Saffa v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, a Corp.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1926
• Parties: JOHN T. SAFFA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

279 S.W. 223

218 Mo.App. 502

JOHN T. SAFFA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis

January 5, 1926

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis.--Hon. J Hugo Grimm, Judge.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Order affirmed and cause remanded.

Harry A. Frank for appellant.

(1) Although the relation of passenger and carrier ceased on the completion of the passenger's journey, the carrier remains responsible as such for the baggage of the passenger until the latter has had a reasonable time to remove it. What constitutes a reasonable time for the passenger to remove his baggage after its arrival at destination, if there are no unusual circumstances and the facts are undisputed, is a question of law which the court must determine, but where the evidence is such that reasonable minds might come to different conclusions therefrom, then the question is one of fact and should be submitted to the jury. 10 Corpus Juris, p 1237-1238, sec. 1608, and notes; 10 Corpus Juris, p. 1219 sec. 1590, and notes; Felton v. Chicago G. W. R. R Co., 86 Mo.App. 332; Burnes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 144 Mo.App. 71; 128 S.W. 236; Prickett v. New Orleans Anchor Line, 13 Mo.App. 436; Church v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 116 N.Y.S. 560; Larned v. New Jersey Central R. R. Co., 81 New Jersey Law, 571; McCoy v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 84 S.C. 62; Ziegler v. M. & O. R. R. Co., 87 Miss. 368. (2) The evidence that a passenger was delayed through missing his train and, on his arrival, finds unexpected and unusual circumstances in that the person whom he desires to see is dead and his funeral is being held that very day, together with his attendance at the funeral and thereafter calling at the station, and his offer to the carrier's agent to purchase transportation to another city and his request to check his trunk, considering that no demand for storage or to remove the trunk was made by the agent, is such that reasonable minds might come to different conclusions as to whether a person of ordinary diligence, care and prudence under similar circumstances has had a reasonable time to receive and remove his baggage. This question was properly submitted to the jury and the jury's verdict on this question of fact is final and the court erred in setting it aside. (3) Where a trunk is left with the carrier and deposited in its baggage room and the owner offers to purchase a ticket and to pay his fare to another city and requests that the baggage be checked for immediate transportation by the next train to such other city, the liability of the carrier attaches at once upon the express or implied understanding that the owner is to become a passenger to the same extent as if the baggage were in transit, although, for convenience, the owner consents to delay in purchase of his ticket and at the time of the loss, the owner had neither purchased the ticket nor paid his fare. Gregory v. Wabash R. R. Co., 46 Mo.App. 575; 10 Corpus Juris, p. 12215, sec. 1585 and notes; 1 Hutchison on Carriers (3 Ed.), secs. 113, 116; Mason v. Storage Co., 25 Mo.App. 479; Shaw v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 40 Minn. 144; Illinois Central R. R. Co., v. Trostine, 64 Miss. 834; Goodbar v. Wabash R. R. Co., 53 Mo.App. 434; Lakeshore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Foster, 104 Ind. 293; Morris & Grain Co. v. Mo. Pac., 182 Mo.App. 339, 170 S.W. 406; Green v. Milwaukee R. R. Co., 38 Iowa 100; see same case on second appeal in 41 Iowa 410. (4) The railroad company having received the trunk as baggage and having deposited it in its baggage room, even though it was liable only as a warehouseman, when the owner of the baggage offers to purchase a ticket and to pay his fare to another city and requests that his baggage be checked for immediate transportation or as soon as the facilities of the railroad company will permit, and the agent requests a delay in the purchase of the ticket and the checking of the trunk and makes no demand for charges on the baggage, the owner has done all he possibly could do to make himself a passenger and the liability of a common carrier attaches at once upon the implied understanding that the owner is to become a passenger, and if any loss occurs to said baggage after that time until it is delivered at its destination, the railroad company is liable to the same extent as if the baggage were actually in transit. (5) Whether a railroad company in receiving trunks at the station the evening before the owner is to take them over the road, does so as a carrier or warehouseman, is a question of fact for determination by the jury and the court having submitted this case to the jury, whether on this theory or not, and the jury having returned a verdict for the plaintiff, said verdict will be sustained if there is substantial evidence to sustain the finding upon any theory available to the prevailing party.

Watts & Gentry and Arnot L. Sheppard for respondent.

