Central Kentucky Asylum for Insane v. Hauns

• Decision Date: 11 October 1901
• Citation: 64 S.W. 643
• Parties: CENTRAL KENTUCKY ASYLUM FOR INSANE v. HAUNS. [1]
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

64 S.W. 643

CENTRAL KENTUCKY ASYLUM FOR INSANE v. HAUNS. ^[1]

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 11, 1901

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county, chancery division.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by Valentine Hauns against the Central Kentucky Asylum for the Insane to enforce a judgment. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Carroll & Carroll, for appellant.

E. L McDonald, Jno. I. Calloway, and Hazelrigg & Chenault, for appellee.

HOBSON J.

On June 17, 1896, appellee, Valentine Hauns, recovered a judgment against appellant for $5,000. Execution was issued upon this judgment, and levied upon a tract of land owned by the asylum, and some horses, mules, wagons, brick, hogs, cows and other personal property belonging to it. Appellant entered a motion in the circuit court to quash the execution and levy. The court refused to quash the execution, but quashed the levy. From that ruling appellee appealed to this court, which reversed the judgment, holding that the levy was properly made, and that whether the property levied upon was necessary for the support and maintenance of the patients at the asylum was a question of fact to be determined by the court. Among other things, after quoting a number of statutory provisions, the court said (Hauns v. Lunatic Asylum, 45 S.W. 890): "It will be seen from the foregoing that the title to the asylum property is vested in the corporation, and that its agents or officers have charge and control of the property and products of the farm, and that they must make proper reports respecting such property and products, and that, when a sale is made of anything, they shall report the proceeds thereof. The products of the farm and garden lessen, of course, the amount of money which would otherwise have to be appropriated by the state for the care and maintenance of the inmates of the asylum. It will be seen that the appellee is authorized to sue and to be sued. It is manifest that, if the appellant had committed a trespass upon the property of the appellee, it would have been entitled to have sued him, and recover judgment therefor, and that an execution could have been levied upon his property, if any he had subject to execution; or in case of trespass he would have been liable to be imprisoned under a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. Is it possible that appellant, whose property has been so greatly damaged and injured for the benefit of appellee, is authorized to only sue and recover a judgment without any means of collecting or enforcing the same? But we are told that the appellee is an agent of the state, employed to discharge a charitable function undertaken by the state and therefore appellant cannot enforce the collection of his judgment by a sale of the property, the title of which is by the statute vested in the appellee; and the reason for this is said to be that, if said property be sold, it will lessen the income to be derived therefrom, and consequently require a further or greater appropriation from the state treasury to support the inmates. It seems to us that such reasoning is not well founded. The title to this property is in the appellee, not in the state. It is true that the state requires the appellee to account for the proceeds of such as may be sold, and to furnish the products of the farm for the benefit of the asylum, such as may be needed; but it does not appear that, if all the products of the farm were taken and appropriated to the satisfaction of appellant's judgment, the inmates or objects of the state's bounty would thereby suffer. It may be conceded that it would not be lawful to levy and sell, under the execution in question, such property of the appellee as would render it totally unable to properly care for the inmates; but, as before stated, we are unable from this record to certainly determine as to all the property levied on by the sheriff. It, however, seems to us that the court judicially knows that the brick, the 137 fat and stock hogs, the 14...