Chadwick v. Sullivan
| Citation | 313 P.3d 837 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | 109,181.,Nos. 109,179,109,185,109,191,s. 109,179 |
| Parties | Max C. CHADWICK, Appellant, v. Shawn SULLIVAN, Secretary of the Kansas Department on Aging and Disabilities, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kansas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Pawnee District Court; Bruce T. Gatterman, judge.
Max C. Chadwick, pro se appellant.
Corrine E. Johnson, litigation counsel, of Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, for appellee.
Before BRUNS, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER and POWELL, JJ.
Max C. Chadwick, a civilly committed sexually violent predator, is a patient in the custody of the Secretary of the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services (Secretary) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act, K.S.A. 59–29a01 et seq. During 2012, Chadwick filed four petitions for habeas corpus under K .S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. The district court stayed the cases and ordered him to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to proceeding in the district court. Prior to the expiration of the stay order, Chadwick filed motions for relief that were ultimately denied by the district court. Although his habeas corpus petitions were not dismissed, Chadwick filed the present appeal.
On appeal, Chadwick contends that the enactment of K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24 excuses him from his obligation to exhaust appropriate administrative remedies prior to filing a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Secretary disagrees with Chadwick's contention. Moreover, the Secretary argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over Chadwick's appeal because no final order was entered by the district court. We agree with the Secretary, and we dismiss Chadwick's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. During August and September 2012, Chadwick—who is a patient in the Sexual Predator Treatment Program at Larned State Hospital—filed four petitions in Pawnee County District Court seeking writs of habeas corpus pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. In late September and early October 2012, the district court filed an order in each case staying the proceedings for 90 days pending proof that Chadwick exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501.
Before the expiration of the 90 days, Chadwick filed a motion for relief in each case. He argued that the provisions of K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24—which was enacted by the 2012 Kansas Legislature—exempted him from the requirement that he exhaust appropriate administrative remedies prior to seeking a writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. On December 5, 2012, the district court denied each of Chadwick's requests for relief. It did not, however, dismiss Chadwick's habeas corpus petitions. Shortly thereafter, Chadwick appealed.
The Secretary contends that there is no jurisdiction over this appeal because the district court did not dismiss Chadwick's habeas corpus petitions. The right to appeal is statutory. See Kansas Medical Mut. Ins. Co. v. Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, 609–10, 244 P.3d 642 (2010); Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476, 480–81, 153 P.3d 523 (2007). Thus, “[w]hether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited.” Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶ 1.
Under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–2102(a)(4), we have appellate jurisdiction over a “final decision in any action.” A final decision is one that In re T.S.W., 294 Kan. 423, 433, 276 P.3d 133 (2012).
Here, the district court stayed Chadwick's habeas corpus actions for 90 days until he exhausted his administrative remedies. But instead of exhausting his administrative remedies, Chadwick filed motions for relief in the district court, contending that K.S.A.2012 Supp. 59–29a24(d) removed any exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus actions filed pursuant to K.S.A.2012 Supp. 60–1501. Although the district court denied the motions for relief, it did not dismiss Chadwick's habeas corpus petitions. Likewise, nothing in the record on appeal reveals that the district court ever terminated the stay.
Generally, a stay is not a final decision. See Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 289–90, 200 P.3d 467 (2009) (); Turner v. Steele, 47 Kan.App.2d 976, Syl. ¶ 11, 282 P.3d 632 (2012) (); Kansas Pipeline Partnership v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 22 Kan.App.2d 410, 418, 916 P.2d 76,rev. denied 260 Kan. 994 (1996) (). Accordingly, we find that neither the stay nor the denial of Chadwick's motions for relief constituted final decisions for the purpose of appeal.
We recognize that the collateral order doctrine is a narrow and sparingly used exception to the final order rule. “[T]o be collaterally appealable, the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Svaty, 291 Kan. 597, Syl. ¶¶ 8–9, 612. An order is “effectively unreviewable” when it implicates “ ‘rights which could be lost or irreparably harmed if immediate review were denied.’ “ Reed v. Hess, 239 Kan. 46, 54, 716 P.2d 555 (1986) (quoting Coleman v. Sherwood Medical Industries, 746 F.2d 445, 446 [8th Cir.1984] ).
Here, we find that the first two factors...
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