Turner v. Steele

• Decision Date: 20 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 105,552.,105,552.
• Citation: 282 P.3d 632,47 Kan.App.2d 976
• Parties: Dan E. TURNER, et al., Appellees/Cross-appellants, v. Larry STEELE, et al., Appellees. (First Tribune Insurance Agency, Inc., and Western Plains Funds, Inc.), Appellants/Cross-appellees.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

47 Kan.App.2d 976

282 P.3d 632

Dan E. TURNER, et al., Appellees/Cross-appellants,

v.Larry STEELE, et al., Appellees.

(First Tribune Insurance Agency, Inc., and Western Plains Funds, Inc.), Appellants/Cross-appellees.

No. 105,552.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

July 20, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Standing is a jurisdictional question whereby a court determines whether a person has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant invocation of jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf.

2. Standing implicates a court's jurisdiction to hear a case, and therefore, the existence of standing is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review.

3. Purchasers at a sheriff's sale become parties and are entitled to file motions related to the sale, the confirmation of the sale, or other matters relating to the property. The courts recognize that purchasers have a right to be heard before any order is made affecting their rights. Holders of property rights are entitled to due process of law before their property is taken.

4. A sheriff's deed is sufficient evidence of the legality of the sheriff's sale. A sheriff's deed vests title to the property in the purchaser. The burden of proving the invalidity of a sheriff's deed is on the party challenging its validity.

5. Title owners of real property have standing to request a delay of a sheriff's sale and/or the subsequent confirmation of the sale because such actions could result in a cloud on their title or otherwise negatively affect their title to the real property.

6. Intervention in a lawsuit is subject to a determination of law and fact. An appellate court reviews the factual findings made by the district court under a substantial competent evidence standard and reviews de novo whether those findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions.

7. Substantial competent evidence possesses both relevance and substance and provides a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can be reasonably determined.

8. A judgment from a federal foreclosure law suit that is filed in a Kansas state court is a foreign judgment under K.S.A. 60–3001.

9. A judgment in a civil lawsuit becomes a lien on the debtor's property located within the county where the judgment is rendered. A judgment registered in a district court of another county becomes a lien on the debtor's real property in the registering county. However, K.S.A. 60–601 only allows executions on the judgment to be issued from the court in which the judgment is rendered.

10. The staying of proceedings in a state court pending determination of a lawsuit in a federal court is not a matter of right but rests on the rule of comity and involves the exercise of discretion, which will not be interfered with unless clearly abused. A similar comity principle applies when there are cases pending in different county courts within the state.

11. A stay order does not terminate a lawsuit; it merely postpones the disposition. Like a continuance, the question of whether to stay a lawsuit is largely discretionary with the court.Casey R. Law, of Wise & Reber, L.C., of McPherson, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Richard F. Hayse and Maren K. Ludwig, of Morris, Laing, Evans, Brock, & Kennedy, Chtd., of Topeka, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., MARQUARDT and ARNOLD–BURGER, JJ.

MARQUARDT, J.

In 2000, the law firm of Turner and Turner and its principals, Dan and Phillip Turner (Turners), obtained a default judgment in Shawnee County District Court in a contract action against former clients who are members of the Steele family and various Steele family businesses (the Steeles). The Turners had their judgment transcribed in the Greeley County District Court in June 2000. After filing several affidavits of renewal, in 2010 the Turners filed a praecipe in Shawnee County District Court for a writ of special execution seeking to enforce their 2000 judgment. The writ directed the Greeley County Sheriff to attach several parcels of real property located in Greeley County and to commence a sheriff's sale of the attached real property.

Following issuance of this writ, First Tribune Insurance Agency, Inc. and Western Plains Funds, Inc. (Landowners), who had redeemed and/or purchased the real property following a mortgage foreclosure sale in 2002, filed motions to set aside (stay) the scheduled sheriff's sale and to intervene until their Greeley County quiet title action against the Turners was resolved. The Landowners appeal the district court's order dismissing their motions for lack of standing and from the order confirming the sheriff's sale. The Landowners also appeal from the Shawnee County District Court's refusal to extend the post-sale redemption period until the merits of the Greeley County quiet title action was resolved.

The Turners cross-appeal, contending the Landowners are prohibited from challenging the denial of the Landowners' motion to intervene in the Shawnee County case under the doctrine of invited error.

