Central Stock Yards Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1902
• Citation: 112 F. 823
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
• Parties: CENTRAL STOCK YARDS CO. v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.

112 F. 823

CENTRAL STOCK YARDS CO. v. LOUISVILLE & N.R. CO.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Kentucky.

January 23, 1902

W. M Smith and Dodd & Dodd & Dodd, for complainant.

Helm Bruce & Helm and Gibson, Marshall & Gibson, for defendant.

EVANS District Judge.

The complainant, the Central Stock Yards Company, has very recently established a large and expensive plant for the conduct of its business. It is located on the line of the Southern Railway Company, just outside of the limits of the city of Louisville, Some 12 or more years ago the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, having no adequate depot facilities for handling live freight, entered into a contract with the Bourbon Stock Yards Company (the plant of which was located within the city limits), under which that stock yards company was to erect, and it did erect and provide, at large expense, a depot for the defendant for receiving, loading, and unloading and shipping live stock and, in consideration of what was done and expended by the Bourbon Stock Yards Company, the defendant agreed that the depot thus provided should be, and should continue to be, its only live stock depot in the city of Louisville, and accordingly it has been such ever since and is now. There is a physical connection between them within the city limits. The situation being thus, about the time this bill was filed certain car loads of cattle designed for sale at complainant's yards were shipped to Louisville from states other than Kentucky, and the defendant refused either to bill the freight to the complainant at the Central Stock Yards, Ky., or otherwise than to Louisville simply, and refused to deliver it to the consignee at any other place in the city except at its live stock depot at the Bourbon Stock Yards, and refused to deliver it to the Southern Railway Company at any of the points of Physical connection of the two roads, although a demand for all the things thus refused was made upon the defendant by the complainant and also by the shippers of the freight; whereupon this suit in equity was brought to compel the defendant, by means of a mandatory injunction, to do all the things just mentioned, the claim to the relief thus sought being avowedly based upon the provisions of section 3 of the interstate commerce act, as possibly aided by the provisions of the constitution of Kentucky. The bill attempts to show the very great injury that would be inflicted upon the complainant if the defendant is not compelled to bill and ship such freight to the complainant direct, and to deliver it at points of physical contact in Louisville to the Southern Railway Company, to be transported by it to the complainant's yards. The evidence offered by the complainant was designed more explicitly to show the injury, and the details of it, which would result to the complainant if the defendant is not compelled to obey the provisions of the interstate commerce act, which, it is insisted, are being violated and disregarded by the defendant.

Upon filing the bill, the complainant moved the court for an injunction pendente lite, as prayed for therein, and the court appreciates the importance, to all the parties who are concerned in the litigation, of the very interesting questions which have thus arisen; but the view the court takes of them, particularly at this hearing, makes it unnecessary to state more than one or two of the various grounds upon which the defendant resists the motion. No demurrer to the bill of complaint has been filed. The defendant has answered, and that pleading has been read as an affidavit on the hearing of the pending motion.

The first inquiry that always presents itself at the outset of every case in the courts of the United States is, has jurisdiction been shown? And this inquiry in this case divides itself into two questions-- First, has the court jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action? and, second, if so, does it come within its equitable powers? The diverse citizenship of the parties to this litigation appears upon the face of the bill, though that is immaterial if the right claimed is founded upon a law of the United States; but does it appear from the bill that equity has jurisdiction of the case as presented by the actual facts stated in that pleading? This inquiry would have to be answered in the negative if other exclusive remedies are provided by law. I do not say that it is impossible to present a state of case where an injunction might not lie to enforce rights created under the interstate commerce act, but on the facts stated in this particular bill of complaint is this such a case? The supreme court in the case of Railroad Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 296, 21 Sup.Ct. 118, 45 L.Ed. 194, used this language: 'At common law the court would be without power to make such an order as was made in this case by the state court. Legislative authority would be necessary in order to give power to the court to render a judgment of this kind. ' This language would, I think, aptly apply to the orders asked to be made in this case. The rights created by section 3 of the interstate commerce act did not exist at common law, and the legislation which was necessary to create them can only be found in that act. That legislation seems to have been the sole origin of the rights now sought to be enforced. While some reliance seems to be placed upon the provisions of the Kentucky constitution does and what the interstate commerce act does. This suit, at all events, seems to have been brought to enforce the rights, if any, conferred upon the complainant by the congressional legislation referred to, and this raises the very important jurisdictional questions that presents itself in limine. Section 3 of the interstate commerce act is in this language:

'Sec. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever. Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business.'

Section 8 and 9 of the act are as follows:

'Sec. 8. That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter or thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this act, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case.

'Sec. 9. That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; but such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of said remedies, and must in each case elect which one of the two methods of procedure

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