Chad A. Post v. Jarrod C. Harber
| Decision Date | 16 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | 01-LW-0691,00CA541 |
| Citation | 2001 Ohio 2401 |
| Parties | CHAD A. POST, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. JARROD C. HARBER, et al., Defendants-Appellees Case |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Todd O. Rosenberg, 6110 Parkland Blvd Mayfield Heights, Ohio 44124
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES: Steven G. LaForge, 250 East Broad Street Suite 900, Columbus, Ohio 43215
Mark A Preston, 280 Yoctangee Parkway, Chillicothe, Ohio 45601
This is an appeal from a Vinton County Common Pleas Court summary judgment entered in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) and Ohio Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers),[1] defendants below and appellees herein.
Chad A. Post, Ricky E. Post, and Judy E. Post, plaintiffs below and appellants herein, raise the following assignment of error:
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT OHIO LAW ALLOWS INSURERS TO LIMIT UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE TO THE SINGLE PER PERSON LIMIT WHEN ONLY ONE PERSON HAS SUFFERED BODILY INJURY."
The facts in the case at bar are relatively undisputed. On October 9, 1996, Chad was a passenger in Lloyd Tatman's vehicle. Jarrod Harber's vehicle hit Tatman's vehicle, causing Chad to sustain injuries. Harber allegedly proximately caused the accident.[2]
On April 5, 1999, appellants filed a complaint against Tatman and the appellees. Appellants included claims for negligence, for loss of consortium on behalf of Chad's parents, Ricky and Judy, and for underinsured motorists benefits under the Farmers and the State Farm policies. Appellants, State Farm, and Farmers subsequently filed motions for summary judgment requesting the trial court to determine the insurance companies' respective liabilities.
The following facts relating to the parties' insurance policies are undisputed: (1) Dairyland Insurance Company insured Harber under a liability bond in the amount of $12,500; (2) Tatman was a named insured under the Farmers's automobile insurance policy and Chad fell within the definition of an insured under Tatman's policy; (3) Tatman's insurance policy with Farmers provided uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident; (4) State Farm insured Chad under an automobile insurance policy issued to his father, Ricky; (5) Ricky's insurance policy with State Farm provided uninsured/underinsured motorists coverage in the amount of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per accident; and (6) Ricky, Judy and Chad fall within the definition of an "insured" under the insurance policies.
State Farm advanced appellants the $12,500 that could be available under Harber's insurance. Farmers set off the $12,500 that State Farm advanced as coverage available under Harber's insurance and paid appellants $12,500 under its underinsured motorists coverage (the $25,000 per person limit less the $12,500 available to appellants under Harber's insurance). State Farm has not paid any amounts to appellants under appellants' automobile liability policy, but represents that $25,000 remains available to appellants (the $50,000 per person limit, less the $12,500 Farmers paid, less the $12,500 State Farm advanced on behalf of Harber's insurer).
In their motion for summary judgment, appellants raised three issues. First, appellants argued that each parent's loss of consortium claim was subject to the per person limits contained in the State Farm and the Farmers insurance policies. According to appellants, each of their loss of consortium claims individually carries a separate per person limit under each policy, and therefore, Ricky and Judy individually could recover up to $25,000 under the Farmers policy and up to $50,000 under the State Farm policy, minus any set off.
Second, appellants argued that the amount State Farm and Farmers may set off against their underinsured motorist coverage provisions is the amount that each appellant individually received under the respective policies. According to appellants, the amount of set off is limited to the amount that each insured individually receives for his or her loss. Appellants asserted that the Ohio Revised Code does not permit insurance companies to set off amounts that may be available for payment under another insurance policy, i.e., the other applicable policy limits. Rather, appellants asserted, the Ohio Revised Code only permits insurance companies to set off amounts that an insurer actually has paid individually to each insured under an insurance policy.
Third, appellants argued that R.C. 3937.18 is unconstitutional.
In its motion for summary judgment, Farmers argued that the parents' loss of consortium claims are collectively subject to the per person limit specified in its policy. Farmers asserted that its policy specifically limits all claims arising out of a single individual's bodily injury to the per person limit. Moreover, Farmers argued, Ohio law permits insurance companies to limit all claims arising out of any one individual's bodily injury to the per person limit. Farmers noted that R.C. 3937.18(H) specifically permits insurance companies to limit all claims arising out of a single individual's bodily injury to the per person limit. Farmers further argued that Ohio law permits it to set off the amount available for payment, as opposed to the amount an insured actually recovered, under another automobile insurance policy.
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm argued that: (1) each parent's loss of consortium claims is not individually subject to the per person limit set forth in the State Farm policy; (2) it is entitled to set off against its per person coverage limits the amounts available for payment under Harber's and Tatman's policies; and (3) the per person limit set forth in the State Farm policy defines its underinsured motorist coverage liability limit for the parents' loss of consortium claims and for Chad's bodily injury claim.
On February 9, 2000, the trial court granted appellees' motions for summary judgment. The trial court determined that the parents' loss of consortium claims were not subject to a separate per person limit. Rather, the trial court determined that appellees' insurance policies validly limited the loss of consortium claims to the per person limit. The court further found that appellees are entitled to set off the amounts available for payment under other insurance policies. Thus, the trial court determined that Farmers is entitled to set off the $12,500 that is available for payment under Harber's insurance policy, and that State Farm is entitled to set off the $12,500 available for payment under Harber's policy and the $12,500 available for payment under the Farmers' policy. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
In their sole assignment of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting appellees summary judgment. Specifically, appellants assert that the trial court incorrectly found that Ohio law permits insurers to limit underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage to the single per person limit when only one person has suffered bodily injury. Within their assignment of error, appellants raise three issues: (1) whether the parents' loss of consortium claims are individually subject to the per person limit of the UIM coverage; (2) whether Ohio law permits insurance companies to set off, under UIM policy provisions, the amounts available for payment under another insurance policy, as opposed to the amounts actually received by each insured under other applicable insurance policies; and (3) whether S.B. 20 denies consortium claimants constitutional rights. We will address each issue in turn.
When reviewing a trial court's decision regarding a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court conducts a de novo review. See, e.g., Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241, 245. Accordingly, an appellate court must independently review the record to determine if summary judgment was appropriate and need not defer to the trial court's decision. See Brown v. Scioto Bd. of Commrs. (1993) 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153, 1157; Morehead v. Conley (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 409, 411-12, 599 N.E.2d 786, 788. In determining whether a trial court properly granted a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court must review the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment as set forth in Civ.R. 56, as well as the applicable law.
Civ.R. 56(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
* * * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party's favor.
Thus a trial court may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless the evidence before the court demonstrates that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such...
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