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 761 (internal citations omitted), quoted in

Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. The initial burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to “demonstrate[ ] the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue.” Id. at 761–62 (internal substitution omitted), quoted in

Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003.

The church appeals the trial court's July 16, 2013 order granting the homeowners' motion for summary judgment on both the adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims. As such, for the basis of this appeal, the homeowners are the moving party for summary judgment.

Adverse Possession Claim

In Fraley v. Minger, this Court discussed and synthesized the common law doctrine of adverse possession:

[T]he doctrine of adverse possession entitles a person without title to obtain ownership to a parcel of land upon clear and convincing proof of control, intent, notice, and duration, as follows:

(1) Control—The claimant must exercise a degree of use and control over the parcel that is normal and customary considering the characteristics of the land (reflecting the former elements of “actual,” and in some ways “exclusive,” possession);

(2) Intent—The claimant must demonstrate intent to claim full ownership of the tract superior to the rights of all others, particularly the legal owner (reflecting the former elements of “claim of right,” “exclusive,” “hostile,” and “adverse”);

(3) Notice—The claimant's actions with respect to the land must be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to the legal owner of the claimant's intent and exclusive control (reflecting the former “visible,” “open,” “notorious,” and in some ways the “hostile,” elements); and,

(4) Duration—the claimant must satisfy each of these elements continuously for the required period of time (reflecting the former “continuous” element).

829 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Ind.2005)

. The requisite period of time for adverse possession is ten years. Id. at 487 ; see Ind.Code § 34–11–2–11. In addition to these elements, our Legislature has added the statutory requirement that “the adverse possessor pay[ ] all taxes and special assessments that the adverse possessor reasonably believes in good faith to be due on the real property during the period the adverse possessor claims to have adversely possessed the real property.” Ind.Code § 32–21–7–1.¹ Substantial compliance satisfies this statutory tax payment requirement “where the adverse claimant has a reasonable and good faith belief that the claimant is paying the taxes during the period of adverse possession.” Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 493.

In their motion for summary judgment, the homeowners argue they took fee simple title to the disputed real estate from their immediate predecessor in title: “Patty's mother, the immediate predecessor in title had already established the necessary time elements of adverse possession and prescriptive easement prior to [the church] ever taking title to its real estate.” Appellant's App'x at 144. The church, in contrast, focuses on the homeowners' behavior since 2003 (“the past ten years”), the year both the church and the homeowners took possession of their real estate. Appellant's Br. at 11. We find the homeowners, as the moving party, have met their initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the designated evidence. This evidence, in turn, establishes by clear and convincing proof that the homeowner's immediate predecessor in title adversely possessed and obtained fee simple title to the disputed real estate by operation of law² prior to the church ever taking title to its real estate. Such title by adverse possession was conferred in 2003 to the homeowners, who have maintained their possession.

In their motion for summary judgment, the homeowners also point to designated evidence establishing by clear and convincing proof that they and their predecessor met the statutory tax payment requirement of adverse possession. This evidence includes the sworn affidavits of Weathers and her daughter Patty, stating they each believed in good faith that the taxes they had always paid on their real estate (lot 4) included all the grassy portions of the yard over to the gravel. See Appellees' App'x at 49 (“In good faith I always believed the taxes I paid on the Real Estate included all the area of the yard (grass area) over to the gravel.”), 58 (“At all times during my ownership of the Real Estate I believe[d] in good faith the taxes we were paying on the Real Estate was for all those portions occupied by the grassy area used as the yard.”). These affidavits are corroborated by designated county tax records showing the transfer of ownership from Weathers to her daughter Patty (showing no arrearage in taxes on lot 4) and the homeowners' payment of real estate taxes since. In response, the church does not dispute the payment of the taxes assessed on lot 4. The church even concedes that the homeowners and Patty's mother thought such payments covered the disputed tract. Appellant's App'x at 157.

The church focuses its argument instead on the homeowners' admission that they did not actually pay taxes on the disputed real estate. Id. Comparing this case to Hoose v. Doody, 886 N.E.2d 83 (Ind.Ct.App.2008)

, trans. denied, and Flick v. Reuter, 5 N.E.3d 372 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied, the church argues that “the Tuckers have offered no evidence as to why they would have believed they paid any taxes on ‘lot 3’....” Id. at 157. We find both Hoose and Flick distinguishable from...