Carter v. Howe Mach. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1879
• Citation: 51 Md. 290
• Parties: JOHN H. CARTER v. THE HOWE MACHINE COMPANY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

51 Md. 290

JOHN H. CARTER v. THE HOWE MACHINE COMPANY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 26, 1879

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.

This case came into the Circuit Court for Baltimore County from the Court of Common Pleas, from which Court it was removed. The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the Court.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., BRENT, MILLER, ALVEY and ROBINSON, J.

Richard J. Gittings, for the appellant.

The appellant contends, that whatever doubts formerly existed on the subject, the whole tendency of modern decisions, both in England and in this country, is to hold a corporation responsible in an action for malicious prosecution. Eastern Counties Railway Co. vs. Brown, 6 Exchequer, 314; Goff vs. the Great Northern Railway Co., 107 E. C. L., 672; Whitfield vs. South Eastern Railway Co., 96 E. C. L., 115; Green vs. London Omnibus Co., 97 E. C L., 290; Queen vs. Great N. of England R. Co., 58 E. C. L., 315; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. vs Quigley, 21 Howard, 202; Moore vs Fitchburg R. R. Co., 4 Gray, 465; Goddard vs. G. T. Rail. Co., 57 Maine, 222; Hamer vs. E. & N. R. R. Co., 62 Maine, 84; Gillett vs. Mo. Valley R. Co., 55 Mo., 319; Maynard vs. F. F. Ins. Co., 34 Cal., 48; P. W. & B. R. R. Co. vs. State, 20 Md., 157; Cooley on Torts, 121 L. R., 5 C. P., 644; 32 Eng. L. Eq., 1.

The right to maintain an action for malicious prosecution against a corporation, was expressly decided in Goodspeed vs. The East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn., 530; Vance vs. Erie Railway Co., 32 N. J., (3 Vroom,) 334; Fenton vs. The Wilson Machine Co., 9 Phil., 189.

The precise point was presented to this Court, but not decided, because unnecessary, in the case of Medcalfe vs. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 45 Md., 189. In the subsequent case of Baltimore and York Turnpike Co. vs. Boone, 45 Md., 344, in conformity with the principles involved in the case above cited, the Court decided that vindictive or exemplary damages could be awarded against a corporation. See Green's Brice's Ultra Vires, 266-271, (note and cases cited.)

Theophilus B. Horwitz and Orville Horwitz for the appellee.

The appellee contends that an action for malicious prosecution cannot be maintained against a corporation. Bank of Augusta vs. Earle, 13 Peters, 587; Perrine vs. Chesapeake and Delaware Canal Co., 9 Howard, 184; Pearce vs. Madison and Indiana R. R. Co., &c., 21 Howard, 443, 444, 445; State vs. Great Works Milling and Manufacturing Co., 20 Maine, 43, 44; Childs vs. Bank of Missouri, et al., 17 Mo., 215, 216, 217; Stevens vs. Midland Counties Railway Co., 10 Exch. R., 354, (b); Orr vs. Bank of the U.S., et al., 1 Ohio R., 29, 30, (t), 31 (b); Foote vs. the City of Cincinnati, et al., 9 Ohio., 34.

ALVEY J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an action for malicious prosecution, and for false imprisonment, instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant, a corporation incorporated by the State of Connecticut, and doing business in the State of Maryland.

The declaration alleges that the defendant maliciously, and without probable cause, caused and procured the plaintiff to be falsely charged before a justice of the peace with having fraudulently embezzled certain money and other property belonging to the defendant, and upon such charge, procured the issual of a warrant and the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff, and that such charge was afterwards abandoned and dismissed. And in a second count, it is alleged, that the defendant, by its servants, assaulted the plaintiff, and unlawfully caused him to be arrested and imprisoned in jail.

To this declaration the defendant pleaded, that it did not commit the wrongs alleged.

At the trial below there was but a single exception taken, and that but briefly states the proof. It states that the plaintiff offered evidence tending to maintain and prove the issue joined; and it is also stated that the defendant offered evidence tending to prove the issue on its part joined. It is also stated that the plaintiff was arrested on the oath of an employé of the defendant, and that the defendant was at the time, and so continued, a corporation, duly chartered by the State of Connecticut, exercising its franchises in this State, having an office in the city of Baltimore.

Upon the evidence, the Court was asked to instruct the jury, that if they found the defendant to be a corporation, the plaintiff could not recover; and that instruction was given.

Whether this instruction is maintainable is the question presented; and the only question that has been argued at the bar is, whether an action for malicious prosecution can be maintained against a corporation aggregate.

This question was argued in the case of Medcalf vs. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 45 Md., 189, but was not decided, because it was found to be unnecessary to the judgment pronounced in that case. It does not appear, so far as our investigation has extended, that this precise question has ever been expressly decided by the English Courts. In the case of Stevens vs. Midland Counties R. Co., 10 Exch., 352, the question was to some extent considered, but it was left undecided. ALDERSON, B., threw out a doubt whether such an action could, in any case, be maintained against a corporation aggregate, inasmuch as such action is predicated of an act done malo animo, and, according to his opinion, a corporation can have no animus. But the other Barons, while reserving their opinion upon this point, rather intimated that a state of case might exist where such form of action might be maintained against a corporation. And it would seem to be now clear, whatever may have been the former state of judicial opinion upon the subject, that corporations are liable for all acts, whether wilful or malicious, of their agents or servants, done in the course of their employment. Hence it has been repeatedly decided that corporations are liable in actions for assault and battery, and false imprisonment, committed by their servants, and for false representation, and for libel, as well as for all consequences of the negligent or unskilful acts of their servants, within the scope and course of their employment; and it would appear that actions for such injuries may be maintained against corporations aggregate in any case where, under similar circumstances, such actions could be sustained against individuals for the acts of their servants. The principles and reasoning upon which such actions have been sustained against corporations it is unnecessary here to repeat. We need not do more than refer to the familiar cases of Phila., Wilm. & Balto. R. Co. vs. Quigley, 21 How., 202; Whitfield vs. S.E. R. Co., El. Bl. & El., 121; Railway Co. vs. Broom, 6 Exch., 314; Goff vs. G. N. R. Co., 3 El. & El., 672. The two first of these cases were actions for libel, and the two last were for assaults and false imprisonment. If such actions, founded on wrongful acts done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, (the legal definition of malice,) can be sustained, why should there be any difficulty in maintaining the action for malicious prosecution?

Judge COOLEY, in his recent work on Torts, page 121 thinks that the same reasons that sustain an action against a corporation for a libel will sustain one for a malicious prosecution; and though there are cases which hold that no such action can be sustained, the better doctrine, he thinks, is that laid down by some other Courts which have sustained the action. The cases to which he refers as sustaining the action, are Vance vs. Erie R. Co., 32 N. J., 334; Goodspeed vs. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn., 530; Copley vs. Sewing Machine Co., 2 Woods, (U.S.C. C.,) 494; Fenton vs. Sewing Machine Co., 9 Phil., (Penn.,) 189, and Walker vs. S.E. Railway Co., L. R., 5 C. P., 640. In the latter case, the action was for assault, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and the verdict being for the plaintiff with separate damages assessed on each head of complaint, the defendant, under leave reserved, moved to enter the verdict on the count for malicious prosecution for the defendant, upon the ground that it was unsupported by the evidence;...