Centre College v. Trzop

• Decision Date: 18 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2000-SC-1102-DG.,2000-SC-1102-DG.
• Citation: 127 S.W.3d 562
• Parties: CENTRE COLLEGE; Michael Adams; Milton Reigelman; Julie McGuigan King; Richard Grewe; and Gary Bugg, Appellants, v. Peter TRZOP, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

127 S.W.3d 562

CENTRE COLLEGE; Michael Adams; Milton Reigelman; Julie McGuigan King; Richard Grewe; and Gary Bugg, Appellants, v. Peter TRZOP, Appellee.

No. 2000-SC-1102-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

December 18, 2003.

As Modified January 30, 2004.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 18, 2004.

Kenneth Gregory Haynes, Michelle Turner, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Robert L. Chenoweth, Chenoweth Law Office, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant.

David R. Marshall, Lexington, Counsel for Appellee.

GRAVES, Justice.

FACTS

Centre College is a private institution of higher education located in Danville, Kentucky. In 1995, while a junior at Centre, Appellee, Peter Trzop was dismissed for possession of a deadly weapon in his dormitory room. Specifically, he was found to have in his possession a survival knife with a blade over five inches in length, a direct violation of the Centre Student Handbook. The Handbook prohibits the possession of dangerous weapons by students, and stipulates that dismissal is a possible consequence for possession of such weapons.

Centre became aware of Trzop's ownership of the knife after Jim Pokorny, Trzop's roommate, informed students Mike Snarr and Janine Szymanski, Snarr's girlfriend, of a conversation in which Trzop stated that he wanted to harm Snarr. Pokorny recounted that Trzop wanted to obtain a position of authority wherein he could kill Snarr and "get away with it." Szymanski stated in her deposition that she took the threats very seriously because of Trzop's recent behavioral changes and isolation from friends. In fact, Szymanski was so concerned that she went to her psychology professor, Dr. Brown, and, without providing names, informed him of the threats. Following the advice of Dr. Brown, Szymanski went to see the Dean of Students, Nancy Lackey. Upon learning that Dean Lackey was out of town, Szymanski informed Julie McGuigan (now King), Director of Student Activities and Greek Life, of the situation. Szymanski reported that she was afraid for her safety and the safety of Mike Snarr.

McGuigan immediately contacted Milton Reigelman, Centre College Vice-President, and the two met with Snarr, who confirmed Szymanski's report and stated that he believed Trzop had a "large knife" in his possession. McGuigan and Reigelman thereafter sought the advice of Jane McCune, a mental health specialist with Bluegrass Regional Mental Health Center, to assess the level of potential danger the situation posed. McCune advised them to contact the police.

After consulting by telephone with Dean Lackey, Reigelman and McGuigan determined that Trzop's room should be searched and that they should meet with him after the search to discuss the situation. At some point prior to the meeting, Reigelman prepared a letter of dismissal, as a contingency in the event a weapon was, in fact, found.

A search of Trzop's room revealed three pocket-type knives and one large Army survival knife with a blade over five inches long. Following the search, Reigelman met Trzop after his class and accompanied him to a conference room. Also present were McGuigan, McCune, and two campus security officers. Reigelman had requested that McCune be present to assess Trzop's emotional state, such as the likelihood that he would attempt to harm himself or others if dismissed.

McGuigan informed Trzop that some students had complained about threats he had made, and that a weapon had been found during a search of his room. Trzop did not deny the allegation of threats and explicitly acknowledged ownership of the survival knife.

Reigelman thereafter gave Trzop the letter of dismissal. Reigelman later stated that he had carefully chosen the word "dismissal," as opposed to expulsion or suspensions, when drafting the letter in order to take immediate action that would remove Trzop from campus and defuse the situation, with the hope that Trzop could later return to Centre. Reigelman explained to Trzop that he could be readmitted if he agreed to psychiatric treatment and evaluation as specified by Centre. Additionally, Centre required that Trzop's "attitude" change before it would consider any request for re-admission.

