Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co.

Decision Date08 March 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-54,READY-MIX,88-54
Citation770 P.2d 692
Parties52 Ed. Law Rep. 755, 10 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 705 CENTURYCOMPANY; Charles Ness and Gloria Ness, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. LOWER & COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant), Campbell County School District; Tom Barker, d/b/a Cooper Engineering & Material Testing; Rundquist & Hard, P.C.; and Chris Hard, individually, (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

H.W. Rasmussen, Badley & Rasmussen, Sheridan, for appellants.

Harold E. Meier, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The issue to be resolved in this case can be captured by stating the positions of the parties. Lower & Company (Lower) prevailed in the trial court on its position that the statute of frauds incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code, § 34-21-208(a), W.S.1977, prevents Century Ready-Mix Company and its principals, Charles and Gloria Ness, (Century) from pursuing claims based upon an alleged contract because, as a matter of law, the contract is not enforceable. Century's contention is that the law justifies supplementation of the purchase order issued by Lower in order to establish all of the terms of an enforceable contract. We hold that this controversy cannot be settled by applying only § 34-21-208(a). Century is entitled to rely upon information apart from the purchase order to establish the contract. It is apparent that there are genuine issues of material fact and that the summary judgment entered by the district court cannot be sustained. We reverse the summary judgment.

Century states the issue in this way:

"The district court erred by invalidating a 'requirements contract' contrary to sections 21-223 and 21-209 of the Wyoming Commercial Code."

Lower adds a pleading question and states the issues in this way:

"I. Did the District Court err in applying the Statute of Frauds to the dealings between Lower and Appellant?

"II. Is the defense of the Statute of Frauds waived by failure to plead specifically in the Answer when it is raised on a Motion for Summary Judgment?"

In 1986, the Campbell County School District decided to expand the high school building at Gillette. Competitive bids were obtained by the school board who then selected Lower as general contractor for the project. Lower had premised its successful bid upon bids received from various potential subcontractors, including Century, and it relied upon those bids in preparing its bid for the project. Lower chose Century to furnish the concrete needed to accomplish the job on the basis of Century's low subcontract bid. Century assumed, in submitting its bid, that it would deliver about 5,500 cubic yards of concrete. This quantity was approximately the quantity of concrete anticipated as being required for the expansion of the high school building.

After receiving advice that its bid had been accepted, Lower issued this purchase order to Century.

EXHIBIT 1

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

This is the only document which existed relating to the concrete for the job. It is critical to note that Lower did not include any specific quantity of concrete, measured in cubic yards or any other unit, that it would be purchasing. The only specific contract terms were the prices to be paid for the concrete and other materials when, and if, purchased. The purchase order, of course, does refer to the project and provides for delivery "as called for."

After work commenced, Century delivered several loads of concrete to the high school expansion job site. An independent testing laboratory tested the concrete and concluded that it did not measure up to the strength standards required by the school district. Century protested the result of those tests and obtained independent testing, at its own expense, which showed the concrete was within the required standards. Even so, the school district ordered Lower to "stop pouring," and compliance with that order would have resulted in a complete work stoppage. Lower then asked the school district if obtaining the concrete from another supplier would be an acceptable alternative. The school board agreed to this suggestion, and work on the expansion project continued. Century had not been involved in this decision and discovered it only when its loaded trucks were turned away from the job site. From that point on, the concrete was delivered by the new supplier. The contract dispute between Century and Lower followed.

The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment submitted by Lower. The argument that the contract claim by Century could not be sustained because the alleged contract did not comply with § 34-21-208(a), W.S.1977, was accepted. Century has appealed the order granting summary judgment.

Section 34-21-208(a), provides as follows:

"Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing."

The parties agree that the purchase order contemplated the sale of concrete for an amount in excess of $500; that the purchase order does constitute a writing within the statute; and that the purchase order is signed by an agent of Lower. The price terms are clear and unambiguous. The dispute focuses upon the phrase which reads "but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in the writing." The purchase order does not set forth any specific quantity of concrete.

Century points, however, to § 34-21-209, W.S.1977, which states, in pertinent part:

"(a) Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented:

"(i) By course of dealing or usage of trade (section 1-205 [§ 34-21-212] or by course of performance (section 2-208 [§ 34-21-215]); and

"(ii) By evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement."

Century then invokes the provisions of § 34-21-223, W.S.1977:

"(a) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded."

Century contends that, according to the usage in the trade, concrete generally is obtained by a purchase order such as this, and that the purchase order contemplates the requirements for the job. In connection with this argument, the provisions of § 34-21-124, W.S.1977, become significant. That statute provides, in pertinent part:

"(b) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity or observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts * *...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Wyoming Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Allstate Indem. Co.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • December 21, 1992
    ...P.2d 1306 (Wyo.1979); Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995 (Wyo.1978). Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692, 696 (Wyo.1989). Contractual provisions cannot rise above constitutional and statutory Tri-County Electric Association, Inc. v......
  • Smithco Engineering, Inc. v. International Fabricators, Inc.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • June 16, 1989
    ...Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corporation, 590 P.2d 1306, 1309 (Wyo.1979) (the statute involved was the U.C.C.); see Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692 (Wyo.1989). In two other instances, the court has noted that "laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract......
  • Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., READY-MIX
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1991
    ...Testing. We affirm the orders granting summary judgment. FACTS This case is before us a second time. In Century Ready-Mix Company v. Lower & Company, 770 P.2d 692 (Wyo.1989) (Century I ), we reversed summary judgment entered against Century and in favor of Lower & Company, the general contr......
  • B & W Glass, Inc. v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 10, 1992
    ...liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. Wyo.Stat. § 34.1-1-102(a) (1991); Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Lower & Co., 770 P.2d 692 (1989), appeal after remand sub nom. Century Ready-Mix Co. v. Campbell County School Dist., 816 P.2d 795 (Wyo.1991). Accordin......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT