Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Hall
| Decision Date | 20 November 1905 |
| Citation | 52 S.E. 679,124 Ga. 322 |
| Parties | CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. HALL et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
A common carrier cannot limit his legal liability by any notice given, either by publication, or by entry on receipts given or tickets sold. By special contract, he may relieve himself of his common-law liability as an insurer, and may contract against liability arising from certain losses which do not involve negligence of the carrier or his servants; but he cannot, even by special contract, exempt himself from liability for loss of goods intrusted to him, where the loss arises from his negligence or that of his servants.
A common carrier of goods which transports live stock is as to the latter property also a common carrier. There are however, certain inherent differences between live stock and inanimate property offered for transportation.
A carrier of live stock may by special contract so limit its liability for loss or damages that it will be liable only in the event that it is guilty of gross negligence.
A railway company, in its capacity as a common carrier, may, as a basis for fixing its charges and limiting the amount of its corresponding liability, lawfully make with a shipper a contract of affreightment, embracing an actual and bona fide agreement as to the value of the property to be transported and in such case the latter, when loss, damage, or destruction occurs, will be bound by the agreed valuation. But a mere general limitation as to the value, expressed in a bill of lading, and amounting to no more than an arbitrary preadjustment of the measure of damages, will not, though the shipper assent in writing to the terms of the document, serve to exempt a negligent carrier from liability for the true value.
Where there is an issue of fact as to whether there was an actual bona fide valuation or a mere arbitrary effort to limit liability, the question is one for the jury; but where the written contract shows that it falls within the latter description, and there is no issue of fact on that subject it is proper for the court to construe the contract.
The evidence in this case was not sufficient to show the perpetration of any fraud by the shipper on the company.
Where the common-law rule applies, under which no excuse avails a common carrier in cases of loss unless it was occasioned by the act of God or the public enemies of the state, if a locomotive engineer desired to leave his train and proceed with the engine some distance to a water tank for the purpose of obtaining water, and thereupon caused the flagman to uncouple the engine from the cars, which were left standing on the track while the engineer, in company with the conductor (who had authority to control him) and the fireman, proceeded on the engine to the water tank, obtained the water, and returned to where the cars were, but the engineer caused the engine to run at such a rate of speed as to be evidently dangerous, and to result in wrecking one of the cars, and causing the loss of property being transported, even if he were insane at the time, the loss could not be attributed to the act of God, within the meaning of the rule of law referred to, so as to excuse the carrier.
The meaning of "the act of God" falling within the rule discussed.
In this state it is the general rule that, in order to avail himself of the act of God as an excuse, the burden is upon the common carrier to establish not only that the act of God ultimately occasioned the loss, but that his own negligence did not contribute thereto.
Where, under a special contract for the shipment of live stock, the common-law liability of the common carrier was so modified that the carrier was liable for injuries arising only from fraud or gross negligence, it was admissible to defend by pleading and proving that its engineer upon the train on which the goods were shipped suddenly became insane at the time of the transaction complained of; and it would be for the jury to say whether the carrier did not know, or could not by the exercise of proper care have known of it, and whether it exercised due diligence in view of the situation and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.
Where an action was brought against a railroad company for loss alleged to have arisen from negligence, and the defendant in its answer denied the negligence, and some two years thereafter, pending the trial of the case, amended its pleadings by setting up that the engineer in charge of its engine became suddenly insane at the time of the transaction complained of, and that it was thereby relieved from liability, counsel for the plaintiff could legitimately comment upon the time when this amendment was made and this defense set up.
Where a suit is brought for damages arising from the destruction of property, and there is a basis of calculation as to the value, interest is not recoverable eo nomine. But the jury may consider the length of time damages have been withheld, the character of the tort, the conduct of the defendant, and all the circumstances of the transaction, and may in their discretion increase the amount of damages by adding to the value of the property destroyed a sum equal to the interest on such value; the entire sum found being returned as damages, and not exceeding the amount sued for.
Error from Superior Court, Morgan County; H. G. Lewis, Judge.
Action by J. S. Hall and others against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. From the judgment defendant brings error, and plaintiffs assign cross-error. Judgment on main bill of exceptions affirmed, and on cross-bill dismissed.
West Headnotes
Where an action was brought against a carrier for loss through alleged negligence and defendant denied the negligence and some two years thereafter pending the trial amended its pleadings by setting up that the engineer in charge of its engine became suddenly insane at the time of the transaction and it was thereby relieved from liability, counsel for plaintiff could legitimately comment on the time his defense was set up.
Hall and Crawford brought suit against the Central of Georgia Railway Company to recover damages for the killing of a mare. There was no conflict in the evidence as to the following facts: One White, acting for the plaintiffs, who were the owners of the mare, shipped her from Augusta to Bishop, Ga., along with several other horses, over the defendant's railroad. The train came to a standstill, and was divided into two sections, with one of which the engineer proceeded. At a point on the road the engineer said that the engine was out of water, and that he must go on to the water tank. The engine was cut loose from the cars, and went on to the tank, where water was obtained. The conductor and fireman accompanied the engineer. On the return the speed at which the engineer ran the engine was 20 or 25 miles an hour. The conductor warned him three or four times that he should reduce the speed, or the engine would run into the cars. He replied that he knew where the train was. There was a collision. The car containing the mare was wrecked, and she was killed. The defendant denied negligence, and pleaded that the engineer was stricken with sudden insanity at the time and while the transaction was in progress, that his acts were due thereto, and that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff demurred to the plea, but the demurrer was overruled. Evidence was introduced as to the market value of the horse. The jury found for the plaintiff $800. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and it excepted. Plaintiff filed a cross-bill of exceptions, complaining of the allowance of the plea setting up a sudden access of insanity, and the refusal to sustain the demurrer thereto. The other facts, so far as necessary, are stated in the opinion.
Dessan, Harris & Harris, for plaintiffs in error.
Saml. H. Sibley, for defendant in error.
1-3. In cases of loss the presumption of law is against a common carrier, and no excuse avails him unless it was occasioned by the act of God or the public enemies of the state. ...
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