Central Trust Co. v. Texas & St. L. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1885
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Parties: CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. TEXAS & ST. L. RY. CO. [1] In re WATERS PIERCE OIL CO., Intervenor. (FN1)

23 F. 703

CENTRAL TRUST CO. v. TEXAS & ST. L. RY. CO. ^[1]

In re WATERS PIERCE OIL CO., Intervenor. (FN1)

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri.

April 8, 1885

W. R Woodward and J. D. Johnson, for intervenor.

Phillips & Stewart, for receiver.

Butler Stillman & Hubbard and Elenious Smith, for complainant.

BREWER J., (orally.)

In the intervening petition of the Waters Pierce Oil Company, in the case of Central Trust Co. v. Texas & St. L. Ry. Co., the question presented is whether the oils furnished by the intervenor come within the Missouri statute in reference to liens. The language of the statute contains the word 'fuel,' in addition to the words 'labor and material;' and it is claimed that the use of the word 'fuel' enlarges the meaning of the word 'material,' and makes it broad enough to cover all supplies furnished. But for that word 'fuel' there would be no question. The idea which underlies these lien statutes is that because the labor and the material have gone into the building of the road or structure, and to that extent added to its value, therefore a lien for such labor and material should be given to him who does the one and furnishes the other.

Now fuel does not go into the structure of a railroad; neither does coal oil. It is something used in the running of the road; a part of the supplies necessary for the operation of the road, but nothing which goes into the enduring structure. While we may be compelled to follow the language of the statute, and give for the fuel furnished a lien, yet I think in the construction of these statutes we should start from the underlying thought of giving security to him who adds to the value of the road, and that we should never carry the statute beyond that, unless imperatively demanded by the language used; particularly, as Brother TREAT suggests, when it would operate to override prior mortgages. So that, while that word 'fuel' is in there, I take it it is not fair to give it the force of enlarging the meaning of the other words, 'material,' etc., but it should be considered as a new term, something added by the legislature carrying its own weight, but giving no different meaning to the word 'material' from that which it possessed in prior statutes, and, in fact, changing the statutes only in this respect: that it adds a certain specified matter for which a lien is given. The master was correct in his conclusions. The exceptions hill be...