Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI
| Decision Date | 26 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-3111,18-3111 |
| Citation | 972 F.3d 245 |
| Parties | Adam ROSEN, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT MAHANOY SCI; Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Karl D. Schwartz [Argued], Jonathan D. Cioschi, Wiseman & Schwartz, LLP, 718 Arch Street, Suite 702, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Counsel for Appellant
Adrienne D. Jappe [Argued], Robert M. Falin, Montgomery County Office of District Attorney, P.O. Box 311, Norristown, PA 19404, Counsel for Appellees
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and PHIPPS Circuit Judges
Adam Rosen asks us to reverse the District Court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus.1 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania requested a psychiatric exam of Rosen in preparation for his first murder trial, where he raised a diminished capacity defense. After his first conviction was overturned, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense. Rosen argues that the second trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when it ruled that his statements from the court-ordered psychiatric exam were admissible to impeach Rosen if he chose to testify at his second trial. After electing not to testify, Rosen was again convicted of murder. Because Rosen cannot demonstrate that using his statements to the Commonwealth's psychiatric expert at the second trial for the limited purpose of impeachment would violate clearly established Fifth Amendment law, we will affirm the District Court's dismissal.
On June 30, 2001, Adam Rosen stabbed his wife, Hollie Rosen, to death in their home.2 Thereafter, Rosen called the police and claimed that masked intruders had invaded his home and stabbed his wife.3 However, within several hours, he confessed to the stabbing but claimed it was an unintentional response to his wife swinging a knife at him.4 According to Rosen, he and his wife had been arguing in the kitchen that morning when she nicked him on the neck and stomach with a knife.5 He claimed he followed her upstairs and then blacked out. The next thing he said he remembered was seeing his severely wounded
wife on the bedroom floor. Hollie Rosen died of stab wounds to her back, neck, and chest.6 Adam Rosen was arrested and charged with first degree murder.7
At his first trial, Rosen presented a diminished capacity defense.8 In support of his defense, Rosen retained and was evaluated by psychiatrist Dr. Paul Fink.9 The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion to have Rosen evaluated by its own expert, Dr. Timothy Michals, in order to rebut the diminished capacity defense.10 The record does not show that he was Mirandized prior to this evaluation.11 Dr. Fink testified at trial that Rosen was incapable of forming the intent to kill due to his manic-depressive mental illness, accompanied by psychotic features and paranoia, and the stress caused by the volatile deterioration of his marriage.12 Dr. Michals, on the other hand, testified that Rosen did not have a mental disorder that impaired his ability to form the specific intent to kill.13 Dr. Michals also testified that discrepancies between the statements Rosen made to the two psychiatric experts and Rosen's changing version of events—including his initial false statement about the home invaders—demonstrated that Rosen was self-serving.14 Rosen did not testify in his own defense and the jury convicted him of first-degree murder.15
After Rosen was granted a new trial for reasons unrelated to this appeal, he abandoned his diminished capacity defense and notified the Commonwealth that he did not intend to call a mental health expert.16 This time, Rosen planned to testify in his defense and argue that he did not premeditate or have the deliberate, willful intent to kill his wife.17 Nevertheless, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking to admit Rosen's statements to Dr. Michals about killing his wife and those in which Rosen admitted he previously attempted to rape her.18 The trial court ruled that Rosen's statements could not be used as substantive evidence in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, but that the Commonwealth could use the statements to impeach Rosen if he testified.19 After the trial court's ruling, Rosen changed his mind and chose not to testify at the ensuing bench trial.20 At that trial, Rosen was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
After the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur review on the question of "[w]hether the limited Fifth Amendment waiver occasioned by a mental health defense in a defendant's first trial allows the Commonwealth to use the evidence obtained pursuant to such waiver as rebuttal in a subsequent trial where no mental health defense is presented."21 Based upon several Pennsylvania state cases and Supreme Court law on the Fifth Amendment, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine .
In Commonwealth v. Morley , 545 Pa. 420, 681 A.2d 1254 (1996), the court held that a defendant who raises a mental health defense in Pennsylvania waives the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and can be compelled to submit to an examination by the Commonwealth's psychiatric expert. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Sartin , 561 Pa. 522, 751 A.2d 1140 (2000), the court held that a defendant who intends to use the results of his or her own psychiatric exam can be compelled to submit to examination by an expert of the Commonwealth's choosing for the purpose of rebutting the defense.22 Reading Morley and Sartin together with Commonwealth v. Santiago23 and Commonwealth v. Boyle ,24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court distilled the following rule: "[w]hen the defendant voluntarily presents a mental health defense that he subsequently abandons, the Commonwealth may, upon retrial, utilize the results of its psychological examination as to those issues that have been implicated by the defendant's own expert."25 The court explained that because the Commonwealth could introduce Dr. Fink's testimony as substantive evidence, Dr. Michals’ testimony "clearly could have been utilized in response to those issues implicated by Dr. Fink's testimony."26
Finally, the court found that any error would have been harmless because, if Rosen had testified, "all of the impeachment evidence could have been elicited solely from Dr. Fink, who was in possession of the same mental health records and reports that Dr. Michals possessed."27 Rosen "made admissions of guilt to both" experts and could have been impeached by the admissible statements he made to Dr. Fink.28 Therefore, "there is no reasonable possibility that the error may have contributed to the verdict."29
Rosen filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the trial court's ruling that his statements to the Commonwealth's psychiatric expert could be used to impeach him violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.30 The District Court denied the petition, explaining that Rosen failed to show that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion that there was no Fifth Amendment violation ran afoul of clearly established federal law.31 The court explained that Rosen "relies on snippets from several Supreme Court cases and a Third Circuit case, in an attempt to extrapolate ‘clearly established Federal law’ from general principles and materially distinguishable holdings of the Supreme Court."32 Thus, the District Court concluded that Rosen had failed to overcome the deference owed to state court decisions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).33
Rosen brought this habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2254(a). The order of the District Court dismissing the petition is an appealable final order. The District Court denied a certificate of appealability, but we later granted one on Rosen's claimed Fifth Amendment violation.34 Jurisdiction for this appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
We exercise plenary review over the District Court's denial of Rosen's habeas petition.35 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the Fifth Amendment issue on the merits. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), AEDPA requires Rosen to show that the state court ruling:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.36
In Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court elaborated on § 2254(d)(1), explaining:
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.37
We have further explained that a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established law where "the Supreme Court has established a rule that determines the outcome of the petition."38 "[I]t is not sufficient for the petitioner to show merely that his interpretation of ...
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