Cent. Iowa Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs

• Decision Date: 22 October 1885
• Citation: 67 Iowa 199,25 N.W. 128
• Parties: CENTRAL IOWA RY. CO. v. BOARD OF SUP'RS AND OTHERS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

67 Iowa 199

25 N.W. 128

CENTRAL IOWA RY. CO.

v.BOARD OF SUP'RS AND OTHERS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed October 22, 1885.

Appeal from Wright circuit court.

Action to restrain the collection of certain taxes. The relief asked was granted, and the defendants appeal.Nagle & Birdsall, for appellants, Board of Sup'rs and others.

J. H. Blair and N. C. Daly, for appellee, Central Iowa Ry. Co.

SEEVERS, J.

The construction of a railway in Wright county was commenced in May, 1881, and completed in November of that year. About 79 acres of land are owned and used by the company as right of way. This land was assessed on the first day of January, 1881, to the then owners at the rate of five dollars per acre, and if assessed to the plaintiff at the same rate the total amount thereof would be $395. The length of the road in the county is slightly more than six miles. The executive council assessed the plaintiff on its said road at the rate or value of $2,000 a mile, the total assessment being upward of $12,000; and upon such valuation the defendants levied taxes for the year 1882.

1. The plaintiff insists that the taxes so levied are illegal, because the right of way of defendant, which was the basis of the levy, is real estate, and that real estate can only be taxed upon the valuation fixed thereon on the first day of January in each odd-numbered year. Code, § 812; Richards v. Wapello Co., 48 Iowa, 507. That the statute so provides as to the assessment of real estate must be conceded. The effect is that improvements placed upon real estate after the assessment escape taxation until lands are again assessed, two years later. But it is further provided by statute that all property belonging to railway corporations used in the operation of the railway shall be assessed in March of each year by the executive council. Code, § 1317. If the appellee's construction of these two statutes is adopted, then the last-mentioned statute to an extent ceases to be operative.

The settled rules for the construction of statutes which have prevailed in all courts for many years forbid that such a construction should be adopted. It is a fundamental canon of construction that when there are two statutes which relate to the same subject-matter they should be construed, if it can reasonably be done, so that both may stand and have force and effect. It is not claimed, and we apprehend it cannot be successfully maintained, that it is not competent for the general assembly to provide that certain species of property shall or may be assessed by one officer, and other kinds of property assessed by some other officer or tribunal. It is equally competent for the legislature to provide that one kind of property shall be assessed once in every two years, and another kind assessed every...