Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller

• Decision Date: 28 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 41683,41683
• Citation: 42 Ill.2d 542,248 N.E.2d 89
• Parties: CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lois E. MILLER, County Treasurer, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 89

248 N.E.2d 89

42 Ill.2d 542

CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lois E. MILLER, County Treasurer, Appellee.

No. 41683.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 28, 1969.

Inghram & Dittmeyer, Quincy, and Nafziger & Otten, Springfield (John T. Inghram, Quincy, and Elmer Nafziger, Springfield, of counsel), for appellant.

Donald G. Adams and Delbert Loos, Quincy, for appellee.

KLINGBIEL, Justice.

Central Illinois Public Service Co. pursues two tax objections on this appeal from adverse rulings by the circuit court of Adams County. One is for $36,518.94 in taxes extended against its personal property by the town of Quincy for general assistance purposes for 1966 and the other is for $7,818,76 extended against its personal property for payment of annual principal and interest on swimming pool bonds of Quincy Park District. Both amounts were included in a total of $106,844.06 of taxes paid under protest.

The objection to the levy for general assistance is based on the contention that the amount on hand in the general assistance fund, together with the funds due from the previous year's levy, made a levy for 1966 unnecessary and resulted in an illegal accumulation of monies.

The facts are stipulated. The balance on hand at the beginning of the fiscal year was $173,649.85 and taxes extended for the prior year (1965) amounted to $131,797.33, making total assets of the fund $305,477.18. Actual expenditures from the fund for the three previous fiscal years were $109,561.63, $118,380.65 and $94,163.46, respectively, or an average of $107,368.60 per year. Thus, the amount available was 2.84 times the 3-year annual average spent and 3.24 times the amount expended in the last previous fiscal year.

It has long been the fixed policy in this State not to permit the unnecessary accumulation of monies in the public treasury. And while the taxing authorities have reasonable discretion in fixing the amount necessary to be raised, the courts will interfere to prevent a clear abuse of their discretionary powers. People ex rel. Schaefer v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co., 353 Ill. 518, 187 N.E. 443; People ex rel. Nash v. Westminster Building Corp., 361 Ill. 153, 197 N.E. 573; People ex rel. Leaf v. Roth, 389 Ill. 287, 59 N.E.2d 643.

A review of the cases in this area makes it apparent that this levy was not justified. In People ex rel. Bracher v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 138 N.E. 113, it was held that where there were sufficient funds to pay interest on road bonds for 2 years with a balance over, the levy was void. In the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co. case the levy was declared illegal where the cash on hand and in process of collection was 3 times the average yearly expense for improvements. In Roth (cited with approval in People ex rel. Harding v. Chicago and North Western Railway Co., 413 Ill. 93, 108 N.E.2d 22) this court voided a levy where the district had assets available, not including any part of the questioned levy, in almost twice the estimated expenditures.

There is nothing in the record to indicate any unusual anticipated call upon the fund or that the levy was for any purpose other than the accumulation of monies in the fund. The argument is made in the town's brief that it has no control over the number of people who will need aid in a given year. This argument is not impressive when the expenditures for the past three years have varied only slightly over $15,000 between the high and low for the period, and the cash balance has steadily increased each year, the balances being $150,132.99, $161,693.45 and $173.649.85, respectively. From the brief it is apparent that the real reason for continuing to accumulate further surpluses is the belief that if no levy is made the town would not be eligible for a State supplement in case of some unusual demand for assistance. While loss of State assistance is not a valid reason for continuing to make levies which result in abnormal accumulation of surplus funds, there is a ready answer. Section 4--29 of article IV of the Public Assistance Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 23, par. 429) makes provision for allocation of State funds where there is no levy made because of the unobligated balance of funds on hand. Section 3.04 of article IV of the Township Organization Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 139, par. 39.04) shows a legislative intent that surpluses not be created by inclusion of a proviso which reads that the tax 'shall in no case exceed the amount needed in such township for such general assistance.' We are of the opinion that this...