United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 December 1905
• Docket Number: 3,008,3,020.
• Citation: 142 F. 176
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO.

142 F. 176

UNITED STATES v. ATCHISON, T. & S.F. RY. CO.

Nos. 3,008, 3,020.

United States Circuit Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division.

December 4, 1905

Syllabus by the Court

An information for contempt at the relation of the United States against a railroad company for violation of a temporary injunction restraining it from granting rebates is criminal in character. In such proceeding the defendant is entitled to every reasonable doubt as to the obligatory force of the mandate, and whether its disobedience was willful.

If the court issuing the injunction alleged to have been violated had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of relief prayed for in the bill, the restraining order was void, and no contempt could be predicated of its disregard.

Prior to the enactment by Congress of the Elkins act (Act Feb. 19 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p 599)), a United States Circuit Court had no jurisdiction in equity over a suit instituted by direction of the Attorney General of the United States to enjoin a railroad company from granting rebates under the interstate commerce law especially where no order had hitherto been made by the interstate commerce commission on the railroad company to discontinue the forbidden act.

The interstate commerce act and the act known as the 'Sherman Anti-Trust Law' are separate and independent acts, not germane in character and purpose; and therefore jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of the United States over a bill in equity to enjoin a railroad company from granting rebates to favored shippers cannot be maintained upon the ground that such act of the railroad company is a monopoly within the meaning of the second section of said anti-trust act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p 3200)).

Statutes are presumed to be prospective in operation, and the courts refuse to give a retroactive effect to statutes, unless the intention is so clear and positive as by no reasonable possibility to admit of other construction.

The doctrine of relation, like every other fiction of the law, has its limitations. It can never be applied where its root was not planted in an antecedent lawful right.

A suit in equity instituted by the Attorney General of the United States to enjoin a railroad company from granting rebates, and a restraining order made thereon in March, 1902, were not validated by the enactment of the Elkins act in February, 1903 (Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 599)). Held, further, that if the suit could have been continued under the Elkins act, where the antecedent offense of the railroad company was being continued after February 19, 1903, an action by the United States attorney in the summary method authorized by the latter act would have presented an issue of fact entitling the defendant to a hearing thereon; and any injunction granted would be as to violations of law then being committed, but would not have the effect to vitalize an antecedent injunctive order granted by the court when it had no jurisdiction to make it. Held, further, that where no such action was taken by the United States attorney after the passage of the Elkins act, an information for contempt filed by him, based on a violation of such void order, has not the effect to bring it within the operation of the Elkins act.

Where the bill for an injunction against a railroad company, at the relation of the United States attorney, for granting rebates, in its specifications describes only grain and packing-house products of meat on which rebates were being granted, followed by a general allegation that the defendant was likewise granting rebates on other necessities of life, the subjects of interstate traffic, etc., and the injunctive order specifically enjoined the granting of rebates on the specified articles of traffic 'or any other interstate traffic,' held, that the latter general term, on the rule of 'ejusdem generis' and 'noscitur a sociis,' is controlled by the antecedent particularization, and is limited to objects of like kind with those specified; and therefore an information for contempt, predicated of alleged rebates granted by the defendant a year or so afterwards in another jurisdiction on the commodities of salt and coal, could not be sustained under such limited restraining order.

Where a short line railroad, chartered by the state, authorized to haul freights for hire, is owned by stockholders common to said short road and the shipper, and a long distance railroad connecting therewith enters into a joint traffic arrangement with it for the transportation of interstate traffic, and the two roads file and publish such joint rates, as required by the interstate commerce law, and live up to the same-- Quaere: Can an information by the United States attorney against the interstate carrier for granting rebates to such shipper be sustained on evidence tending to show that the division of the through rate is grossly disproportioned to the haul over such short line?

This is a proceeding for contempt, growing out of a temporary restraining order made by this court on March 25, 1902.

The restraining order was predicated upon a bill of complaint in equity filed by the United States attorney for this district, under direction of the Attorney General of the United States, against the defendant railroad company. The bill recited that the action was taken on the request of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It charged that the defendant railroad company, a corporation of the state of Kansas, was engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce; that in conformity to the requirements of the interstate commerce act of congress it had filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission at Washington City a copy of schedule of rates and charges established and published by it for the transportation of freight traffic; among other things on cured meats, known as 'packing-house products,' and also on dressed meats, for transporting the same from Kansas City, Mo., and Kansas City, Kan., across the states of Missouri, Iowa, and Illinois, to the city of Chicago Ill., and other points known as 'Chicago

common points'; that these were the only lawful rates for transporting such commodities between said points prior to January, 1902, to the time of the institution of the suit. That notwithstanding its duty to ship at no greater or less rate in that regard, the defendant, combining and confederating with certain persons, to the orator unknown, to create a monopoly in the transportation of said commodities on defendant's line of railway between the points aforesaid, early in the year 1901, entered into an agreement or agreements with the persons unknown to transport such commodities between such points at rates much less than the published, established rates on said commodities. It is then charged that in pursuance of said combination the defendant transported such packing-house products from Kansas City, Mo., to Chicago and Chicago common points, billing the same at the established rate therefor, but in pursuance of said unlawful agreement rebating to such unknown persons the difference between the rate agreed upon and the established rate, and transported such traffic at less than schedule rates. In paragraphs 5 and 6 the bill charges that prior to the 1st day of January, 1901, the defendant filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission its schedule of rates established jointly with connecting railways, for the transportation of grain from Mississippi river points to New York and New York common points, and from Kansas City, Mo., to the Mississippi river points aforesaid, and to Chicago and Chicago common points. These paragraphs refer exclusively to grain and its transportation between the points specified. The seventh paragraph then charges that the defendant granted to certain favored grain buyers and shippers, whose names are unknown, who shipped wheat, corn, and other grain over the defendant's line between the points aforesaid, large concessions and rebates from its published and established schedules, whereby such shippers obtained from the defendant unlawful rebates in respect to such shipments on grain between the points aforesaid. There is no charge in this paragraph of any combination or monopoly; it is simply a charge for carrying grain for certain shippers below the schedule rates. The ninth paragraph charges that during the period complained of shippers could not, at the points of origin, without ruinous loss, purchase at market prices and pay transportation to eastern destination at the said published and established rates. This charge refers to 'said commodities'; but does not specify packing-house products, dressed meats, or grain. The bill prayed for special and general injunctions against the defendant.

A temporary restraining order was granted and set for the 23d day of June, 1902, for further hearing. It recited that until that date, or the further order of the court, the defendant its officers, agents, and servants, be enjoined and restrained from further acting under and enforcing, or executing in any manner whatever, any agreement to transport over the defendant's railroad, or any part thereof, between the states, any packing-house products, dressed meats, grain, or the products of grain, or any other interstate traffic, at any greater or less rate than the rates named for such services in defendant's established schedule in force on its lines, and at the time said traffic is transported on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, or from departing from their schedule rates in carrying any of said above products or traffic between the states, and enjoining them from hereafter agreeing with any shipper or other...