Central Ry. Co. v. Brewer
| Decision Date | 12 January 1894 |
| Citation | 28 A. 615,78 Md. 394 |
| Parties | CENTRAL RY. CO. v. BREWER. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Baltimore city court.
Action by Elias Brewer against the Central Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.
Argued before ROBINSON, C.J., and BRYAN, FOWLER, McSHERRY, BRISCOE and ROBERTS, JJ.
T Wallis Blakistone and Geo. Blakistone, for appellant.
A. S Niles and Oscar Wolff, for appellee.
This is an action for malicious prosecution and for false arrest, whereby the plaintiff seeks the recovery of damages of the defendant company, a body corporate of the state of Maryland. The declaration alleges that the defendant, falsely, maliciously, and without probable cause whatsoever, caused the plaintiff to be arrested upon a writ issued by a commissioner of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Maryland, upon the charge of passing counterfeit money, knowing the same to be false and counterfeit, and with intent to defraud, whereupon the commissioner required the plaintiff to give bail for his appearance before him the day following for a hearing, when said charge was dismissed and the appellee discharged. In the second count it is alleged that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff, and gave him into custody of a police officer, upon a false charge, and required him to go before the said commissioner and give bail for his appearance, etc. To this declaration the defendant pleaded that it did not commit the wrongs alleged. The facts are that the defendant was engaged in running cars upon certain streets of the city of Baltimore for the conveyance of passengers. The plaintiff boarded one of the cars of the defendant at the corner of Druid Hill avenue and Biddle street, and, before taking his seat, dropped into the fare box, which was of the Slawson patent, a coin resembling a five-cent piece or nickel. When the car had proceeded nearly the distance of a short block, the driver of the car called the plaintiff to him, and told him that he had dropped a lead nickel in the box, and requested him to redeem it. The driver pointed out to the plaintiff the particular coin which was lying on the glass shelf of the box, which is an inclined glass plate held in such position that the coins which are dropped into the box fall upon the upper surface of the inclined plane of the glass shelf. This glass shelf is intended to give to the driver a careful scrutiny of the coins deposited for fares, before the same are dropped into the lower part of the box. The testimony conclusively shows that the nickel in question was deposited in the box by the plaintiff. It is equally clear that the coin so deposited was a leaden nickel or counterfeit coln of the United States. And notwithstanding the driver told the plaintiff that he must redeem the counterfeit coin, and that he could not deliver the same to him, as a driver had no right to open the box, but that he could obtain the same at any time by calling at the office of the company, the plaintiff continued in the car, and passed the office of the company, without paying further attention to the matter. Immediately thereafter, three of the employes of the defendant--the driver of the car in question, the treasurer, and also the superintendent--followed the car in which the plaintiff was, a short distance, and after the plaintiff had left it the superintendent approached him, and said, "You put a piece of counterfeit money in the box, and I would like you to make it good." But the plaintiff declined doing so, and said there was nothing the matter with the nickel,--only a piece out of the corner of it. The plaintiff was then taken before the United States commissioner, where the charge of passing a counterfeit coin was made, the superintendent making the affidavit. The commissioner held the plaintiff under bail for his appearance on the day following, and detained him for about two hours, until bail was furnished. On the day following the making of the charge, the case was heard by the commissioner, and the plaintiff discharged.
At the trial below there were two exceptions taken,--one relating to the court's action on the prayers, and the other to the admissibility of certain testimony. The liability of corporations aggregate for torts committed by them through their agents has, in recent years, received a good deal of attention from the courts. It may indeed be said that the question of corporate liability for torts has been in a progressive stage; but step by step have the limits of such liability been enlarged and extended, until now there is but little difference between corporate liability and individual liability, with respect to torts. In consequence, however, of the fact that a corporation must, of necessity, act through its agents, courts have almost invariably held that, to hold a corporation liable for a tortious act committed by its agent, the act must be done by its express precedent authority, or ratified and adopted by the corporation. Nor is a corporation responsible for unauthorized and unlawful acts, even of its officers, though done colore officii. To fix the liability, it must either appear that the officers were expressly authorized to do the act, or that it was done bona fide, in pursuance of a general authority in relation to the subject of it, or that the act was adopted or ratified by the corporation. Ang. & A. Corp. (10th Ed.) § 311; Carter v. Machine Co., 51 Md. 296.
When the plaintiff was arrested and held to bail, in the manner already stated, the affidavit was made by the superintendent of the defendant. It is asserted in the brief of the appellee that the president of the defendant was also present at that time. We fail, however, to discover the fact in the record. But, in our view of the case, it is immaterial whether he was or was not. The president was but the agent of the defendant as were the other officers and employes. There is nothing in the record which directly or indirectly tends to show that the superintendent was acting in pursuance of express precedent authority from the defendant, (Carter v. Machine Co., 51 Md. 298,) in causing the arrest of the plaintiff, nor had he any implied authority for so doing, arising out of the scope of his employment, so far, at least, as the testimony in the record discloses. The fact that he had general authority to look after and manage the affairs of the defendant, in running its cars on the streets of Baltimore city for the carriage of passengers, in no manner suggests that he had, unless expressly authorized so to do by his principal, any authority to arrest a passenger for placing in the fare box a leaden nickel in payment of his fare. He may have a general authority to look after and protect the property of the defendant, and he may possess all the powers properly pertaining to such employment; and yet he would not be empowered to invoke the aid of the criminal law on behalf of his company, unless he had express precedent authority. And, if this be true of the superintendent, it is equally true of the other agents and employes of the defendant. As to the subsequent ratification or adoption by the defendant, the testimony is very meager and inconclusive. At the hearing of the charge, the president, the superintendent, and the driver testified, and the impression made upon the mind of the commissioner is described by him in his testimony, when he says there was nothing in the conduct or manner of the officers or employes of the railway company before him to indicate that they wanted to do anything more than tell the facts which were within their knowledge, and which appertained to their examination. The fact that the president, superintendent, and driver testified before the commissioner affords no legally sufficient evidence of ratification or adoption, for, if they were without authority in causing the arrest, the subsequent testimony given for the government by them, or the manner in which they demeaned themselves in delivering their testimony, in no way supports the theory of adoption or ratification. Improvement Co. v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 320, 20 A. 188. There was not, we think, any legally sufficient evidence given at the trial below, from which the jury could have properly inferred either express precedent authority to justify the agents of the defendant in causing the arrest of the plaintiff, nor was there any legal evidence which establishes the adoption or ratification by the defendant of the acts of its agents. It was certainly not within any of the usual objects or powers of the defendant company to...
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