Lord v. Mansfield

• Decision Date: 25 August 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. 17122,18035,s. 17122
• Citation: 717 A.2d 267,50 Conn.App. 21
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Iris W. LORD v. Paul H. MANSFIELD et al.

Page 267

717 A.2d 267

50 Conn.App. 21

Iris W. LORD v. Paul H. MANSFIELD et al.

Nos. 17122, 18035.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 8, 1998.

Decided Aug. 25, 1998.

Max F. Brunswick, with whom, on the brief, was John R. Williams, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).

Frederick W. Krug, Waterbury, for appellees (defendants).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, C.J., and FOTI and DALY, JJ.

FOTI, Judge.

In the first of these consolidated appeals, the plaintiff appeals from the trial court's judgment rendered in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's complaint and on the defendants' counterclaim. The second appeal is the plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's judgment of civil contempt. In the first appeal (17122), the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) excluded evidence, (2) limited the plaintiff's testimony, (3) refused to hear rebuttal evidence, (4) denied the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint and (5) concluded that the plaintiff's actions were extreme and outrageous, intentionally inflicting emotional distress on the defendants. In the second appeal (18035), the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly awarded a compensatory amount to the defendants after the plaintiff's actions were found to be in contempt of a court order.

I

The parties are owners of adjoining parcels of land in Woodbury. The plaintiff commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring that she had acquired, by adverse possession, a strip of land between the common boundary of the two properties and a split rail fence about six to eight feet from that boundary. Her complaint also sought damages for the defendants' intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with this property dispute. The defendants disputed the claims and filed a counterclaim asking the court to confirm the boundary line as they requested, and to award damages for the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On April 8, 1997, after a lengthy trial, the trial court filed its twenty-two page memorandum of decision finding against the plaintiff on her complaint and for the defendants on their counterclaim. Each defendant was awarded $15,000 in compensatory damages and the court further granted the defendants a permanent injunction in accordance with their request for relief. ¹ With respect to the defendants' claim for punitive damages for the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial court concluded that such were warranted and appropriate and scheduled a supplemental hearing on April 25, 1997, "for evidence about the defendants' litigation expenses."

On April 25, 1997, the plaintiff filed her appeal from "the memorandum of decision and judgment dated April 8, 1997." Thereafter, on July 15, 1997, the trial court filed its seven page memorandum of decision awarding the defendants punitive damages of $1815.

The trial court's original judgment of April 8, 1997, disposed of both counts of the plaintiff's complaint and, therefore, constitutes an appealable final judgment as to the complaint. Practice Book (1998 Rev.) § 61-2. ² The plaintiff's first four issues on appeal relate to that judgment and may be reviewed by this court. Her fifth issue, however, challenges the trial court's judgment on the defendants' counterclaim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because this appeal was taken prior to the July 15, 1997 determination as to the amount of punitive damages due the defendants on that claim, we must, as a preliminary matter, decide whether an appealable final judgment had been rendered on the counterclaim at the time the appeal was taken. The parties were notified ³ and addressed this issue, which appears to be one of first impression, at oral argument.

Generally, a judgment as to liability only that leaves the amount of damages unresolved is not an appealable final judgment. Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 197 Conn. 82, 84, 495 A.2d 1063 (1985). "It is well established that appellate courts in this state do not have jurisdiction to entertain appeals not taken from final judgments. See General Statutes § 52-263; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983). The lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that mandates dismissal." Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). While a judgment is not final where the trial court has yet to rule on a claim for prejudgment interest; Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., 222 Conn. 211, 214-15, 608 A.2d 682 (1992); a judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even if the recoverability or amount of counsel fees remains to be determined. Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 523, 544 A.2d 634 (1988).

In distinguishing prejudgment interest from attorney's fees, the Balf court concluded that prejudgment interest was part of the plaintiff's compensation and not collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action. The court stated that "unlike attorney's fees, which at common law were regarded as an element of costs and therefore not part of the merits judgment ... prejudgment interest traditionally has been considered part of the compensation due [the] plaintiff. Second, unlike a request for attorney's fees or a motion for costs, a motion for discretionary prejudgment interest does not rais[e] issues wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action ... nor does it require an inquiry wholly separate from the decision on the merits.... In deciding if and how much prejudgment interest should be granted, a district court must examine--or in the case of a postjudgment motion, reexamine--matters encompassed within the merits of the underlying action.... Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, [489 U.S. 169, 175-76, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) ]. Third, the conclusion that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment interest postpones the finality of a judgment on the merits helps further the important goal of avoiding piecemeal appellate review of judgments. Id., [at] 177 ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., supra, 222 Conn. at 214-15, 608 A.2d 682.

The Supreme Court in Balf held that the plaintiff's right to recovery of prejudgment interest "is part of its claim to be made whole. Whether it succeeds will depend upon an assessment of the underlying merits of the transaction between the parties. An appeal after a resolution of all the issues will afford an appellate court a better opportunity to review in its entirety the alleged 'wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's full damages, as well as other matters of equity bearing on the merits of the litigation.' [Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, supra, 489 U.S. at 177, 109 S.Ct. 987]." Id., at 215, 608 A.2d 682. Our inquiry, then, is whether punitive damages represent part of the compensation due the plaintiff, as part of her "claim to be made whole." We conclude that they do.

Punitive damages are limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 825-27, 614 A.2d 414 (1992). Although attorney's fees may be the primary component of litigation expenses, and have been regarded as an element of costs and not part of the "merits judgment"; Balf Co. v. Spera Construction Co., supra, 222 Conn. at 214, 608 A.2d 682; punitive damages serve a different end and have a different purpose than attorney's fees. Some purposes are clearly not intended to be for compensation to the plaintiff, i.e., " 'to vindicate the public interest, not that of a particular plaintiff' "; Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 221 Conn. 674, 679, 607 A.2d 370 (1992), quoting M. Wheeler, "The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures," 69 Va. L.Rev. 269, 292 (1983) (punitive damages awarded under CUTPA); "not merely to deter a particular defendant from future misconduct but to deter others from committing similar wrongs." Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 562-63, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989) (punitive damages awarded as to loss of consortium claim).

Our Supreme Court, however, has observed: "In Waterbury Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., [193 Conn. 208, 477 A.2d 988 (1984) ] ... [w]e affirmed the continuing viability of a long line of cases holding that common law punitive damages serve primarily to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries and, thus, are properly limited to the plaintiff's litigation expenses less taxable costs.... We remain convinced that a rule limiting punitive damages awards to the expenses of litigation less taxable costs 'fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by a jury.' [Id., at 238, 477 A.2d 988]." (Citations omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, supra, 223 Conn. at 827, 614 A.2d 414. Punitive damages in Connecticut are not designed "to punish the defendant for his offense but rather to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries." Miller v. Drouin, 183 Conn. 189, 190, 438 A.2d 863 (1981); see also Virgo v. Lyons, 209 Conn. 497, 503-504, 551 A.2d 1243 (1988); Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 538, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111 Conn. 575, 578, 150 A. 692 (1930).

Because we conclude that punitive damages are designed to compensate the injured party fully, we also conclude, as in Balf, that judgment is not final under these circumstances. We therefore dismiss that portion of the plaintiff's appeal challenging the judgment on the defendants' counterclaim.

II

The plaintiff also appeals from the judgment rendered for the defendants on her complaint. The plaintiff does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact. Additionally, the plaintiff does not contest the trial court's ultimate conclusion that she was unable to prove continuous adverse use of the...