Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. James
| Decision Date | 27 June 1903 |
| Citation | 45 S.E. 223,117 Ga. 832 |
| Parties | CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v. JAMES. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. On the trial of an action sounding in tort, brought against a railway company with a view to recovering damages sustained by the plaintiff because of its failure to safely transport live stock which he in his petition alleges he delivered to it for shipment, it is competent for him to show that delivery to the carrier was made by him through an agent notwithstanding such agent made the shipment in his own name as owner, without disclosing to the company the fact that he was acting for and in behalf of the plaintiff. It follows however, that, as the plaintiff thus predicates his suit upon a breach of duty arising out of the contract made by his agent, the former is bound by its terms, irrespective of the question whether the agent was or was not authorized to enter into a contract of that character.
2. A shipper of live stock cannot justly complain that a carrier failed to give needful attention thereto while in transit when, notwithstanding he agreed, in consideration of a reduced freight rate and free transportation for himself or agent, to take charge of and care for the animals during their journey, he did not himself accompany them, or procure another to do so.
3. When, in an action such as the present one, the plaintiff does not allege that the carrier was negligent in not transporting his stock with due dispatch, proof that there was unusual delay in the transportation, and that the company was requested to hasten the shipment, is wholly irrelevant and inadmissible.
4. In view of the terms and stipulations of the special contract upon which the prevailing party in the trial court relied as furnishing a basis for his suit, the evidence offered in his behalf did not warrant a finding in his favor on the theory that the company was negligent in furnishing him with a car which was unsuitable and defective.
Error from Superior Court, Early County; H. C. Sheffield, Judge.
Action by D. W. James against the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Reversed.
A. G. Powell and W. W. Bacon, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
R. H. Sheffield, for defendant in error.
An action for damages was brought by D. W. James against the Central of Georgia Railway Company, the plaintiff alleging in his petition that on December 27, 1900, he delivered to the defendant carrier, in the city of Atlanta, a car load of mules to be shipped over its line to Blakely, Ga.; that, while the mules were in transit, one of them "kicked through the door of the car in which they were being so transported, and was unable to draw its foot back, and, although the foot of said mule was fully exposed to view to the servants and agents of said company passing by and around said car, the said mule remained in the condition aforesaid until the same was delivered to petitioner in Blakely," and within four days thereafter died from the injuries it received. The company was charged with negligence, in that it failed "to provide a car with a sound and suitable door, and one sufficiently thick and strong to have avoided injury by the stock to themselves," and also with neglect in not giving attention to the mule after it had so caught its foot and had fallen in a helpless condition upon the floor of the car. The company set up the defense that the car load of mules had been shipped at a reduced rate of freight under a special contract, by the terms of which it was absolved from all liability to account to the plaintiff for the value of the mule which had been injured in transit. He subsequently amended his petition by alleging that "the freight was not agreed upon nor paid until after the said mules had arrived in Blakely, the end of their destination." The case was tried upon the issue thus raised, the trial resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. The company made a motion for a new trial, based on divers grounds, but its motion was overruled, and it excepted.
1. The plaintiff was permitted, over the objection of counsel for the company, to testify that the stock had been delivered to it in Atlanta by the proprietors of the Brady-Miller Feed & Sale Stables, under an arrangement whereby they were to act as his agents in making the shipment. The objection urged against this testimony was that the plaintiff, in his petition, alleged he had made the delivery to the company whereas "the written contract of shipment, which had been produced in court by the plaintiff under notice, showed on its face that this stock was not delivered to [the defendant] by plaintiff, but by the Brady-Miller Feed & Sale Stables, of Atlanta, who signed the contract as owners without revealing that plaintiff was interested in the shipment except as consignee and person in charge of the stock." We think the testimony was properly admitted. The action sounded in tort, and it was permissible for the plaintiff to show that, by virtue of a contract of shipment made in his behalf by his authorized agents, the company owed him a duty, as a common carrier, to transport the stock to destination in accordance with its undertaking thus assumed. In other words, proof of this contract was competent for the purpose of showing that a relation existed between the plaintiff and the carrier which imposed upon it a legal duty, as to him, of properly performing its obligations in the premises. It is not essential, in order to create such a relation, that a shipper should in person deliver freight to a carrier, for the law deems the acts of an authorized agent as those of his principal. Thus, though a consignee be not a party to a contract of carriage between a railway company and a shipper, the consignee may nevertheless make proof of such contract, with a view to showing the company became liable to him for a failure to comply with its legal duty as a common carrier to perform such contract, the same having been made for his benefit. Of course, where the owner of goods does not attend to their shipment in person, but procures another to act in his behalf, who does so without disclosing the name of his principal, the latter is bound by the terms of the contract which his agent makes with the carrier to the same extent as though the contract was made by the principal in person, irrespective of the...
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