People ex rel. Harding v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1952
• Docket Number: 32334,Nos. 32333,s. 32333
• Citation: 108 N.E.2d 22,413 Ill. 93
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HARDING v. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. PEOPLE ex rel. HARDING v. SUPERIOR COAL CO.

Page 22

108 N.E.2d 22

413 Ill. 93

PEOPLE ex rel. HARDING v. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO.

PEOPLE ex rel. HARDING v. SUPERIOR COAL CO.

Nos. 32333, 32334.

Supreme Court of Illinois Sept. 17, 1952.

Hugh J. Dobbs, of Springfield, and Nelson Trottman, of Chicago (Lowell Hastings, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.

Miles Gray, of Springfield, for appellant Superior Coal Co.

Edward R. Phelps, State's Atty., of Carlinville, and Paul C. Verticchio, of Gillespie, for appellee.

CRAMPTON, Chief Justice.

The only questions presented by these disputes are the merits of two tax objections filed by the objector-appellants in two separate appeals. The cases were heard separately on the same day before the county court of Macoupin County, which court overruled the objections to certain 1949 delinquent taxes for educational and building purposes of High School District No. 184, paid under protest by objectors, objection having been made upon application of the county collector of Macoupin County for sale of lands. The issues in both cases are identical and the appeals were consolidated here for opinion.

Objectors filed written objections and the cases were submitted to the court below upon stipulation, exhibits, and the testimony of the secretary of the school board. There is no dispute concerning the governing facts. The district concedes objectors properly stated and applied the formulas for the computation of the tax rates under section 162a of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 120, par. 643a,) and that the maximum established rate for educational tax purposes for the year 1949, the only year in dispute in any of the objections, would have been 45.1 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation of objectors' property, computed and based upon a rate approved at an election held on April 8, 1944, later reduced 50 per cent by subsequent legislation.

On April 10, 1948, the district purportedly approved by election a rate of seventy-six cents, and it is claimed this election is null and void for the reason the district failed to follow the statutory requirements in that no election was held to first increase the said 45.1 cent rate to fifty cents and no election held to increase said rate to seventy-five cents before the authorization of said seventy-six-cent rate and that the seventy-six-cent rate is therefore excessive and illegal to the extent of 30.9 cents. It is conceded by the school that no other elections were held other than the two above referred to.

This objection may be quickly disposed of. We deem it unnecessary to unduly extend this opinion by a reprint of the formulas, a recital of all the pertinent items, and levies, for the reason that this particular objection falls squarely within the rules laid down by this court in two recent cases. We held in People ex rel. Ruchty v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 408 Ill. 480, 97 N.E.2d 463, that the existing authorized levy, which was an essential prerequisite to a referendum increase under the provisions of article 17 of the School Code, was to be determined after applying the formulas provided in section 162a of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 120, par. 643a), for determining maximum levies during the period of transition to State-wide full value assessment. The effect of the Ruchty case was to require the raise in school rates that might be authorized by elections to proceed by steps, that is from fifty cents, the basic rate, to seventy-five cents and from seventy-five cents to the next step by successive elections. Since no election appears to have been taken to raise the rate from fifty cents to seventy-five cents, under the Ruchty case the levy in excess of that which could be raised under the minimum rate was void and, of course, the one cent in addition to the seventy-five cents, if such had been legally authorized, was also void. Since no election was had to raise the rate from fifty cents to seventy-five cents of from seventy-five cents to the next higher bracket, anything in excess of the legal rate of 45.1 cents on the $100 was clearly illegal. Section 162a was fully quoted and effectively discussed by this court in the more recent consolidated cases of People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. and People ex rel. Ross v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railroad Co. reported in 411 Ill. 60, 103 N.E.2d 79, with which cases the case at bar stands squarely on its facts. In those cases we held the rule announced in the Ruchty case was not affected by the 1947 amendments to section 162a of the Revenue Act and that a school district whose maximum rate under that section was less than .75 per cent did not have authority to increase its maximum rate above the .75 per cent by a single election. It is interesting to note that the election of April 10, 1948, in the case at bar, was held on the same day and year as that in the Ross cases. Thus, this court has settled the question of the applicability of the 1947 amendments to section 162a of the Revenue Act in this situation and the county court erred in overruling the objections.

The objection to the items concerning the levy for the building funds likewise raises an issue which it seems to us has been a long-settled principle in the law of school taxation, despite some recent...