Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 11 April 1907
• Citation: 43 So. 575,150 Ala. 379
• Parties: CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

43 So. 575

150 Ala. 379

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 11, 1907

Appeal from Geneva County Court; P. N. Hickman, Judge.

Action by A. E. Jones against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Espy &amp Farmer, for appellant.

E Foster Ellsberry, for appellee.

TYSON C.J.

This action was brought by plaintiff to recover the value of a trunk and its contents, alleged to have been lost by reason of the negligence of defendant's station agent. It is made to appear, both by the pleading and the proof, that the trunk was delivered by plaintiff to defendant to be transported as baggage from a point in the state of Georgia to Malvern, a station on its line of road in this state. It was also shown that the trunk arrived at Malvern and was taken in charge by the defendant's station agent at that point, and that while in his possession it was taken by some one other than plaintiff during the day of its arrival or during the night of that day.

The point is made that it was the duty of plaintiff to call for his trunk within a reasonable time, and that his failure to do so until the next morning after its arrival and its taking absolves the defendant from all liability. It may be that it was plaintiff's duty to call for his trunk within a reasonable time after its arrival, but his failure to do so did not absolve the defendant from all liability. His failure may have terminated the defendant's liability as carrier, which was that of an insurer, but that of warehouseman or bailee was still extant; and if the trunk was lost by reason of the negligence of its station agent, who received it, as alleged in the complaint, the defendant was liable, and proof of its loss raised the presumption of such negligence, and cast the burden of proof upon defendant of acquitting itself of negligence. 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 750, 751, and note.

The defendant having wholly failed to discharge this burden, the affirmative charge requested by plaintiff was properly given.

Affirmed.

DOWDELL, SIMPSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

NOTE.

Care of Passengers Under Disability.

[a] (Ark. 1894) In an action against a railroad company for personal injuries it appeared that plaintiff, a child seven years of age, who was traveling with her mother, while standing at the water cooler, was thrown forward by the stoppage of the train, and her hand caught in the door as it was being closed by the conductor. Plaintiff had followed him down the aisle. Held, that it was error to instruct that defendant was liable if the conductor might have seen her at the cooler, and, knowing the train was about to stop closed the door negligently, and thereby injured plaintiff as the conductor had the right to rely on the mother taking care of plaintiff.--St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rexroad, 59 Ark. 180, 26 S.W. 1037.

[b] (Fla. 1885) If the agents of the carrier have no knowledge of, or reason to believe, the existence of any disability on the part of the passenger, the carrier is held to no greater care than if the disability did not exist.--Jacksonville St. Ry. Co. v. Chappell, 21 Fla. 175.

[c] (Kan. 1880) A little girl, under five years of age, was put, with an older girl about the same size, an invalid, on board a train of cars, without anything wherewith to pay their fare. No adult accompanied them, and no notice was given to the railroad employés to take charge of them. When they reached their place of destination, they delayed to get off until the train had started, and, in doing so, the younger girl fell and was run over. There was no negligence on the part of the company. Held, that no action could be maintained for damages.--Atchison & N. R. Co. v. Flinn, 24 Kan. 627.

[d] (Md. 1886) Passenger conductors are presumed and required to possess ordinary intelligence and judgment to distinguish between the needs of a vigorous man and those of a woman far advanced in pregnancy, and must act accordingly.--Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Leapley, 65 Md. 571, 4 A. 891.

[e] (Mich. 1873) Where a child 4 years old, with

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