Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 March 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. Bcd–11–375.
• Citation: 2013 ME 37,68 A.3d 1262
• Parties: CENTRAL MAINE POWER COMPANY v. DEVEREUX MARINE, INC., et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

68 A.3d 1262

2013 ME 37

CENTRAL MAINE POWER COMPANY

v.DEVEREUX MARINE, INC., et al.

Docket No. Bcd–11–375.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 9, 2012.

Decided: March 26, 2013.

John B. Lucy, Esq., Richardson, Whitman, Large & Badger, Bangor, and Henry Sorett, Esq. (orally), Brickley, Sears & Sorett, Boston, Massachusetts, for appellant Central Maine Power Company.

Barry K. Mills, Esq. (orally), Hale & Hamlin, LLC, Ellsworth, for appellees Devereux Marine, Inc., Devereux Family LLC, Andrea Devereux, William Stevenson, and Andrea Devereux, LLC.

Christian T. Chandler, Esq., James L. Costello, Esq., and Benjamin M. Leoni, Esq., Curtis Thaxter LLC, Portland, for amicus curiae Bangor Hydro Electric Company.

Christian T. Chandler, Esq., Curtis Thaxter LLC, Portland, and Kenneth P. Carter, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, New Orleans, Louisiana, for amicus curiae Edison Electric Institute.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶ 1] In this appeal from the denial of a motion to attach, we are asked to decide whether, pursuant to the Maine Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act, 35–A M.R.S. §§ 751–761 (2012), Central Maine Power Company, as the owner of an overhead high-voltage power line, may be entitled to be fully indemnified by Devereux Marine, Inc., for damages that CMP paid to compensate a severely injured employee of Devereux Marine for injuries that the employee suffered when he was electrocuted after a boat mast that he was holding came into contact with the power line.

[¶ 2] CMP appeals from a denial of its motion to attach the property of Devereux and related entities, sought pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4A, entered in the Business and Consumer Docket ( Horton, J.). CMP contends that the court erred when it interpreted 35–A M.R.S. § 760 as creating a statutory right of contribution, rather than a right to full indemnification, from an employer when (1) an employee is injured after bringing materials into contact with an overhead high-voltage power line, (2) the employer is determined to have violated the Act, and (3) the owner of the high-voltage line becomes liable to the employee. We conclude that full indemnification is required in such circumstances. Accordingly, we vacate the denial of the motion to attach and remand for further consideration of the motion in light of our interpretation of the Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 3] Bryan Smith was an employee of Devereux Marine in 2002. Smith v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 2010 ME 9, ¶ 5, 988 A.2d 968. While working at Devereux Marine, Smith was electrocuted when the mast he was lowering from a customer's sailboat came into contact with an overhead high-voltage power line owned by CMP. Id. Smith was severely burned and suffered significant permanent injuries. Id. This was not the first time that a sailboat had come into contact with the power line at Devereux Marine. Id. ¶ 4.

[¶ 4] Smith received workers' compensation benefits through Devereux and separately sued CMP for negligence in the Superior Court. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5. After a bench trial, the court (Penobscot County, Murphy, J.) found that, pursuant to the Public Utilities Commission's rules and regulations, CMP's power line should have had a vertical clearance of 45.5 feet. See id. ¶¶ 6–7. The evidence produced at trial showed that the height of the power line was in fact only 30 feet. See id. ¶ 8. The court further found that (1) the accident would not have occurred if CMP had met the 45.5–foot vertical clearance requirement, (2) CMP failed to provide training on its vertical clearance standards to its employees, and (3) the negligence of Devereux Marine, as Smith's employer, was not the sole proximate cause of the accident. ¹Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Based on its findings, the court entered a judgment on November 14, 2008, awarding Smith $4,890,631 in damages. Id. ¶ 9. CMP appealed, and we affirmed the judgment. Id. ¶¶ 1, 25. CMP paid the judgment, including interest, in the amount of $6,012,795.69 on February 16, 2010. This claim for indemnification brought by CMP against Devereux Marine follows from that judgment.

[¶ 5] After paying Smith as required by the judgment, CMP filed a complaint against Devereux Marine and others ² in the Superior Court. The complaint, as subsequently amended, alleged that CMP had a right to indemnification pursuant to the Act for the amount that it paid to Smith. Accompanying CMP's complaint was a motion for ex parte real estate attachment. The court (Cumberland County, Humphrey, C.J.) denied CMP's motion for ex parte attachment and granted the opportunity for a contested hearing on the attachment issue.