The Steeles have been the subject of litigation in state and federal district courts in Kansas since at least the late 1980's. See, e.g., In re Steele Cattle, Inc., Nos. 94–1250 through 1253–PFK, 1996 WL 42073 (D.Kan.1996) (unpublished opinion); Steele v. Guardianship & Conservatorship of Crist, 251 Kan. 712, 714–16, 840 P.2d 1107 (1992). This appeal concerns the title to Greeley County real estate that once belonged to the Steeles.

Facts

In October 1999, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company filed a mortgage foreclosure action in the United States District Court of Kansas in a case captioned John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Steele, Case No. 99–1406–JTM. The defendants in the lawsuit were various members of the Steeles. John Hancock sought to foreclose mortgages on property the Steeles owned in Greeley County, Kansas. See also John Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Steele, No. 90,943, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2004 WL 794532 (Kan.App.2004) (unpublished opinion) (discussing federal foreclosure case in a different dispute), rev. denied 278 Kan. 845 (2004). At the time the federal foreclosure action was filed in 1999, John Hancock filed a notice of its pending action in Greeley County as a lis pendens notice under 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994) and Kansas law.

In April 1999, the Turners filed a civil lawsuit in Shawnee County, Case No. 99–CV–544 against the Steeles and their businesses. The Turners claimed the Steeles hired them to provide legal services in various civil and bankruptcy matters between 1988 and 1998. Under the terms of their employment contract, the Turners alleged the Steeles still owed them approximately $560,000. After the Steeles failed to respond to the lawsuit, the Turners obtained a default judgment in excess of $632,000. The court filed its journal entry on May 17, 2000. The Turners assert that their judgment was transcribed in Greeley County, Case No. 00–C–09, on or about June 26, 2000.

Meanwhile, John Hancock's federal foreclosure action proceeded to a default judgmentin that case on May 31, 2001. John Hancock filed a notice of the final judgment in Greeley County in Case No. 01–C–10 within 2 weeks.

On July 13, 2001, the United States District Court for Kansas issued a praecipe for an order of sale of the real property identified in the John Hancock foreclosure proceeding and directed the Greeley County Sheriff to conduct a sale of four separate parcels of real estate. Notice of the praecipe for the sale was mailed to various attorneys, members of the Steele family, and various other individuals and businesses. One of the attorneys who was sent the notice was Jim Miles of Garden City, Kansas.

A sheriff's sale of the real estate was held in January 2002. Of relevance here, the property identified as Count I property was described as:

“Southeast Quarter (SE/4) of Section Seventeen (17), Township Sixteen (16) South, Range Forty (40) West of the 6th p.m., except a tract containing 2.68 acres, more or less, described as follows: Commencing at a point 50 ft. west and 30 ft. north of the southeast corner thereof, thence West 395 ft., thence North 295 ft., thence East 395 ft., thence South 295 Ft. to the point of beginning;

“West Half (W/2) of Section Ten (10), Township Seventeen (17) South, Range Forty-one (41);

“Southwest Quarter (SW/4) of Section Two (2), Township Seventeen (17) South, Range Forty-two (42);

“Northeast Quarter (NE/4) of Section Six (6), Township Nineteen (19) South, Range Forty-two (42); and

“West Half (W/2) of Section Twenty-four (24), Township Nineteen (19) South, Range Forty-three (43), all West of the 6th P.M.”

The real estate identified as Count II property was described as:

“The North Half (N/2) of Section Thirty-five (35), the West Half (W/2) of Section Twenty-five (25), and the Southeast Quarter (SE/4) of Section Twenty-five (25), all in Township Sixteen (16) South, Range Forty-two (42) West of the Sixth Principal Meridian.”

At the 2002 sheriff's sale, John Hancock purchased the real properties identified as Count III and IV property. Two other parties purchased the real estate identified as Count I and II.

In April 2002, the Greeley County District Court issued an order confirming the sheriff's sale in the John Hancock case. The court set a redemption period for the Count I property of 3 months and a redemption period for Count II property of 12 months.

In May 2002, the rights to redeem the Count I property were assigned to Schulte Farms, Inc., Dennis L. Schulte, Charles H. Schulte, and Darvin Meurisse; the assignment was recorded in Greeley County. Shortly thereafter, these parties redeemed the Count I property and a sheriff's deed was issued to them. Several months later, Western Plains Funds, Inc. purchased the Count II property from the Schultes and Meurisse.

In October 2002, the redemption rights to the Count II property were assigned to First Tribune...