In 1996, Trzop filed suit in the Boyle Circuit Court, claiming that his due process rights had been violated by Centre. He alleged that he was not given adequate notice of the pre-dismissal meeting, and was denied the opportunity to defend himself, or to call witnesses on his behalf. The complaint asserted: (1) a contractual due process claim; (2) a state statutory due process claim via KRS 446.070; (3) a constitutional due process claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) a defamation claim.¹

In February 1999, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Centre College. The trial court found that Trzop's contractual due process claim failed as a matter of law because the Centre Student Handbook expressly prohibited possession of a dangerous weapon and clearly "reserve[d] to the college administration the right to invoke sanctions including dismissal [outside the student judiciary process] in unusual circumstances." Further, the trial court found Trzop's KRS 446.070 claim legally deficient because no state statute was alleged to have been violated and the regulations relied upon by Trzop could not support such a claim in the absence of negligence. In any case, however, the trial court found that due process was, in fact, provided to Trzop, so there was no regulatory violation. Finally, the trial court ruled as a matter of law that Centre College did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner:

Given the totality of the circumstances, Centre's right to compel order on its campus, and the duty to protect others in the college community-the administration's conduct was reasonable and fair. It is evidence of good faith that the letter of dismissal referred the plaintiff to the procedure for readmission; and it is further evidence of good faith that Trzop and the college commenced meetings and communications regarding readmission [following Trzop's dismissal.]

On appeal, Trzop again argued that KRS 164.945-164.947 and related regulations impose due process requirements on private colleges and a violation thereof could make Centre liable under KRS 446.070. Specifically, KRS 164.947 requires that non-public colleges be licensed. Regulations adopted pursuant to the statute require that to be licensed a non-public college must establish policies and procedures to ensure that all students receive due process. 13 KAR 1:020 Section 7(11)(h).

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that KRS 164.945-164.947 apply to all state colleges and universities, both public and private. It also concluded that 13 KAR 1:020 Section 7(11)(h) requires that, as a condition for being licensed to bestow college diplomas to students, a non-public college must establish policies and procedures whereby all students are ensured due process. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that, "the law entitles students at private colleges due process in any disciplinary proceeding," and thus summary judgment in favor of Centre College was improper. Centre College thereafter sought discretionary review in this Court. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order of summary judgment.

ARGUMENT

I. KRS 446.070 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE RECOVERY FOR A VIOLATION OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CONTROVERSY.

KRS 446.070 states:

Penalty no bar to civil recovery

A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation. (emphasis added)

In accepting Trzop's argument that KRS 164.945-164.947 apply to all state colleges (public and private) and that 13 KAR 1:020 § 7(11)(h) promulgated thereunder require private colleges, such as Centre, to establish policies and procedures whereby all students are ensured due process, the Court of Appeals concluded that he could recover under KRS 446.070 for Centre's alleged violation of Kentucky's administrative regulations adopted pursuant to KRS 164.945-.947.

The Court of Appeals relied upon this Court's decision in Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328 (1987). In fact, Grayson concerned the issue of dram shop negligence liability, not the applicability of KRS 446.070 to violations of administrative regulations. Furthermore, Grayson involved the violation of a statute, KRS 244.080, not an administrative regulation. Nowhere in Grayson does this Court explicitly state that KRS 446.070 applies to violations of administrative regulations. The only reference to the statute is as follows:

KRS 446.070 is styled, "Penalty no bar to civil recovery." It provides that "[a] person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation." The purpose of this statute is to permit a person injured by the violation of a statute to recover damages by reason of the violation. Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x, 303 Ky. 238, 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946). For instance, this rule has been applied to recognize a cause of action on behalf of a fire victim where the apartment building lacked adequate exits as required by the Building Code, Higgins Investments Inc. v. Sturgill, Ky., 509 S.W.2d 266 (1974), and to recognize a cause of action on behalf of a child visiting a tenant when the child was scalded as the result of a violation of the Plumbing Code, Rietze v. Williams, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 613 (1970).

Id. at 333.

We would point out that in Rietze, supra, our predecessor court held "Administrative regulations, properly adopted and filed have the force and effect of law, KRS 13.081, and as observed by Chief Judge Swinford in Home Insurance...