Central Ohio Transit Authority v. Transport Workers Union of America, Local 208

• Decision Date: 25 May 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 87-655,87-854,s. 87-655
• Citation: 524 N.E.2d 151,37 Ohio St.3d 56
• Parties: , 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3176, 1988 SERB 4-47 CENTRAL OHIO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 208, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 56

37 Ohio St.3d 56

524 N.E.2d 151, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3176, 1988 SERB 4-47

CENTRAL OHIO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellee, v. TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 208, et al., Appellants.

Nos. 87-655, 87-854.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted March 8, 1988.

Decided May 25, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. R.C. 4117.16(A) does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.

2. Under R.C. 4117.16(A), the court of common pleas is without jurisdiction over a strike by public employees after the State Employment Relations Board has determined pursuant to that statute that the strike does not pose a clear and present danger to the public health or safety.

The controversy before this court today traces its origins to a contract dispute between appellee, the Central Ohio Transit Authority ("COTA"), and appellant, Local 208 of the Transport Workers Union of America ("union"). When the parties were unable to agree, the union, whose membership includes persons employed by COTA, commenced a strike against COTA on December 9, 1986. As a result, COTA bus service was suspended.

On February 6, 1987, COTA filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County seeking a determination, pursuant to R.C. 4117.16(A), that probable cause existed to believe that the strike might pose a "clear and present danger to the public health or safety" within the meaning of that statute. The petition prayed for a seventy-two-hour temporary restraining order to enjoin the union from continuing the strike.

After a hearing held on February 6, 7 and 8, the trial court announced its decision on February 8, 1987, finding that probable cause existed for a belief that the strike might pose a clear and present danger to the public health or safety within the meaning of R.C. 4117.16(A). Based upon this finding, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the union from the continuation of the strike for a period of seventy-two hours beginning February 10 at 12:01 a.m. The court further directed that " * * * within that 72 hour period, the parties present to the Court the finding of the State Employment Relations Board with respect to whether the strike creates a clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public, and the Court retains jurisdiction to extend this temporary restraining order to issue an appropriate order or injunction under the provisions of § 4117.16 in the event that the Board so finds."

For purposes of obtaining an extension of this order, COTA promptly requested a determination on this question from intervenor-appellant, the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB"), as required by R.C. 4117.16(A). COTA simultaneously filed an original action in prohibition in the court of appeals, seeking to prevent SERB from proceeding with such a determination, on the basis that R.C. 4117.16 is unconstitutional. This original action was dismissed. 33 Ohio App.3d 168, 514 N.E.2d 946. On February 12, after a hearing, SERB issued a determination that the strike did not pose a clear and present danger to the public health or safety. Therefore, "the statutory determination necessary to authorize an extension of the restraining order is denied."

On the same date it received this determination from SERB, COTA filed a motion "for a hearing, temporary restraining order and sixty-day injunction order * * * " in the court of common pleas. In support of this motion, COTA argued that the grant of authority to SERB by R.C. 4117.16(A) constitutes an impermissible delegationof the trial court's inherent judicial power to an administrative agency contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers.

[1988 SERB 4-48] On February 12, 1987, the trial court stated that R.C. 4117.16(A) appeared to be unconstitutional, and granted the parties fourteen days to file supplementary briefs on the constitutionality of the statute and the propriety of further injunctive relief. The temporary restraining order previously issued was extended through that fourteen-day period.

On February 27, 1987, the trial court announced its decision that R.C. 4117.16(A) was an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, in that it authorized SERB to "direct, control and impede" the trial court's jurisdiction and to block the court's exercise of its inherent equitable powers. The court reasoned that the doctrine of separation of powers requires that the determination of an administrative agency must be subject to judicial review where, as here, that determination is an exercise of judicial power. The court proceeded to assume jurisdiction on the basis that the statute, with the offending portions severed, would permit the court to retain jurisdiction "over a request by a public employer to require striking workers to return to work when the interests of the public demand such relief." Upon a review of the evidence from both the SERB hearing and its own previous hearing, the court found that the strike posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety. On that basis, the court issued an order enjoining the strike for an additional sixty days. Both the union and SERB appealed the February 27 judgment of the trial court. The union had earlier appealed the trial court's judgment of February 12, whereby the court extended the original temporary restraining order by fourteen days.

The court of appeals consolidated the two cases and issued a decision on March 18, 1987. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that R.C. 4117.16(A) is unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Specifically, the court of appeals held that the statute improperly grants SERB the power to terminate the jurisdiction of the trial court by finding no clear and present danger to the public health or safety; and that the statute impermissibly reduces the trial court to an agent of SERB by forcing the court to accept SERB's finding and act, or refrain from acting, solely in accordance with that finding. The appellate court found that the offending portion of the statute was severable, and held that the trial court's resumption of jurisdiction under the remaining language of R.C. 4117.16(A) was consistent with the intentions of the legislature. However, the appellate court reversed the lower court's finding that the strike posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety, on the basis that there was no evidence properly before the court from which that determination could have been made. No hearing had been held on this issue, nor was there any stipulation by the parties that the transcript of the hearing before SERB could be reviewed by the trial court. The cause was remanded to the lower court for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate action to afford the parties the opportunity to offer testimony.

Both SERB and the union appealed the judgment of the court of appeals, which judgment found R.C. 4117.16(A) unconstitutional, to this court. (Case No. 87-655.)

While that appeal was pending, the trial court, upon remand, again found that the strike posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety. ¹ That finding was based on the evidence adduced at the prior probable cause hearing held by the trial court and at the hearing before SERB, the parties having stipulated to the admission of such evidence into the record. ² Based upon this finding, the court held that the temporary restraining order previously issued should be continued for sixty days "as provided in Section 4117.16(A)." Upon appeal by the union, the court of appeals affirmed this judgment. An appeal of the court of appeals' judgment was taken to this court. (Case No. 87-854.)

The appeals were consolidated, and the causes are now before this court pursuant to the allowance of motions to certify the record.

Baker & Hostetler, John H. Burtch, Mark D. Senff and Mark A. Johnson, Columbus, for appellee.

Cloppert, Portman, Sauter, Latanick & Foley, Robert W. Sauter and Russell E. Carnahan, Columbus, for appellant Transport Workers Union of America, Local 208.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Joseph M. Oser, Columbus, for appellant State Employment Relations Bd.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur and Charles J. Kurtz III, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Transit Ass'n, in case No. 87-655.

Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson & Newman, Robert J. Walter and Rankin M. Gibson, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n of Public School Employees, AFSCME/AFL-CIO.

Jon Ziegler, Columbus, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Educ. Ass'n, in case No. 87-655.

Leonard S. Sigall, Reynoldsburg, urging reversal for amici curiae, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Locals 880, 954, 1059 and 1099, United Food & Commercial Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, in case No. 87-655.

Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff and N. Victor Goodman, Columbus, urging reversal for amici curiae, AFSCME Ohio Council 8 and Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n/AFSCME, Local 11.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

The central question presented to this court is whether R.C. 4117.16(A) violates the doctrine of separation of powers. We hold that it does not.

R.C. 4117.16(A) provides:

"Whenever the public employer believes that a lawful strike creates clear and present danger to the health or safety of the public, the public employer may petition the court of common pleas having jurisdiction over the parties to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the strike. If the court finds probable cause to believe that the strike may be a clear and present danger to the public health or safety, it has jurisdiction to issue a temporary restraining order, not to exceed seventy-two hours, enjoining the strike.

"Should a court issue a temporary restraining order, the public employer shall immediately request authorization of the state employment relations ...