Cent. R.R. & Banking Co v. Ryles

• Decision Date: 18 July 1891
• Citation: 87 Ga. 491,13 S.E. 584
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Ryles.

13 S.E. 584

87 Ga. 491

Central Railroad & Banking Co.

v.Ryles.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 18, 1891.

Railroad Companies—Negligence—Injuries to Persons on Track—Instructions.

1. A deed made in 1869 to the defendant company, or its predecessor, conveying the laud on which the yard of the company is located, was irrelevant. An exception in the warranty of title which that deed contained would be no evidence that the public or any individual had a right of way or used the premises as a pass-way at the time the accident occurred, the exception merely excluding from the warranty rights, if any, that may have grown up previous to the execution of the deed. Other evidence tending to show how the premises wore used before they became the railroad yard of the company was irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible.

2. Though the analogies of criminal law touching presumptions as to the age of discretion are properly regarded by a court in ruling upon a demurrer where contributory negligence by an infant is involved, (as was decided by this court in Rhodes v. Railroad, etc., Co., 84 Gta. 320, 10 8. E. Rep. 922,) it is doubtful whether these analogies have any relevancy on the trial of the case before the jury. It would seem the better rule would be for the jury to deal with each case on its own facts, unhampered by presumptions of law either for or against the competency of the child. In the present case, however, the charge of the court on this subject, if erroneous, was harmless.

3. Only express consent would serve to license a thoroughfare under stationary cars. Mere knowledge by a railroad company or its servants that numerous persons, including children, without any public or private right of way, passed daily and hourly through its yard, situate in or near a populous part of the city, and crawled under stationary cars occupying its tracks, will not render it liable for an injury accruing to a child by a sudden and involuntary movement of a long line of such cars, resulting from the negligence of the company's servants in handling other cars several hundred yards distant from the scene of the accident, such other cars rolling against the standing cars and setting them in motion while the child was passing under one of them.

4. The other grounds of the motion are not cause for a new trial.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from city court of Atlanta; Howard Van Epps, Judge.

Action by Maud Ryles, by next friend, against the Central Railroad & Banking Company of Georgia, for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Calhoun, King & Spalding and J. T. Pendleton, for plaintiff in error.

Hoke & Burton Smith, for defendant in error.

Simmons, J. Maud Ryles, by her next friend, brought her action against the defendant for damages. So far as specifically enumerated, the facts in the declaration (excluding certain mere conclusions therein stated, and which, in connection with the specific facts alleged, made the declaration good against a demurrer) were substantially proved, and were as follows: The defendant company had a yard in which it left Stationary cars. Two streets ended at this yard, but there was a pass-way from one of these streets to the shops of another railroad company; and this pass-way was used by men, women, and children at all hours of the day, and was so used with the knowledge of the defendant. The places at which the people were accustomed to pass were, at the time of the injury, occupied by stationary cars, and "the line of cars stretched as far as the eye could see." The plaintiff was under nine years of age, and was going to the shops of another railroad, to carry a meal to one of the employes. When she reached the place where people usually crossed, she found it occupied by these stationary cars. There was no way for her to cross except by passing under the cars. Children in the neighborhood were in the habit of passing beneath the cars while standing at the place. In attempting to pass under one of the stationary cars she was injured. The injury was occasioned by the employes of the defendant "kicking" other cars from a quarter of a mile above where the child was, and out of sight, and these cars ran down and "kicked " the stationary cars, so as to cause them to move, and the one under which the child was ran over her leg. The plaintiff further proved that people were in the habit of crossing at this place before the railroad company established its yard. The plaintiff also introduced the deed by which the defendant company obtained title to this property, dated in 1869, in which it was recited that the company then claimed and had possession of the premises therein described, which were also claimed by the vendors, who had brought ejectment against the company, which, to settle the action, and to obtain an undisputed warranty title to the premises in fee-simple, had, by way of compromise, and without surrendering its former claim or conceding the invalidity thereof, agr»ed to pay the vendors $L', 000, for which consideration the vendors warranted the title to the premises against the claims of all persons whatsoever; but this warranty was not to extend to any riirht the Western & Atlantic Railroad and certain other named persons might have to remove the buildings, tracks, or other structures erected by them on the premises, "nor to anyright of way tho public may have acquired Id streets, ways, or roads over, across, or upon said...