Centeno v. Davis
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civ. Action 16-2779 (RMB) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | JAMIE CENTENO, Petitioner v. BRUCE DAVIS, ADMINISTRATOR and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Respondents |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner Jamie Centeno's (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2010 state court conviction for murder, endangering an injured victim and weapons charges. (Am. Pet., Dkt. No. 4.) Respondents filed an answer opposing habeas relief (Answer Dkt. No. 13), and Petitioner filed a reply brief. (Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 21.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
On June 10, 2009, a grand jury in Camden County, New Jersey returned an indictment charging Petitioner with first-degree murder of Jose Sosa, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1)(2) (Count One); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a (Count Two); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b (Count Three); third-degree endangering an injured victim, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2 (Count Four); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7b (Count Five). (Answer, Ex. Ra1, Dkt. No. 13-4.)[1] After trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts. (Rta5 at 123-24, 139-40; Dkt. No. 13-57; Ra2, Dkt. No. 13-5; Ra3, Dkt No. 13-6.) On March 23, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced on Counts 1 and 2 to life imprisonment, with 63 ¾ years parole ineligibility; on Count 3, a five-year term of imprisonment concurrent to Count 1 and consecutive to Count 4 and 5; on Count 4, a four-year term of imprisonment consecutive to Counts 1 and 5; and on Count 5, a 7-year term of imprisonment consecutive to Counts 1 and 4, with 5 years parole ineligibility. (Ra4, Dkt. No. 13-7 at 5-6.)
Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal with the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. (Ra5, Dkt. No. 13-8.) On May 2, 2012, the Appellate Division affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence. (Ra9, Dkt. No. 13-12.) Petitioner filed a notice of petition for certification in the New Jersey Supreme Court, which was denied. (Ra10, Ra11, Ra13, Ra14, Dkt. Nos. 13-13, 13-14, 13-16 and 13-17.) On February 13, 2013, Petitioner filed his first petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Ra15, Dkt. No. 13-18.) The Honorable Gwendolyn Blue, J.S.C. denied Petitioner's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. (Ra19, Dkt. No. 13-22). The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's motion to file his notice of appeal as within time (Ra22, Dkt. No. 13-25), and on October 1, 2015, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner's first PCR petition. (Ra25, Dkt. No. 13-28.) The New Jersey Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for certification. (Ra29, Dkt. No. 13-32.) On May 17, 2016, Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court, and sought a stay and abeyance because Grounds Three and Four of the petition were unexhausted. (Pet., Dkt. No. 1.) On June 1, 2016, this Court granted Petitioner's request for a stay and held the petition in abeyance while he exhausted Grounds Three and Four of his habeas petition in the state courts. (Order, Dkt. No. 2.)
On April 27, 2017, Judge Blue denied Petitioner's second PCR petition. (Ra34, Dkt. No. 13-34.) On September 13, 2018, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of Petitioner's second PCR petition, and subsequently denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration. (Ra42, Ra44, Dkt. Nos. 13-45, 13-47.) On April 4, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for certification. (Ra49, Dkt. No. 13-52.) On April 30, 2019, Petitioner submitted his amended habeas petition, which Respondents now oppose. (Am. Pet., Dkt. 4; Answer, Dkt. No. 13; Reply Brief, Dkt. No. 21.)
Prior to bringing a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), a state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies. Nevertheless, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” § 2254(b)(2). If a state prisoner's constitutional claim has been barred in the state courts on procedural grounds, a procedural default occurs and a habeas court cannot review the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 750 (1991).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
When a state court summarily rejects all or some federal claims without discussion, habeas courts must presume the claim(s) was adjudicated on the merits. Bennett v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 886 F.3d 268, 282 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013)). The presumption is rebuttable. Bennett, 886 F.3d at 281-83. The Supreme Court provided the following guidance.
[H]ow [is] a federal habeas court to find the state court's reasons when the relevant state-court decision on the merits, say, a state supreme court decision, does not come accompanied with those reasons. For instance, the decision may consist of a one-word order, such as “affirmed” or “denied.” What then is the federal habeas court to do? We hold that the federal court should “look through” the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning. But the State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). “When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to an unencumbered opportunity to make his case before a federal judge.” Johnson, 568 U.S. at 303.
The Third Circuit directed habeas courts to follow a two-step analysis under § 2254(d)(1). See Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 972 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied 528 U.S. 824 (1999)). First, courts should “determine what the clearly established Supreme Court decisional law was at the time Petitioner's conviction became final” and “identify whether the Supreme Court has articulated a rule specific enough to trigger ‘contrary to' review.” Id. at 253 (quoting Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2004)). “The ‘clearly established Federal law' provision requires Supreme Court decisions to be viewed through a ‘sharply focused lens.'” Id. Clearly established law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A decision is “contrary to” a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), only if the state court applies a rule that “contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result.]” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
Second, if Supreme Court precedent is not specific enough to trigger contrary review, habeas courts should “evaluate whether the state court unreasonably applied the relevant body of precedent.” Rosen, 972 F.3d at 253 (quoting Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888)). Under § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). For relief under this provision, the state court's decision “evaluated objectively” must have “resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.” Rosen, 972 F.3d at 252 (quoting Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890)). A habeas court must frame the “relevant question as whether a fairminded jurist could reach a different conclusion.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S.Ct. 517, 524 (2020) or, in other words, whether “every fairminded jurist would disagree” with the state court. Mays v. Hines, 141 S.Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021).
A petitioner who claims that the state court's adjudication of his claim was based on an unreasonable factual determination under § 2254(d)(2), faces a similarly heavy burden of proof because “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Miller-El v. Cockerell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). “The petitioner must show that the state court verdict was based on...
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