Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker
| Decision Date | 14 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 22A01–1405–PL–229.,22A01–1405–PL–229. |
| Citation | 26 N.E.3d 1074 (Table) |
| Parties | CELEBRATION WORSHIP CENTER, INC., Appellant/Plaintiff/Counter–Claim Defendant, v. Patrick TUCKER and Carolyn P. Tucker a/k/a Patty Tucker, Appellees/Defendants/Counter–Claim Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Joseph C. Klausing, Stephanie L. Caldwell, O'Bryan, Brown & Toner, PLLC, Louisville, KY, Attorneys for Appellant.
John A. Kraft, Young, Lind, Endres & Kraft, New Albany, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
BRADFORD
, Judge.
On June 30, 2011, Appellant/Plaintiff/Counter–Claim Defendant Celebration Worship Center, Inc. (“CWC”) filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment against the Appellees/Defendants/Counter–Claim Plaintiffs Patrick and Carolyn P. Tucker (collectively, the “Tuckers”), regarding a land dispute. Specifically, CWC sought a declaration that it was the rightful owner of certain real property. For their parts, the Tuckers argued that they had either acquired ownership of the land at issue by means of adverse possession or had a prescriptive easement over the land in question. After the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tuckers on both the adverse-possession and prescriptive-easement claims. Because we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Tuckers and that summary judgment should have instead been granted in favor of CWC in both regards, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions.
The instant matter involves a land dispute over a portion of Plat 349, Lot Three (“the land at issue”) located in Floyd County. CWC claims that it is the rightful owner of the land at issue. The Tuckers claim that they have acquired ownership of the land at issue by means of adverse possession. Alternatively, the Tuckers argue that they have acquired a prescriptive easement for use of the land at issue.
On June 30, 2011, CWC filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment against the Tuckers with regards to the parties' land dispute. On August 15, 2011, the Tuckers filed a counterclaim against CWC in which they claimed that they had either acquired of the land at issue by means of adverse possession or had acquired a prescriptive easement over the land at issue. The parties subsequently filed competing motions requesting summary judgment. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties' summary judgment motions on June 25, 2013. On July 16, 2013, the trial court issued an order in which it denied CWC's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of the Tuckers on both the adverse-possession and prescriptive-easement claims. The parties have subsequently filed numerous motions to correct error and for clarification. CWC appeals following the trial court's denial of its most recent motion.
CWC contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Tuckers on the theories of adverse possession and creation of a prescriptive easement.
, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heritage Dev. of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Ind.Ct.App.2002).
When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment “we stand in the shoes of the trial court.” City of Gary v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Ind.2000)
.... “In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider each motion separately.” Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind.2013). Where, as here, the dispute is one of law rather than fact, our standard of review is de novo. See
Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind.2011). Further, the trial court in this case entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, “neither of which are required nor prohibited in the summary judgment context.” City of Gary, 732 N.E.2d at 153. “Although specific findings aid our review of a summary judgment ruling, they are not binding on this Court.” Id. Finally, “we are not limited to reviewing the trial court's reasons for granting or denying summary judgment but rather we may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any theory supported by the evidence.” Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind.2009).
Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville–Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 263, 267 (Ind.2014)
.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. American Management, Inc. v. MIF Realty, L.P., 666 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)
. Once the moving party satisfies this burden through evidence designated to the trial court pursuant to Trial Rule 56, the non-moving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. A trial court's grant of summary judgment is “clothed with a presumption of validity,” and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court erred. [Best Homes, Inc. v. Rainwater, 714 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ] (quoting Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262, 264–65 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) ).
In Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind.2005)
, the Indiana Supreme Court set forth a detailed history of the theory of adverse possession. Specifically, the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
The common law doctrine and application of adverse possession has a long history. As early as 2250 B.C. the Code of Hammurabi discussed adverse possession and the misuse of land, including provisions that punished land waste, rewarded long-term development, and allowed one who worked the land of another for three years to take and keep the land. See Brian Gardiner, Note, Squatters' Rights and Adverse Possession, 8 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L.Rev. 119, 123 (1997)
(hereafter “Gardiner”); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 Cornell L.Rev. 816, 821 n.17 (1994) (hereafter “Critique ”). In England, the history of adverse possession can be traced back to the Norman Conquest in 1066. See Gardiner at 125. The common law doctrine of adverse possession was applied to resolve land disputes between colonists in Virginia as early as 1646, where it was used “in an effort to help resolve the proverbial conflicts between speculators and squatters.” Critique at 823 n.29. The first statutory recognition of adverse possession in the New World appeared in a 1715 statute of limitations in North Carolina. Jeffry M. Netter, et al., An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.217, 219 (1986) (hereafter “Netter”).
With the western migration of pioneers, the federal government initially prohibited settlement of the western lands unless purchased from the government, but that requirement was gradually relaxed; anti-squatting prohibitions were abandoned, recognition of preemptive purchase rights were extended, and land was distributed to military veterans. See John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. Chi. L.Rev. 519, 528–29 (1996)
. Eventually, with the 1852 passage of the Homestead Act, land was freely available to such settlers. Id. At the same time, whereas the courts had originally followed the English example of requiring that the adverse possesser engage in activities giving notice to an inspecting owner such as residence, cultivation, fencing, and other improvements, American courts began to focus upon acts by the adverse possessor in keeping with the nature and character of the land involved. Id. at 538–39. The policy behind favoring adverse possession was the same as that of land distribution: favoring the productive use of the land. Id. at 534–40 ; see also Netter at 219 ().
Claims of adverse possession were litigated in Indiana from the early years of statehood. In Doe v. West, 1 Blackf. 133, 135 (Ind.1821)
, the Court observed that “[i]n England, and in some of our sister States, it has been decided that 20 years' peaceable possession gives a right which is sufficient to maintain ejectment.” The common law doctrine of adverse possession received legislative approval in Indiana with the enactment of specific 20–year statutes of limitation in 1820 and again in 1823. Id. at 136 ed. n.1. In 1853, this Court stated that for a claim of title based in adverse possession to defeat a legal title to property, “strict proof must be made not only that the possession was, from its inception, under a public claim of title adverse to that of the real owner, but that both such claim and possession have been continuous and uninterrupted ... through the full period of twenty years.” Doe v. Brown, 4 Ind. 143, 145 (Ind.1853). In 1951, the General Assembly demonstrated its continued approval of the doctrine by shortening the applicable statute of limitations from twenty years to ten years. See Acts of 1951, ch. 301, § 2; see also
Phar–Crest Land Corp. v. Therber, 251 Ind. 674, 683–684, 244 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind.1969) (Hunter, J., concurring); Berrey v. Jean, 401 N.E.2d 102, 104–105 (Ind.Ct.App.1980).
During the latter nineteenth century, many of the Indiana adverse possession cases began to articulate specific elements required to establish adverse possession. See, e.g., Hargis v. Inhabitants of Congressional Township, 29 Ind. 70, 71 (Ind.1867)
(). A relatively consistent list of similar elements of...
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Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker
...trial court on both claims, concluding the church, not the homeowners, was entitled to summary judgment. Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker, 26 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind.Ct.App.2015) (table). We now grant transfer and affirm the trial court on both claims. We review a summary judgment decision......