Cincinnati, Richmond & Muncie Railroad v. Shera

• Decision Date: 17 February 1905
• Docket Number: 5,051
• Citation: 73 N.E. 293,36 Ind.App. 315
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: CINCINNATI, RICHMOND & MUNCIE RAILROAD v. SHERA ET AL

73 N.E. 293

36 Ind.App. 315

CINCINNATI, RICHMOND & MUNCIE RAILROAD v. SHERA ET AL

No. 5,051

Court of Appeals of Indiana

February 17, 1905

Rehearing denied June 28, 1905.

Transfer denied October 13, 1905.

From Randolph Circuit Court; John W. Macy, Judge.

Suit by Eddie K. Shera and another against the Cincinnati, Richmond & Muncie Railroad. From a decree for plaintiffs defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Nichols, Goodrich & Bales and Robbins & Starr, for appellant.

John L. Rupe and Wickens & Osborn, for appellees.

ROBINSON, P. J. Comstock, C. J., Wiley and Myers, JJ., concur. Black and Roby, JJ., dissent.

OPINION

ROBINSON, P. J.

The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a person who furnishes coal used as fuel to generate steam for the operation of a steam shovel used by a contractor for excavating and removing earth in the construction of a railroad is given a lien by statute upon the right of way and franchises of the railroad for the coal so furnished and used.

Section 7265 Burns 1901, Acts 1889, p. 257, § 4, provides: "All persons who shall perform work or labor in the way of grading, * * * or who shall perform work of any kind in the construction or repair of any railroad, * * * and all persons who shall furnish any material for any such bridge, * * * or who shall furnish any material for use in the construction or repair of any railroad, * * * may have a lien to the extent of the work or labor performed, or material furnished, or both, upon the right of way and franchises of such railroad corporation," etc.

Counsel for appellee cite, as controlling, the case of Haskell v. Gallagher (1898), 20 Ind.App. 224, 67 Am. St. 250, 50 N.E. 485. In that case appellants, as tenants under a gas and oil lease, erected a derrick and contracted with one Ogle to drill a well. One of the appellees furnished natural gas to the contractor for fuel to run the engine supplying power to do the drilling, and the other appellees performed labor in the drilling of the well, under the employment of the contractor. The well drilled was an oil-well. The statute under which the appellees proceeded (§ 7255 Burns 1894, Acts 1889, p. 257, § 1) provides that contractors and "all persons performing labor or furnishing material or machinery for erecting * * * any house * * * or other structure, may have a lien," etc. The controlling question in that case, and the only question about which there seems to have been any controversy, was whether an oil-well is a "structure" within the meaning of that term as used in the statute, and it is held that it is. A lien was given one of the appellees for fuel furnished, although the question does not seem to have been a controverted one upon appeal. However, that statute gives a lien "for furnishing material for erecting" the structure, while the statute in the case at bar gives a lien to one "who shall furnish any material for use in the construction" of the work. The language of the two statutes is not the same. The legislature must have intended by the language used in § 7265, supra, to give a lien for materials which go into the construction of the railroad, so as to be, in a sense, incorporated therein. And this is the construction given the statute in Ferguson v. Despo (1894), 8 Ind.App. 523, 34 N.E. 575. In that case the foreman sought to acquire a lien for labor in the construction of the masonry of a bridge for a railroad company. The court said: "The bill of particulars contains all the items for which the appellee Despo seeks to recover. Besides the item of work and labor done in superintending the stone and masonry work, we do not think there are any for which the railroad company could be held liable, either personally or by a charge upon its property in the way of a lien. These items are such as board, groceries, tobacco and money furnished the hands and workmen of Cummings & Conner [subcontractors], none of them being materials that went into the construction of the work."

This rule has been followed in other jurisdictions in construing similar statutes. See Basshor v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. (1886), 65 Md. 99, 3 A. 285; Central Trust Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (1885), 23 F. 703; Gordon Hardware Co. v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co. (1889), (Cal.), 3 Cal. Unrep. 140, 22 P. 406, and see same case 86 Cal. 620, 25 P. 125; Central Trust Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co. (1886), 27 F. 178; Heltzell v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1886), 20 Mo.App. 435. See, also, Richmond, etc., Construction Co. v. Richmond, etc., R. Co. (1895), 68 F. 105, 15 C. C. A. 289, 34 L. R. A. 625.

