Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc.

• Citation: 105 Cal.Rptr. 904,29 Cal.App.3d 511
• Parties: William CELLI at al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SPORTS CAR CLUB OF AMERICA, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 29689.
• Decision Date: 20 December 1972
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 904

105 Cal.Rptr. 904

29 Cal.App.3d 511

William CELLI at al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SPORTS CAR CLUB OF AMERICA, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 29689.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 20, 1972.

Hearing Denied Feb. 14, 1973.

Bledsoe, Smith, Cathcart, Johnson & Rogers, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

J. Adrian Palmquist, Alameda, for plaintiff and respondent, William Celli.

David P. Weaver, Jr., San Francisco, for plaintiffs and respondents, Bob Reinfried and William Ribbs, Jr.; Jay R. Mayhall, San Francisco, of counsel.

TAYLOR, Presiding Justice.

Vaca-Dixon Enterprises, Durham Jones, Vaca Valley Raceway, Sports Car Club of America, Inc. and San Francisco Region Sports Car Club of America, the respective owners of the track facilities and operators and sponsors of an automobile race (hereafter defendants), appeal from adverse judgments entered on jury verdicts in favor of each of the plaintiffs in three personal injury actions consolidated for trial. Plaintiffs, William Celli, Bob Reinfried and William Ribbs, Jr., ¹ were spectators at defendants' sports car racing event and were injured during a practice run by a car that left the track and skidded into the infield area to which each plaintiff had been admitted pursuant to a 'pit pass' issued by defendants. The major contentions on appeal are that: 1) the trial court erred in refusing to admit the pit passes on the issues of liability and assumption of risk; 2) the release of liability agreements in the pit passes were not void on their face or void as against public policy; and 3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on contributory negligence.

The basic facts are not in dispute. On Saturday and Sunday, September 12 and 13, 1964, defendants sponsored a two-day sports car event at the Vaca Valley Raceway in Solano County. The oval race track was constructed on a north-south axis, with seven turns. Cars raced on the track in a clockwise direction. Vehicles coming out of the last turn, No. 7, at the northern end of the oval entered the straightaway that ran about 3,000 feet south toward the start-finish line. The straightaway consists of a 60-foot-wide strip of asphalt. Only the outer 40 feet are used for the race track. The innermost 20 feet of the straightaway constitute a 'pit lane' that is used by racing vehicles to enter and leave the track.

The pit lane is separated by a line of bales of hay weighing 60--70 pounds from the pit and paddock areas immediately wast of the straightaway in the infield. The hay bales were not intended to serve as a protective barrier but only served to delineate the pit lane. Immediately west of the pit lane and also reached by it was the 'pit area,' a 12-foot-wide strip containing 45 'paddocks' or 'pits,' each assigned to a specific entrant for working on his car. The asphalt stops short of the pit area. The area immediately to the west of the 10--12 foot-wide pits is correctly designated as the 'paddock area,' although in racing, the term 'pit area' is frequently used to describe both the pit and paddock areas.

A race spectator who held the usual $3--$5 general admission ticket was admitted to only two areas: 1) the grandstand located east of the straightaway; or 2) the infield area separated from the track, pit and paddock areas by a small fence. However, a spectator who held a special pit pass was admitted to the paddock and pit areas. The pit pass is essentially a ticket that could be bought at the track or obtained through the sponsors and managers of the race who mailed them to persons associated with the event. Four pit passes were usually issued without charge to each driver, who was also permitted to purchase two additional pit passes for $5 each.

Holders of pit passes are entitled to watch the race from the paddock area, including the row of automobiles parked at right angles to the track. These parked cars form a barricade to provide the only protection for those in the paddock area and the working pits. Holders of pit passes stand in front of the parked vehicles or sit on top of them.

The official rules of defendant, Sports Car Club of America, required that racing events be conducted with 'the highest standards of safety.' Persons in the pit area are entitled to the same high degree of protection provided for other spectators. The only protection afforded to the persons admitted into the paddock or pit areas by the pit passes on the day of the accident was the row of parked cars. Mr. John Luce, the Chief Steward of the race who was in 'overall charge,' testified that 'obviously, the only way' to protect anyone in the pit area is 'with some kind of a barrier that a car will not penetrate.' On prior occasions, cars had spun out on the staightaway on the Vaca Valley Raceway. In addition, in 1964, prior to the instant accident, the press had reported two similar accidents at different race courses involving their respective pit areas.