[¶ 6] Devereux Marine filed an answer to CMP's complaint and a memorandum in opposition to CMP's motion to attach. Shortly thereafter, the case was transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket. The parties filed additional memoranda regarding attachment, and the court ( Horton, J.) held a hearing on the issue. The court denied CMP's motion for attachment, interpreting the Act as creating a statutory right of contribution, as opposed to a right to indemnification. See35–A M.R.S. § 760; see also14 M.R.S. § 156 (2012). Accordingly, the court determined that CMP was not likely to recover a judgment “in an amount equal to or greater than the aggregate sum” requested in its motion for attachment. M.R. Civ. P. 4A(c). CMP filed this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

[¶ 7] Orders granting or denying prejudgment attachment are immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. See Centrix Bank & Trust v. Kehl, 2012 ME 52, ¶ 13, 40 A.3d 942. We ordinarily review an order denying attachment for an abuse of discretion and clear error. Sweeney v. Hope House, Inc., 656 A.2d 1215, 1216 (Me.1995).

[¶ 8] In this matter of first impression, however, we are called upon to interpret the meaning of section 760 of the Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act. We review the interpretation of a statute de novo as a question of law. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94. “The primary purpose in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We “examine the plain meaning of the statutory language seeking to give effect to the legislative intent, and we construe the statutory language to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “We also construe the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved.” Id. (quotation marks omitted.) “All words in a statute are to be given meaning,” and no words are to be treated as surplusage “if they can be reasonably construed.” Davis Forestry Prods., Inc. v. DownEast Power Co., 2011 ME 10, ¶ 9, 12 A.3d 1180 (quotation marks omitted). We will look to legislative history or other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only if the statute is ambiguous. Id.

B. The Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act

[¶ 9] The Legislature enacted the Overhead High-voltage Line Safety Act, 35–A M.R.S. §§ 751–761, without debate, in 1995. See P.L.1995, ch. 348 (effective Sept. 29, 1995). The Act was amended slightly in 1999, but that amendment has no bearing on this appeal. See P.L.1999, ch. 398, § A–19 (effective Mar. 1, 2000) (codified at 35–A M.R.S. § 752(2) (2012)).

[¶ 10] To enhance public safety, the Act prohibits any “person” from engaging in specific activities around an overhead high-voltage power line until that person notifies the line owner or operator, here CMP. See35–A M.R.S. §§ 754, 757. The Act's definition of a “person” includes any “natural person, firm, business association, company, partnership, corporation or other legal entity.” Id. § 752(3).

[¶ 11] In the matter before us, the person prohibited from engaging in the specified activities near overhead high-voltage lines is Devereux Marine. A business such as Devereux is generally prohibited from undertaking any work or activity that would bring a person, tool, or other material used by a person within ten feet of an overhead high-voltage line. See id. § 754(1). If the business intends to do work in that proximity to the line, the business must notify the owner or operator of the line at least seventy-two hours prior to commencing the work or activity. See id. § 757(1).³ Upon notification, the business that intends to conduct the prohibited work or activity and the owner or operator of the line must negotiate “promptly and in good faith” to make precautionary safety arrangements to accommodate the work. Id. § 758(1).⁴

[¶ 12] Until the notification requirements are met, the business may not, either individually or through an agent or employee, perform work that may cause (A) a person to be placed within ten feet of the overhead high-voltage line, or (B) a tool or material used by a person to be brought within ten feet of the line. Id. § 754(1)(A), (B). Additionally, “A person may not, individually or through an agent or employee or as an agent or employee,” erect, operate, maintain, transport, or store any “covered equipment or item” within ten feet of the line. Id. § 754(2). The Act's definition of “covered equipment or items” includes “items such as ladders, scaffolds, boat masts and outriggers.” Id. § 752(1) (emphasis added).

C. Allocation of Liability in the Act

1. The Indemnification Statute

[¶ 13] Because of the substantial possibility of personal injury or property damage arising from violations of the Act, the fiscal consequences for violating the Act can be severe:

§ 760. Indemnification

A person is liable to the owner or operator of the overhead high-voltage line and 3rd parties, if any, for all damages to facilities, injuries to persons and all costs, expenses and liabilities incurred by the owner or operator...