Mechanics' liens are in derogation of the common law, and depend wholly for their existence upon positive legislative enactment. The right to acquire and to enforce such liens rests upon the theory that the value of the property has been enhanced to the extent of the labor done or material furnished. The object of a statute in giving such a lien is to give a security for a debt. The creditor's right to collect his debt is not enhanced by the lien law, but the means he may employ in collecting it are. It should not be said therefore that the lien law is wholly remedial, and that, as a remedial statute, it should be liberally construed. There is reason for saying that, after the lien has once attached, the statute should be liberally construed for the purpose of fulfilling its objects. But there is no reason for saying that the statute should be given a liberal construction in determining the question whether a lien attaches at all. 2 Jones, Liens (2d ed.), § 1554. Where, by force of a statute, the performance of certain labor or the furnishing of certain materials creates an interest in the real estate of another, a court, in determining whether a lien attaches in the particular case, should not extend the statute to labor done and materials furnished, unless clearly within the intention of the legislature. It should be remembered that the statute imposes an additional liability under which it is sought to make the property owner responsible for a debt which he never contracted. In considering the application of the statute in its remedial character, it has been held many times in this State that the statute is to be liberally construed so as to make effective the statute to the extent designed by the legislature. But we do not understand that the rule of liberal construction has been declared in determining whether the particular labor done or particular materials furnished are within the scope of the statute. In Morris v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (1890), 123 Ind. 489, 24 N.E. 335, it is said: "The courts must construe and enforce the statute as a remedial one, but they can not extend it to meet cases not within its scope, however meritorious they may be. * * * We must, therefore, look entirely to the provisions of the statute to determine the extent and character of the lien which it gives subcontractors who do work and furnish materials in the construction of railroads." See Caulfield v. Polk (1897), 17 Ind.App. 429, 46 N.E. 932. In 2 Jones, Liens (2d ed.), § 1554, the author says: "The rule of construction applicable to questions arising under these liens may be strict at one stage of the proceedings and liberal at another. Mechanics' liens are in derogation of the common law, depending for their existence wholly upon statutes; and therefore, upon the question whether a lien attaches at all, a strict construction is proper. The court is not authorized, in determining whether the statute attaches, to extend it beyond its express terms." See, also, Butler v. Gain (1889), 128 Ill. 23, 21 N.E. 350; Mushlitt v. Silverman (1872), 50 N.Y. 360; Copeland v. Kehoe (1880), 67 Ala. 594; McGugin v. Ohio River R. Co. (1889), 33 W.Va. 63, 10 S.E. 36; Rogers v. Currier (1859), 13 Gray 129; Kay v. Smith (1872), 10 Heisk. 41; Trask v. Searle (1876), 121 Mass. 229; Phillips, Mechanics' Liens (3d ed.), §§ 18, 19; Boisot, Mechanics' Liens, §§ 34-37.

The steam shovel was a part of the contractor's outfit. It can not be denied that the contractor, for the use of his outfit in connection with his own labors, would have been entitled to a lien, not for the use of the outfit alone, but because, with his labor in the use and operation of the outfit, the work was done. That is, the use of the outfit by the contractor in doing the work would be a part of the contractor's labor for which the statute gives him a lien for work and labor done. In no sense is this different from the lien given the contractor for work and labor done by a laborer whom the contractor had employed and paid to assist in doing the work. See Lybrandt v. Eberly (1860), 36 Pa. 347. In the same manner the use of the contractor's teams in connection with his own labor in accomplishing the work would entitle him to a lien. If we say that the fuel used in furnishing motive power to operate the steam shovel is "material" furnished for use in the construction of a railway, how can we avoid saying that the feed furnished the horses used in operating the wheel scoops is "material" furnished for use in the construction of the road? Is the steam shovel any the less a part of the contractor's outfit than are the wheel scoops and horses used to operate them? If the fuel furnished to generate the steam is "material," why is not the water used in the boiler? And how could we exclude the lubricating oil necessary in operating the engine?

In Dudley v. Toledo, etc., R. Co. (1887), 65 Mich. 655, 32 N.W. 884, it is held that clothing and board of men employed in constructing a railroad, and feed for teams employed in such work, are not within the true intent and object of an act for the protection of laborers and "persons furnishing material for the construction and repairing of...