CFM of Connecticut v. Chowdhury
Decision Date | 15 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 12406,12406 |
Citation | 38 Conn.App. 745,662 A.2d 1340 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | CFM OF CONNECTICUT v. Taufiqul CHOWDHURY et al. |
John Timbers, for appellant-appellee (plaintiff).
Frank G. Usseglio, with whom, on the brief, were Karen P. Blado and Medina K. Jett, for appellee-appellant (named defendant).
Before FOTI, LANDAU and HEIMAN, JJ.
The sole issue in this cross appeal by the defendant Taufiqul Chowdhury (defendant) is whether the trial court, Holzberg, J., improperly vacated an order of contempt and sanctions imposed by a coordinate trial court, Susco, J. 1
The following facts are relevant to our disposition of this case. In 1989, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant and 5 C's Corporation for breach of a franchise agreement and against 294 Farmington Realty Company and Sielev Associates for intentional interference with a contract. During the course of these proceedings, the defendant moved for sanctions against the plaintiff and its attorney, John Timbers, for bad faith pleading. 2 On August 31, 1990, the trial court, Susco, J., granted the motion for sanctions and ordered the plaintiff and Timbers personally to pay attorney's fees of $10,000 to the defendant. On December 31, 1990, upon a motion by the defendant, the trial court articulated its order, specifying that the $10,000 was to be paid by February 28, 1991. Timbers neither complied with nor appealed from the order.
The defendant thereafter moved the trial court to find Timbers in contempt of court for, inter alia, his failure to pay the $10,000 in attorney's fees. On March 18, 1993, the trial court, Holzberg, J., vacated Judge Susco's August 31, 1990 order after finding that no hearing had been held in support of the defendant's motion for sanctions pursuant to Fattibene v. Kealey, 18 Conn.App. 344, 558 A.2d 677 (1989). 3
The defendant subsequently cross appealed, arguing that because Judge Susco's August 31, 1990 sanctions order was a final judgment, the doctrine of res judicata barred Judge Holzberg from vacating it. In response, Timbers asserts that (1) the doctrine of res judicata does not bar relitigation in the same action, (2) the doctrine applies only to final judgments and not to interlocutory orders, as he characterizes the trial court's August 31, 1990 sanctions order, and (3) the law of the case doctrine, which is applicable, permits a trial court judge to depart from a ruling by a prior judge in the same case.
As a threshold matter, we conclude that the August 31, 1990 sanctions order was a final judgment pursuant to the test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). In Curcio, the Supreme Court held that Id. The August 31, 1990 order, as articulated on December 31, 1990, both concluded the matter of whether the plaintiff's and Timbers' pleadings were contemptuous and fixed the amount of sanctions at $10,000. No further trial court proceedings were anticipated that would eradicate the plaintiff's and Timbers' obligation to pay the $10,000. Therefore, the August 31, 1990 order constituted a final judgment. See In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 361, 572 A.2d 328, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990); Fattibene v. Kealey, 12 Conn.App. 212, 216, 530 A.2d 206 (1987).
In our resolution of this claim, we need not make use of the stepping stones of res judicata and law of the case, as suggested by the parties. Rather, we turn to the well established law that, Batory v. Bajor, 22 Conn.App. 4, 8, 575 A.2d 1042, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 812, 576 A.2d 541 (1990). Where Id., 22 Conn.App. at 9, 575 A.2d 1042.
General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 326 are applicable in this case because the contempt order was a civil order. The August 31, 1990 order was issued to vindicate the private rights of the defendant rather than the dignity and authority of the court. Dunham v. Dunham, 217 Conn. 24, 28 n. 3, 584 A.2d 445 (1991); Mays v. Mays, 193 Conn. 261, 265-66, 476 A.2d 562 (1984); DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 192 Conn. 271, 278, 471 A.2d 638 (1984); McTigue v. New London Education Assn., 164 Conn. 348, 352-53, 321 A.2d 462 (1973). Dunham v. Dunham, supra.
Following the August 31, 1990 sanctions order, neither the plaintiff nor Timbers filed a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment. Likewise, neither appealed the validity of the order. There is no question that the four month period set out in General Statutes § 52-212a and Practice Book § 326 had run by March 18, 1993, when Judge Holzberg vacated Judge Susco's sanctions order. Also, an examination of the record reveals that the parties did not waive the provisions of § 52-212a and § 326 or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court. While the trial court, Holzberg, J., conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion for contempt and separate application for a writ of quo warranto neither the trial court nor the parties addressed the validity of the August 31, 1990 sanctions order. For these reasons, we conclude that Judge Holzberg lacked jurisdiction to vacate the previously imposed sanctions order. 6
The portion of the judgment vacating the August 31, 1990 sanctions order is reversed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
1 This cross appeal survives the original appeal in this case, which was filed by the plaintiff. We dismissed the appeal on the grounds of untimeliness pursuant to Practice Book § 4009 and the plaintiff's failure to comply with a nisi order issued by the court.
2 Previously, the trial court had ordered the plaintiff to submit a memorandum of law on the question of...
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