(1) The relation of passenger and carrier exists during the journey and only so long thereafter as is reasonably necessary for the passenger to leave the premises of the carrier; and as it affects the question of baggage, the relation exists during the carriage and for a reasonable time after arrival at the destination during which time the passenger must call for his baggage. (a) In this case the facts are not disputed therefore, the question of what constitutes a reasonable time within which a passenger may call for his baggage, is one for the Court and not the jury. D. & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Doyle, 58 Colo. 327, 145 P. 688, L. R. A. 1915-D, 113, and cases cited; Ross v. Railway Co., 4 Mo.App. 582; Rossier v. Wabash, 115 Mo.App. 515; Levi v. Railway Co., 157 Mo.App. 536, 138 S.W. 699; Felton v. Railway Co., 86 Mo.App. 332. (b) Appellant's trunk arrived at Covington at 6:40 p. m., December 5. He made no demand for the trunk before it was destroyed by fire on December 6, about midnight. As a matter of law his delay in calling for said trunk was unreasonable, resulting in respondent's liability, if any, changing from that of carrier to warehouseman. Cohen v. Railway, 59 Mo.App. 66; Levi v. Railway Co., 157 Mo.App. 536, 138 S.W. 699; Ross v. Railway Co., 4 Mo.App. 582; Rossier v. Wabash, 115 Mo.App. 515; Standard Milling Co. v. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258; Blackmore v. Railway Co., 162 Mo. 455, 62 S.W. 993; St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Terrell, 72 S.W. 430; Hoeger v. Railway, 63 Wis. 100; Vineberg v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 13 Ont. App. Rep. 93; Wiegand v. Central Ry. Co., 75 F. 370; Wald v. Louisville, etc., Ry., 92 Ky. 645, 18 S.W. 850; Gausmann v. Railroad, 119 N.Y.S. 1125; K. C., etc., Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 97 Ark. 287, 133 S.W. 1030; Graves v. Railroad, 29 A.D. 591, 51 N.Y.S. 636; White v. Railway, 186 N.W. 145; Doherty v. Railroad Co., 194 Ill.App. 354. (2) The mere fact that appellant failed to arrive upon the train which carried his baggage from Fulton, Kentucky, to Covington, Tennessee, did not excuse his failing to call for the baggage as soon as possible after its arrival at Covington. It was no fault of respondent's that appellant failed to arrive on the train which carried his baggage and for that reason respondent cannot be held responsible for the consequences resulting from appellant's missing the train. The same may be said of appellant's failure to call for the baggage on the day subsequent to its arrival for the reason that he was attending the funeral of one of his customers. For these happenings respondent was in no wise responsible, and it cannot, therefore, be chargeable with any consequence resulting therefrom. D. & R. G. R. R. Co. v. Doyle, 58 Colo. 327, 145 P. 688, L. R. A. 1915-D 113; Laffey v. Grummond, 74 Mich. 186, 3 L. R. A. 287, 16 Am. St. Rep. 624, 41 N.W. 894. (3) Under the facts disclosed in this record the relation of passenger and carrier ceased long before appellant made demand upon respondent for his baggage. Such relation was not resumed by reason of what took place at respondent's station on the evening of December 6, at which time appellant stated to respondent's agent that he desired to buy a ticket and check his trunk to Memphis; and was informed that no train would be available to him until the next morning at which time he would have plenty of time to check his trunk. Thereupon appellant left respondent's station without buying a ticket or checking his trunk. Under these facts respondent's relation to appellant remained that of a warehouseman. As such, respondent was liable only for negligence which was neither pleaded nor proved. Goodbar v. Railway Co., 53 Mo.App. 434; Gregory v. Railroad, 46 Mo.App. 574; Reis v. Railway Co., 179 N.W. 83; 6 Cyc., 670; Murray v. International Steamship Co., 170 Mass. 166; K. G. S. Ry. Co. v. Thomas, 91 Ark. 287, 133 S.W. 1030. (4) The term "baggage" includes such articles of necessity or personal convenience as are usually carried by passengers for their personal use, and does not include merchandise or samples, absent a statute making them "baggage." Doerner v. Railroad Co., 149 Mo.App. 170, 130 S.W. 62, 64; Whitmore v. The Caroline, 20 Mo. 513; Hubbard v. Railroad, 112 Mo.App. 459, 87 S.W. 52; Boack, Dyer & Brecht Millinery Co. v. Railroad, 177 Mo.App. 282, 164 S.W. 175. (a) Appellant's baggage was destroyed in the State of Tennessee. Therefore, the Missouri statutes making samples carried in trunks "baggage," is not applicable to this case. Under the common law, samples did not constitute baggage, and the carrier was not liable as an insurer for their loss. (See authorities last cited.) Tennessee was under the dominion of Great Britain subsequent to the French and Indian War and as such was subject to the common law of England. The law of Tennessee was not pleaded by appellant in the case...