Central New England Ry Co v. Boston Co

• Decision Date: 13 May 1929
• Docket Number: No. 532,532
• Citation: 279 U.S. 415,49 S.Ct. 358,73 L.Ed. 770
• Parties: CENTRAL NEW ENGLAND RY. CO. v. BOSTON & A. R. CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

279 U.S. 415

49 S.Ct. 358

73 L.Ed. 770

CENTRAL NEW ENGLAND RY. CO.

v BOSTON & A. R. CO.

No. 532.

Argued April 19, 1929.

Decided May 13, 1929.

Mr. John L. Hall, of Boston, Mass., for petitioner.

Mr. Lowell A. Mayberry, of Boston, Mass., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner is an interstate rail carrier having a branch line, a portion of which formerly extended a distance of 1.87 miles from Feeding Hills to Agawam Junction, Mass., where it connected with the line of respondent. In order to secure an entrance to Springfield, Mass., petitioner, on October 25, 1899, entered into a contract which provided that until August 30, 1940, it should have the right to operate a limited number of trains per day over the line of respondent from Agawam Junction to Springfield, for which it agreed to pay the sum of $15,000 annually. In 1921, purporting to act under a certificate of public necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, petitioner abandoned this section of its branch line, notified respondent that it would no longer meet its obligations under the contract, and proceeded to sever the connection between their lines.

This suit was brought by the New York Central Railroad, lessee of the present respondent, in the superior court for Suffolk county, Massachusetts, to recover from petitioner the annual payments due under the contract and a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff. Exceptions to rulings on the trial in the superior court were overruled by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on condition that the present respondent be substituted as plaintiff. 162 N. E. 324. The superior court entered judgment for respondent in accordance with the rescript of the higher court. The judgment of the superior court was thus, under local practice, a final decision of the highest court of the state in which the decision could be had and the writ of certiorari, granted January 2, 1929 (278 U. S. 596, 49 S. Ct. 176, 73 L. Ed. —), was properly directed to that court. see DaviS v. l. l. Cohen & Co., 268 U. S. 638, 639, 45 S. Ct. 633, 69 L. Ed. 1129, Myers v. International Trust Co., 273 U. S. 380, 381, 47 S. Ct. 372, 71 L. Ed. 692.

Petitioner offered several defenses to the suit in the state court, only two of which involve federal questions, and which alone may be considered here.

1. In June, 1921, petitioner made application to the Interstate Commerce Commission, as required by section 1, paragraph 18, of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456, 474 (49 USCA § 1(18), 'for a certificate of public convenience and necessity * * * permitting the abandonment of operation of its line between Feeding Hills * * * and Agawam Junction, * * *' on the grounds that it could not be operated, except at a large annual loss, and other available transportation facilities had rendered its continuance unnecessary. The Commis- sion issued its certificate accordingly, authorizing petitioner to abandon the designated section of its branch line.

It is contended by petitioner that the effect of the order was to relieve it from making any further annual payments under its contract. It is said that the provisions of the Transportation Act conferring broad powers on the Interstate Commerce Commission, and designed to secure to interstate carriers an adequate return and the segregation from surplus earnings of a revolving fund for their benefit, see Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 478, 44 S. Ct. 169, 68 L. Ed. 388, 33 A. L. R. 472, taken in conjunction with its authority to permit the abandonment by a carrier of a part of its line, evidence a purpose to grant to the Commission power to relieve the carrier from the further performance of obligations already incurred which are incidental to the operation of the abandoned section. From this it is concluded that, as the abandonment of the branch line by which alone petitioner could reach the tracks of respondent, made it impossible for petitioner to exercise its trackage rights over the lines of respondent, the order permitting the abandonment must be taken to have relieved petitioner from its obligation to make further payments which served but to reduce its revenues and so to burden its other commerce.

Respondent argues, with persuasive force, that the purpose of § 1, paragraphs 18, 19, 20 of the Transportation Act, was merely to protect the public from ill-advised or improper abandonment of its line by an interstate carrier, Colorado v. United States, 271 U. S. 153, 46 S. Ct. 452, 70 L. Ed. 878, and that it conferred no authority upon the Commission to relieve a carrier of its contractual obligations either past or prospective, with respect to an abandoned line. But we need not pass on this contention. It suffices, for present purposes, that the certificate and the accompanying report of the Commission did not purport to exercise such a power. The former certified only that present and future public convenience and necessity permitted the abandonment of the designated section of petitioner's branch...