Luce was aware of the previous occurrences on the Vaca Valley race track and knew that race cars could go out of control on straightaways, as well as on curves. From the practices at other tracks, Mr. Luce knew of the following safety precautions: 1) a ditch in front of the pit area; 2) a pit wall; 3) a barrier formed by 50-gallon oil drums partially filled with water and joined by a chain; 4) a brick wall; 5) piling hay bales in front of a barrier or placing them 3--4 bales deep; and 6) a sturdy wire fence anchored in concrete.

Defendants actively monitored the performance of the drivers during the races and practice runs, and kept a 'driver's observation report' of each spin out, accident or other deviation. Luce, as Chief Steward, had authority to disqualify a contestant if he appeared to be lacking in skill or having difficulty that would endanger other personnel. Although the reports indicated that Connor, the driver in question, had four spins and also had crashed into a pole on the two days preceding the accident, he was not disqualified.

On the day of the accident, approximately 800 to 1,000 persons were in the pit and paddock areas, including women and children. Although the rules of the sponsoring organization allowed in the paddock and pit areas children over 12 in the company of their parents, about 50 percent of the children were under 12 years of age. There is also a concession stand in these areas that sells hot dogs, hamburgers and soft drinks, and the booths of several tire dealers. A number of families bring barbecue pits or hibachi pots for picnicing and are allowed to move freely around anywhere in the pit and paddock areas. No signs restrict movement.

The accident occurred on the morning of September 13, while Connor was making a practice run. His vehicle was proceeding south on the straightaway at a speed exceeding 100 miles per hour and went out of control on the straightaway at a point about 50--100 feet north of the start-finish line and 3,000 feet beyond curve 7. The Connor vehicle spun out from the track, slammed backwards into another vehicle being worked on, and finally came to rest at the western edge of the pit area. Connor and another person were killed in the accident and each of the three plaintiffs was injured while standing in the pit area and about 40 feet from the race course, as indicated below. ²

Defendants first argue that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the introduction into evidence of the pit passes that each plaintiff received and signed prior to entering the area where he was subsequently injured.

Preliminarily, we note that the release agreements in any event were invalid and unenforceable as to plaintiff Ribbs who at the time of the accident in 1964 was nine years old. Civil Code section 35 provides that a contract of a minor made while under the age of 18 may be disaffirmed by the minor himself either before his majority or within a reasonable time thereafter. Disaffirmance may be made by any act or declatation and express notice to the other party is unnecessary. The filing of an action is sufficient (Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 P. 320; Pereira v. Toscano, 84 Cal.App. 526, 258 P. 429). We conclude, therefore, that on this ground alone, the trial court did not err in excluding the pit passes signed by or on behalf of Ribbs. ³

Defendants contend that the pit passes signed by Celli and Reinfried should have been admitted on the issues of liability and assumption of risk.

The entire pit pass, in less than six-point type, reads as quoted in the appendix, infra. Thus, the release provision simply provides that defendants are released from liability for injuries 'resulting from any accident or other occurrence,' and does not state that defendants are released from liability for injuries caused by their negligence.

Defendants contend that the above language constitutes a valid release sufficient to bar recovery by plaintiffs from injuries received as a result of defendants' negligence. Accordingly, the first question presented is whether an exculpatory agreement, written in general terms, such as this, can immunize a defendant from the consequences of his own negligent conduct.

The well established rule in this state is that where the language of an instrument purporting to exculpate one of the parties for its future negligence, was prepared entirely by the party relying on it, words clearly and explicitly expressing that this was the intent of the parties are required (Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 578, 593, 271 P.2d 122; Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal.App.2d 128, 138--140, 242 P.2d 32; Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal.App.2d 264, 275--278, 264 P.2d 978; Sproul v. Cuddy, 131 Cal.App.2d 85, 95, 280 P.2d 158). Woodall v. Wayne Steffner Productions, 201 Cal.App.2d 800, at p. 802, 20 Cal.Rptr. 572, at p. 580, specifically held that an agreement purporting to release from 'any and all...